Merkez bankalarının bağımsızlığı ekseninde Türkiye Cumhuriyet Merkez Bankası

Merkez bankası bağımsızlığı, para politikasını, siyasetçilerin ve dolayısıyla demokratik sürecin kontrolünün ötesine taşıyan ve neoliberal yönetsel reform sürecinin önemli bir uğrağı olan bir olgudur. Bağımsızlığı savunan görüşler bu kurumların, kendi çıkarları peşinde olduğu savunulan siyasetçilerin müdahalelerinden uzakta şeffaflık ve hesap verebilirlik gibi 'yönetişim' uygulamalarının eşliğinde para politikasını yürütmeleriyle enflasyonun düşeceğini öngörmektedir. Bu çalışma, ussallığa dayalı teknik bir yönetsel iyileştirme gibi gösterilen merkez bankası bağımsızlığı taleplerinin tarihsel bağlam ve ideolojiler çerçevesinde çözümlenmesi gerektiğini ileri sürmektedir. Bu çerçevede Türkiye Cumhuriyet Merkez Bankası 'nın gelişimi incelenerek, kurumun farklı dönemlerde uyguladığı politikaları, bağımsızlık reformuyla birlikte enflasyonla mücadeleye odaklanmasının, kazanan ve kaybedenleri ele alınmaktadır.

İndependence of central banks and the central bank of the republic of Turkey

The issue of central bank independence is a crucial aspect of the neoliberal administrative reform process. It aims to achieve the isolation of monetary policy from politicians, thus the democratic processes. Advocates of this view anticipate that inflation will decline when central banks conduct monetary policy accompanied by governance practices, such as transparency and accountability free from the interventions of self-oriented politicians. This article maintains that arguments for central bank independence, which is attempted to be presented as a rationalization-based technical improvement, should be settled within historical and ideological context. In this framework, the article will attempt to analyze the evolution of the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey along with its various policies implemented in different periods and the winners and losers of its inflation-focused policies following the independence reform.

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