Ali ARIÖZ, Özgür Can ÖZBEK

5720

Hakim durumunun kötüye kullanılmasının sonucu olarak zorunlu lisanslama: değerlendirme kriterleri ve uygulanan standartlar

Fikri mülkiyet haklarının lisanslanmasının reddi de dahil olmak üzere bütün alt kategorileriyle birlikte sözlesme yapılmasının reddi davaları rekabet hukukunun en tartısmalı alanlarından biridir. Bütün liberal ekonomik düsünce sistemleri sözlesme özgürlüğünü gerçek ve tüzel kisiler için en temel iktisadi özgürlüklerinden biri olarak gördükleri için zorunlu arz ya da lisanslama gerekliliği çok dikkatli bir değerlendirme gerektirir. Bu çalısmanın amacı su soruyu cevaplamaktır: Türk Rekabet Hukuku uygulamasında lisanslamanın reddi vakaları için herhangi bir kriter uygulanmakta mıdır ve eğer uygulanmaktaysa bu kriterlere yönelik standartlar açık ve belirli midir? Avrupa Birliği (AB) uygulamasında sözlesmenin reddi davalarının değerlendirilmesinde dönüsmekte olan bir kriterler seti olusmus gibi görünmekle beraber, özellikle Microsoft davasının ardından standartların gevsediği hissedilmektedir∗∗∗. Diğer taraftan Türkiye’de, sözlesmenin reddi davalarında kullanılan kriterler açık olmamakla beraber davaların net bir sınıflandırmaya tabi tutuldukları da söylenememektedir. Lisanslamanın reddi bakımından ise uygulayıcılar bir politika olusturmaya yetecek kadar davayı önlerinde bulmamıslardır. Bu alandaki önemli davalardan olan birisi olan Bilsa da zorunlu lisanslamanın değerlendirmesi için gerekli kriterler bakımından zayıf bir ısık tutmaktadır.

Compulsory licensing as a conseQuence of abuse of dominant position: the criteria for evaluation and the standarts applied

Refusal to deal cases -with all its sub-divisions including refusal to license intellectual property right cases- are one the most controversial subjects of competition law. Since every liberal economic thought accepts that the right to contract is one of the very basic economic liberties of (legal and natural) persons, an obligation for compulsory supply or licensing needs careful assesment. This paper seeks to answer the following question: Are there any criteria for refusal to licence cases and, if answered affirmatively, are the standarts clear and concise in the application of Turkish Competition Law? While it seems that there has been an evolving criteria set for the assesment for refusal to deal and licence cases in the European Union practice, the strictness of the standarts seems to be getting looser, especially after the Microsoft case. In Turkey, on the other hand, the criteria used for the assesment of the refusal to deal cases are not clear, besides there is not a clear classification of the cases. As for the refusal to license, the enforcers have not met enough cases to design a policy, nothwithstanding, one of the important cases, Bilsa, is still shedding a glimmer light about the assesment criteria of compulsory licensing.
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Rekabet Dergisi-Cover
  • ISSN: 1302-552X
  • Yayın Aralığı: Yılda 5 Sayı
  • Başlangıç: 2000
  • Yayıncı: Rekabet Kurumu
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Ali ARIÖZ, Özgür Can ÖZBEK