Ela ELÇİ

6060

Leniency programs: Features, components and how they appear in eu and Turkey

Bu çalışma, kartellerle mücadelede bir soruşturma aracı olarak kullanılan pişmanlık programlarını yararları, zorlukları ve başarılı uygulamasının önkoşulları çerçevesinde ele almaktadır. Bunu yaparken de, AB 2006 Pişmanlık Yönetmeliği’ni temel teorik çerçeve içerisinde analiz edip, sonrasında, yakın zamanda mevzuata giren Türk Pişmanlık programını, AB programıyla karşılaştırmalı bir biçimde inceleyip değerlendirmektedir. Sonuç olarak bu çalışma, Türk pişmanlık programının AB pişmanlık programına nazaran daha güçlü bir şekilde şeffaflık ve öngörülebilirliği sağlayan hükümler içerdiğini, fakat bu durumun, yönetmelik maddelerinin uzun dönemde çok cömert bir şekilde yorumlanması halinde programın negatif sonuçlarının ortaya çıkmasına yol açacağını tespit etmektedir. Bununla birlikte, Türk Rekabet Kurumu’nun etkinliği ve kartellere yönelik ceza yaptırımlarını öngören Yönetmeliğin mevzuata girişi, Kurumun eski uygulamalarıyla karşılaştırıldığında karteller için çok daha yüksek cezalar getiriyor olması nedeniyle pişmanlık programını desteklemektedir ve bu da Türk pişmanlık programını AB programına daha da yaklaştırmaktadır.

Pişmanlık programları: Özellikleri, unsurları ve AB ve Türkiye'deki görünümleri

This paper considers the leniency programs, which is an investigative tool in fighting against cartels, in terms of its benefits, challenges and preconditions for its successful application. While doing this, the paper analyzes EU 2006 Leniency Notice within the framework of the theoretical basis and then examines and evaluates the recently introduced Turkish Leniency Program in a comparable way with that of the EU. Ultimately, this paper finds that Turkish leniency program includes provisions so as to provide transparency and predictability in a stronger way than the EU leniency program; however this may cause the appearance of the negative sides of the program in the long term if the provisions are interpreted so generously for a long time. Moreover, the efficiency of the Turkish Competition Authority and the new Turkish Regulation regarding fines against cartels, support the leniency program by providing heavier sanctions compared to past applications of the Authority and this makes the Turkish program closer to the EU leniency program.
PDF

