Active and reactive power transmission loss allocation to bilateral contracts through game theory techniques

Transmission loss has a considerable effect in overall power generation. For fairly distributing the charge of losses to generators and consumers in a deregulated power system, the allocation of this loss is very important. Game-theoretic methods seem fairer for share determination of each participant of a coalition with no discrimination. In this paper, the active and reactive power transmission losses are allocated to bilateral transactions simultaneously through load flow calculations and cooperative game theory solutions. The loss allocation problem and each bilateral transaction are treated as a game and a player of the game, correspondingly. Two game theory-based approaches, the Shapley value and the $\tau $-value, are surveyed. The former is the most relevant game theory allocation method, while the latter is a novel approach. The influences of all loss allocation game players and bilateral bargains on transmission loss are considered. These two proposed methods are applied to a simple 6-bus network and the modified IEEE 57-bus test system. In the 6-bus network positive MVA loss allocations and in the IEEE 57-bus system negative MVA loss allocations are studied. Finally, the results of allocation procedures are compared to each other.

Active and reactive power transmission loss allocation to bilateral contracts through game theory techniques

Transmission loss has a considerable effect in overall power generation. For fairly distributing the charge of losses to generators and consumers in a deregulated power system, the allocation of this loss is very important. Game-theoretic methods seem fairer for share determination of each participant of a coalition with no discrimination. In this paper, the active and reactive power transmission losses are allocated to bilateral transactions simultaneously through load flow calculations and cooperative game theory solutions. The loss allocation problem and each bilateral transaction are treated as a game and a player of the game, correspondingly. Two game theory-based approaches, the Shapley value and the $\tau $-value, are surveyed. The former is the most relevant game theory allocation method, while the latter is a novel approach. The influences of all loss allocation game players and bilateral bargains on transmission loss are considered. These two proposed methods are applied to a simple 6-bus network and the modified IEEE 57-bus test system. In the 6-bus network positive MVA loss allocations and in the IEEE 57-bus system negative MVA loss allocations are studied. Finally, the results of allocation procedures are compared to each other.

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