Karma Savaş Teorisi ve Rusya-Ukrayna Savaşı

2014 yılında başlayan Rusya–Ukrayna Savaşı ve Rusya’nın Batılı devletler veuluslararası örgütler tarafından karma savaş olarak adlandırılan askerifaaliyetleri; teorisyenler tarafından düşük yoğunluklu çatışma, dördüncü nesil,birleşik savaş gibi kavramlarla tanımlanmaya çalışılan Soğuk Savaş sonrasıçatışmaların niteliğine yönelik tartışmaları tekrar başlatmıştır. Çalışma bubilgiler ışığında karma savaşın yeni bir savaş türü olup olmadığını incelemeyiamaçlamaktadır. Öncelikle Soğuk Savaş sonrası döneme odaklanarak karmasavaş teorisinin gelişimini ortaya koymaktadır. Daha sonra Rusya’nın UkraynaSavaşı dönemindeki askeri faaliyetlerini karma savaş teorisi çerçevesindeincelemektedir. Çalışmada Soğuk Savaş sonrası dönem çatışmaların tanımlayandiğer teoriler gibi karma savaşın da yeni bir savaş biçimi olmadığı ve Rusya’nınaskeri faaliyetlerinin savaş tarihi için devrimsel nitelikte bir yenilikkazandırmadığını ileri sürmektedir.

Hybrid War Theory and Russian-Ukrainian Conflicts

The Russian-Ukrainian conflicts started in 2014 and Russian military activities, called hybrid warfare by the western states and international organizations, reopened the debate on the characteristics of Post-Cold War conflicts, which scholars have used the terms such as “low intensity warfare”, “fourth generation warfare” or “compound warfare”. This paper aims to assess if hybrid warfare constitutes a new form of warfare. It first describes the evolution of hybrid warfare theory mainly focusing on the post-Cold War era. It then basically examines Russian military activities during the 2014 Russian-Ukrainian conflicts within the framework of hybrid warfare theory. It will be argued that hybrid warfare, like the other theories that describe post-Cold War conflicts, does not constitute a new form of warfare and Russian military activities in Ukraine did not provide a breakthrough in warfare history.

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