Saddam Dönemi İstihbarat ve Güvenlik Örgütlerinin Irak'taki Sünni Direnişe Etkisi

Saddam Hüseyin daha iktidara gelmeden istihbarat ve güvenlik örgütlerine önem vermeye başladı. Özellikle Sünni Araplardan oluşturduğu geniş güvenlik ve istihbarat ağı, rejimin herhangi bir iç müdahaleye maruz kalmadan 2003’e kadar ayakta kalmasını sağladı. Ancak 2003’te başlayan müdahale süreci, sadece Saddam ve yakın çevresinin devrilmesine değil; bu rejimde önemli görevlerde bulunan Sünni Arapların da sistemden dışlanmasına neden oldu. Bu nedenle farklı amaçları olsa da Amerikan işgaline karşı olma noktasında birleşen Sünni Araplar, gösterdikleri silahlı direnişte geçmişteki tecrübelerinden faydalanma yoluna gitmektedir. Bu bağlamda çalışma, Irak’taki direniş hareketini bütüncül olarak ele almak yerine sadece Sünni direniş üzerinde yoğunlaşarak, Saddam dönemi istihbarat ve güvenlik örgütlerinin Irak’taki Sünni direnişe etkisini, söz konusu örgütlerin yapısını ve Sünni direnişin doğasını dikkate alarak incelemektedir.

The Effects of the Security and Intelligence Organizations of the Saddam Era on the Sunni Resistance in Iraq

Before coming to power, Saddam Hussein already gave importance to intelligence and security apparatus. Extensive intelligence and security network that was formed especially from Sunni Arabs enabled the Saddam regime live against the domestic threats until 2003. However, the intervention process started in 2003 not only caused overthrown of Saddam and his inner circle from power; but also caused exclusion of Sunni Arabs from the system who took important posts in the former regime. Even though they have different aims, Sunni Arabs coincide on the expulsion of American troops from Iraqi soil and benefit from their past experiences. In this context instead of taking into account the resistance as whole, the study is only focusing on the Sunni resistance and examines the influence of Saddam era’s security and intelligence apparatus upon the Sunni resistance by considering organizational structure of those apparatus and the nature of the Sunni resistance.

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