Ekonomide Modeller ve Açıklamalar

Bu makale ekonomideki açıklamaların doğasını ve statüsünü ele almaktadır. Ekonomistler açıklama verirken ve öndeyide bulunurken temel olarak ekono-mik modelleri kullanırlar. Modeller Phillips makinesi gibi fiziksel temsiller şek-linde olabileceği gibi, çoğunlukla grafikler, diagramlar, matematiksel denklem-ler olarak ele alınırlar. Ekonomistlerin sıklıkla kullandığı modeller ise matema-tiksel olanlardır. Höristik, bilişsel, pragmatik rollerinin yanında açıklama verme işinde de modeller birçok farklı bilim pratiğinde yer tutmaya başlamıştır. Bu bağlamda bu makalade ekonomik açıklamalar, ekonomik modeller ve ekonomik modellerin doğasına ilişkin literatürde yer alan görüşleri inceleyerek ekonomist-lerin pratiğine odaklanıldığında ekonomik modellerin de fiili nedensel açıklama-lar verebildikleri ve ekonomideki açıklamaların diğer disiplinlerdeki açıklama-lardan tür değil derece olarak farklılaştıklarını göstermeyi amaçlıyorum.

Moels and Explanations in Economy

This article examines the nature and status of explanations provided by economics. In predicting and providing explanations, economists basically make use of models. Although models can be thought of as physical representa-tions such as the Phillips Machine, more often than not they are taken to be graphics, diagrams, and mathematical equations. Frequently economists use mathematical models. Apart from their heuristic, cognitive, and pragmatical roles, models loom large in providing explanations in many of the scientific practices. Accordingly, in this article, by taking into consideration the views currently on offer regarding the economic models, my purpose is to show that when focusing the economist’s practice, it could be seen that economic models at least sometimes can provide us with actual explanations and these explana-tions differ from those found in other disciplines, not in kind but degree.

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