ERSİN NAİL SAĞDIÇ, İBRAHİM BAKIRTAŞ, Bilal YILDIZ

Oylama gücü ve Türkiye büyük millet meclisi'nin oylama güç indekslerinin ölçümü: 1987-2011

Bu çalışmanın amacı, oylama gücünün kavramsal ve teorik temellerini açıklamak ve 1987-2011 yılları arasında, Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi’ndeki iktidar partileri, koa- lisyonlar ve ana muhalefet partilerinin sahip olduğu oylama güçlerini ortaya koymaktır. Politik karar alma sürecindeki bu aktörlerin oylama güçleri, meclisteki günlük hareket- lenmeler ve nitelikli oy çokluğu dikkate alınarak ormalize Edilmiş Banzhaf Đndeksi’yle ölçülmüştür. Hesaplanan değerler zaman serileri haline dönüştürülerek, tablolar ve grafikler şeklinde raporlanmıştır. Grafik ve tablolar Türkiye’de politik hayatın yakın geçmişe kadar ne ölçüde parçalanmış ve istikrarsız olduğunu göstermektedir.

Voting power and the measurement of voting power indices of grand national assembly of Turkey: 1987-2011

This study aims to explain the conceptual and theoretical foundations of vot- ing power, and to reveal the distribution of power among the ruling parties, coalitions and main opposition parties in the Grand ational Assembly of Turkey during 1987- 2011. The voting power of these decision-making actors has been measured by ormal- ized Banzhaf Power Index with respect to daily representative mobility and qualified majority rule. The computed values have been reported in the form of graphs and tables after being transformed into time series. Graphs and tables show to what extent the Turkish political life was unstable and fragmented until recent past.

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