___

  • ARI, H.M. and E. AYGÜN (2009), “Regulation on Fines Adopted by Turkish Competition Authority: Footsteps of the New Era”, Competition Journal, Vol.10, No. 4, pp. 773.
  • AUBERT, C., REY, P. and W.E. KOVACIC (2006), “The Impact of Leniency and Whistle blowing Programs on Cartels”, International Journal of Industrial Organization, Vol. 24, pp. 1241 1266.
  • AZEVEDO, J. P. (2003), “Crime and Punishment in the Fight Against Cartels: The Gathering Storm”, European Competition Law Review, 24(8), pp.400 407.
  • BILLIET, P. (2009), “How Lenient is the EC Leniency Policy? A Matter of Certainty and Predictability”, European Competition Law Review, 30(1), pp.14-21.
  • BLOOM, M. (2006), “Despite Its Great Success, the EC Leniency Program Faces Great Challenges”, EUI RSCAS/EU Competition 2006 Proceedings, European University Institute Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies 2006, EU Competition Law and Policy Workshop Proceedings, http://www.eui.eu/RSCAS/Research/Competition/2006(pdf)/200610 COMPed Bloom.pdf, Date Accessed: 15.07.2010, pp.1-22.
  • BRENNER, S. (2009), “An Empirical Study of the European Corporate Leniency Program”, International Journal of Industrial Organization, Vol. 27, pp. 639-645.
  • COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT (2009), “Turkey 2009 Progress Report”, COM (2009) 533, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2009/tr_rapport_2009_en.p df, Date Accessed: 02.08.2010.
  • ELLIS, C. and W. WILSON (2002), "Cartels, Price Fixing, and Corporate Leniency Policy: What Doesn’t Kill Us Makes Us Stronger," Manuscript, University of Oregon.
  • EVENETT, S.J., M.C. LEVENSTEIN, and V.Y. SUSLOW (2001), “International Cartel Enforcement: Lessons from the 1990s”, http://scholarworks.umass.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1092&context=econ _workingpaper, Date Accessed: 07.07.2010, pp.1221 1245.
  • FIGHTING CARTELS: BRAZIL’S LENIENCY PROGRAM (2009), 3rd. ed., Secretariat of Economic Law, Antitrust Division Council for Economic Defense Ministry of Justice, Brazil , http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/52/22/43619651.pdf, Date Accessed: 05.02.2011
  • FLETCHER, D. J. (2005), “The Lure of Leniency: Maximizing Cartel Deterrence in Light of La Roche v. Empagran and the Antitrust Criminal Penalty Enhancement and Reform Act of 2004”, Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems, Vol.15, pp.341-362.
  • FRESHFIELDS BRUCKHAUS DERINGER, “Response dated 27 October 2006 to Commission of the European Communities DG Competition, Consultation on the Draft Commission Notice on Immunity from Fines and Reduction of Fines in Cartel Cases Published on 29 September 2006”, http://ec.europa.eu/competition/cartels/legislation/files_leniency_consultation/f bd.pdf, Date Accessed: 01.08.2010, pp.1 11.
  • FRIEDERISZICK, H. W. and F.P. MAIER RIGAUD (2007), “The Role of Economics in Cartel Detection in Europe”, http://www.esmt.org/fm/312/Role_of_Economics_in_Cartel_Detection_in_Euro pe.pdf, Date Accessed: 03.07.2010, pp.1-20.
  • GRASSO, R. (2008), “The EU Leniency Program and US Civil Discovery Rules: A Fraternal Fight?”, Michigan Journal of international law, Vol.29:565, pp.565 605.
  • GREEN, J. and I. McCALL (2009), “Leniency and civil claims: Should leniency programmes extend to private actions?”, Competition Law Insight, http://www.europe economics.com/publications/2009cli_1.pdf, Date Accessed: 05.02.2011)
  • GRIFFIN, J.M. and K.R. SULLIVAN (2008), “Recent Developments in Leniency Policy and Practices in Canada, the European Union and the US”, Paper presented at the ABA “Advanced International Cartel Workshop in San Francisco.
  • GURKAYNAK, G. (2009), “Turkey: A New Era In Turkish Antitrust Enforcement: Leniency Program And Regulation On Fine Calculation”, http://www.mondaq.com/article.asp?articleid=74588, Date Accessed: 05.07.2010
  • HAMMOND, S. D. (2009), “Using Leniency to Fight Hard Core Cartels: Cornerstones of an Effective Leniency Program’, Paper presented at the Seventh Meeting of the Latin American Competition Forum, Session I, Santiago, Chile, http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/31/7/43547530.pdf., Date Accessed: 10.07.2010.
  • HARRINGTON, J. E. Jr. (2008), “Optimal Corporate Leniency Programs”, Journal of Industrial Economics, Vol. 56, issue 2, pp.215 246.
  • INCARDONA, R. (2007), “International and European Business and Competition Law, the Fight Against Hard core Cartels and the New EU Leniency Notice”, The European Legal Forum, Issue 1/2, pp.39 42.
  • ICN (2009), “Drafting and Implementing an Effective Leniency Policy Subgroup 2: Enforcement Techniques”, Anti Cartel Enforcement Manual Chapter 2, http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/ doc341.pdf., Date Accessed: 04.07.2010, pp.1 20.
  • ICN (2010), “Cartel Case Initiation Subgroup 2: Enforcement Techniques”, Anti Cartel enforcement Manual Chapter 4, http://www.icn istanbul.org/ Upload/Materials/Cartel/CartelWG_CH4%20CartelCaseInitiation.pdf, Date Accessed: 04.07.2010.
