BİRLEŞİK KRALLIK ANAYASASI’NDA YÜRÜTMENİN PROROGASYON İMTİYAZI VE YÜKSEK MAHKEMENİN 24 EYLÜL 2019 TARİHLİ CHERRY/MILLER KARARI

24 Eylül 2019’da Birleşik Krallık Yüksek Mahkemesi Cherry/Millerkararında Başbakan Boris Johnson’ın Kraliçe’ye sunduğu Parlamentoçalışmalarının 11 Eylül-14 Ekim 2019 arasında durdurulması tavsiyesinive ilgili Konsey kararını hukuka aykırı bulmuş ve hükümsüzlüğünekarar vermiştir. Bu dava ile yürütmenin prorogasyon yetkisi, BirleşikKrallık anayasa tarihinde ilk kez yargısal uyuşmazlığa konu olmuştur.Yargıçların vereceği karar, gerek diğer Kraliyet imtiyazlarının yargısalrejiminin gelişim seyri gerekse Brexit sürecinde değer kaybı yaşayanParlamentonun anayasal fonksiyonlarının yeniden hatırlanması içinhususi bir önemi haizdi. Bu makalede, Birleşik Krallık Anayasası’ndakiprorogasyon kurumunun normsal sınıflandırması, mahiyeti, etkileri, bağlıolduğu yürütme yetkisi, kanunlarla ilişkisi ve yargısal rejimi ele alınacaktır.Ardından Yüksek Mahkemenin makalenin diğer odak noktasını teşkileden Cherry/Miller kararı incelenecektir. Bu kararı ülke anayasal tarihibakımından fevkalade kılacak nokta, yürütmenin prorogasyon yetkisininsınırları tartışılırken sadece kanunların değil Parlamentonun egemenliğive yürütmenin Parlamentoya hesap verme sorumluluğu ilkelerinin deölçüt norm olarak ele alınmasıdır. Bugüne kadar biliyorduk ki özelliklecommon law geleneğinde Parlamento ile Hükûmet arasındaki güç dengemekanizması ve yürütmenin yasamaya karşı olan sorumluluğu siyasi alanı ilgilendirir. Kanaatimizce bu karar Parlamentonun egemenliğive yürütmenin sorumluluğunu basit birer anayasal teamül meselesiolmaktan çıkarıp işlemin hükümsüzlüğüne karar kıldıracak kuvvetteanayasal ilkeler seviyesine çıkarmıştır. Kararın yüksek profilli bir kararolma ihtimali buradaki yargılama muhakemesine dayanmaktadır.

The Prerogative of Prorogation in the British Constitution and the Cherry/Miller Case, Dated 24 September 2019, of the Supreme Court

In Cherry/Miller case, dated 24 September 2019, the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom found unlawful and declared void the advice of Boris Johnson to the Queen to prorogue parliament from 11 September to 14 October and the relevant Order of Council. It was the first time that the power to prorogue had been subject to judicial scrutiny. The ruling to be given had already appeared highly crucial considering the judicial history of the royal prerogatives and the already damaged perception of Parliament among the public during the course of Brexit. This article aims to argue the power to prorogue within the hierarchy of norms, the broader executive power to which it is associated, and its judicial treatment. As the other major point to concentrate on in the article, the ruling of the Supreme Court on Cherry/Miller will be examined along with those of the first instance proceedings. What would make intriguing the Court’s decision is that not only the statutes but also parliamentary sovereignty and accountability are discussed to be the legal criteria in deciding the lawful extent of the prerogative of prorogation. Until quite recently, it was widely accepted that the relationship between Parliament and the executive, and the responsibility of the later to the former are political issues, particularly in the common law traditions. That said, we believed that this decision uplifts parliamentary sovereignty and accountability to the point where they will be from now on treated as ‘constitutional principles’ rather than merely ‘constitutional conventions’ anymore, to the extent that they will enable courts to nullify the executive decisions/actions at stake. It is in this sense that the decision seems to be likely among the high profile cases in future.

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