  • JONES, A. and B. SUFRIN (2008), “EC Competition Law”, 3rd edition, Oxford University Press, New York.
  • KEKEVI, G.H. (2008), ‘Pismanlik Programlari: Muharebeyi Kaybetmek, Savasi Kazanmak’, Rekabet Dergisi, Sayi.34, s.3 51.
  • KEKEVI, G.,H. (2009), “Pimanlık Yönetmeliği: Garp Cephesinde Yeni Bir ey Var”, Rekabet Dergisi, Sayi.10, No.4, s. 73 117.
  • KROES, N. (2006), “Enforcement of Prohibition of Cartels in Europe”, European Competition Law Annual, http://www.eui.eu/RSCAS/Research/ Competition/2006(pdf)/200610 COMPed Kroes.pdf, Date Accessed: 15.07.2010.
  • LEVER, Q.C (2009), “Whether and if so How, the EC Commission's 2006 Guidelines on Setting Fines for Infringements of Articles 81 and 82 of the EC are Fairly Subject to Serious Criticism’, BDI Law and Public Procurement.
  • LEVY, N., and R. O’DONOGHUE (2004), “The EU Leniency Programme Comes of Age”, World Competition, Vol. 27, issue 1, pp. 75 99.
  • LINKLATERS (2006), “Response to the European Commission’s Draft Leniency Notice”, http://ec.europa.eu/competition/cartels/legislation/files_ leniency_consultation/linklaters.pdf, Date Accessed: 01.08.2010, pp.1 12.
  • MONTI, M. (2001), “Why Should We Be Concerned with Cartels and Collusive Behaviour?” in Fighting cartels why and how?, Swedish Competition Authority, Konkurrensverket, , pp. 14-22.
  • MORGAN, E. J. (2009), “Controlling Cartels Implications of the EU Policy Reforms”, European Management Journal, Volume 27, Issue 1,pp. 1 12.
  • MOTCHENKOVA, E. (2004), “Effects of Leniency Programs on Cartel Stability”, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=617224, Date Accessed: 15.07.2010.
  • MOTTA, M. (2008), “On Cartel Deterrence and Fines in the European Union”, European Competition Law Review, 29(4), pp.209 220.
  • MOTTA, M., and M. POLO (2003), “Leniency Programs and Cartel Prosecution”, International Journal of Industrial Organization, Vol. 21, pp. 347-379.
  • OECD (2002), Fighting Hard Core Cartels: Harm, Effective Sanctions and Leniency Programmes, http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/41/44/1841891.pdf, Date Accessed: 10.07.2010, pp.1-107.
  • ÖNDER, N.T. (2009), “Turkey: Turkish Competition Authority Published Regulation On Immunity From Fines And Reduction Of Fines In Cartel Cases On 15 February 2009”, http://www.mondaq.com/article.asp?articleid=74918, Date Accessed: 05.07.2010.
  • ÖZ, G. and Z. ÇAKMAK, “Turkey Pakistan to Venezuela Anti Cartel Enforcement Worldwide, http://www.cakmak.gen.tr/pdf/antitrust.pdf, Date Accessed: 01.08.2010, pp.1184 1207.
  • RILEY, A. (2010), “The modernisation of EU Anti cartel Enforcement: Will the Commission Grasp the Opportunity?”, European Competition Law Review, Vol.31(5), pp.191 207.
  • SOMAY, M. (2010), “Recent Developments in Turkish Competition Law: Bridging the Gap to Europe?”, The European Antitrust Review, http://www. globalcompetitionreview.com/reviews/19/sections/69/chapters/779/turkey/, Date Accessed: 17.07.2010.
  • SPAGNOLO, G. (2006), ‘Leniency and Whistleblowers in Antitrust’, CEPR Discussion Paper, No.5794, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 936400, Date Accessed: 15.07.2010.
  • STEPHAN, A. (2008), “An empirical assessment of the European Leniency Notice”, Journal of Competition Law and Economics, Vol.5 (3), pp.537 561.
  • TURKISH COMPETITION AUTHORITY (2009), “11th Annual Report”, http://www.rekabet.gov.tr/dosyalar/faaliyetraporu/falrap23.pdf, Date Accessed: 01.08.2010.
  • WILS, W.P.J. (2005), ‘Principles of European Antitrust Enforcement’, Hart Publishing, Oxford and Portland, Oregon, pp.139 150.
  • WILS, W.P.J. (2006), “Optimal Antitrust Fines: Theory and Practice”, World Competition, Vol. 29, issue 2, pp.183 208.
  • WILS, W.P.J. (2007), “Leniency in Antitrust Enforcement: Theory and Practice”, World Competition, Vol. 30, issue 1, pp. 25 64.
  • WILS, W.P.J.(2009), ‘The Relationship Between Public Antitrust Enforcement and Private Actions for Damages”, World Competition, Vol. 32, issue 1, pp. 3-26.
  • ZINGALES, N. (2008), “European and American Leniency Programme: Two Models Towards Convergence?’ Competition Law Review, Vol.5, No.1, _____http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1101803, Date Accessed: 17.07.2010, pp.1-73.
Rekabet Dergisi-Cover
  • ISSN: 1302-552X
  • Yayın Aralığı: 5
  • Başlangıç: 2000
  • Yayıncı: Rekabet Kurumu
Arşiv
Sayıdaki Diğer Makaleler

Leniency programs: Features, components and how they appear in eu and Turkey

Ela ELÇİ

Unctad model rekabet kanunu ve muhtemel bir uluslararası rekabet anlaşmasına ulaşılmasındaki rolü

TALAT KAYA

Avrupa birliği rekabet kuralları karşısında dvd bölge kodu koruması uygulaması: teknik, ekonomik ve hukuki bir değerlendirme

AHMET FATİH ÖZKAN

Daha etkin bir uluslararası rekabet için Hukuki çerçeve arayışı

ALİ CENK KESKİN