2020

Kamu lojmanlarının tahsisi: Bir karakterizasyon

Bu çalışmada, kamu lojmanlarının önceliklere bağlı olarak dağıtımı problemi incelenmektedir. Bu kıt kaynak dağılım problemi için gerçek yaşamda kullanılabilecek önceliklere dayalı sabit fiyat kamu personeli optimal mekanizmasının teşviklerle uyumluluk, bireysel rasyonellik, bütçe dengesi, adil-dağıtım ve iki yardımcı aksiyomu sağlayan tek mekanizma olduğu ispatlanmaktadır. Ek olarak, göreceli olarak adil olmayabilecek dağılımların ortaya çıkmasını önlemek için Kamu Konutları Yönetmeliğindeki öncelik sıralamasını belirlemek için kullanılan puanlama sisteminin önerilen lojman türüne bağlı puanlama sistemiyle değiştirilmesi gerekliliği gösterilmektedir.

Public housing allocation: A characterization

In this paper, we study public housing allocation problems on the basis of priorities. For this scarce resource allocation problems, we prove that fixed-price civil servant optimal mechanisms uniquely satisfies incentive compatibility, individual rationality, budget balance, assignment-fair and two additional auxiliary axioms. We also show that the priorities system currently used in the public housing regulations of Turkey should be replaced by housing type dependent priority system in order to prevent seemingly unfair allocations.

PDF

___

ABDULKADİROĞLU, A. ve SÖNMEZ, T. (1998), Random Serial Dictatorship and the Core from Random Endowments in House Allocation Problems, Econometrica 66, 689-701.
ABDULKADİROĞLU, A. ve SÖNMEZ, T. (1999), House Allocation with Existing Tenants, Journal of Economic Theory 88, 233-260.
ABDULKADİROĞLU, A. ve CHE, Y. (2010), The Role of Priorities in Assigning Indivisible Objects: A Characterization of Top Trading Cycles, Duke Üniversitesi Çalışma Tebliği.
AFACAN, M.O. (2013), Alternative Characterizations of Boston Mechanism, Mathematical Social Sciences, 66, 176-179.
ALCALDE, J. ve BARBERA, S. (1994), Top Dominance and the Possibility of Strategy-proof Stable Solutions to Matching Problems, Economic Theory 4, 417-435.
ALKAN, A., DEMANGE, G. ve GALE, D. (1991), Fair Allocation of Indivisible Objects and Criteria of Justice, Econometrica 59, 1023-1039.
BALINSKI, M. ve SÖNMEZ, T. (1999), A Tale of Two Mechanisms: Student Placement, Journal of Economic Theory 84, 73-94.
BAŞBAKANLIK (2014), İnternet Adresi: http://mevzuat.basbakanlik.gov.tr/, Erişim Tarihi: 07.02.2014.
CLARK, E. (1971), Multipart Pricing of Public Goods, Public Choice 11, 17-33. İnternet Adresi: http://www.dpb.gov.tr/tr-
DEVLET PERSONEL BAŞKANLIĞI (2014), tr/istatistikler/kamu-personeli-istatistikleri, Erişim Tarihi: 07.02.2014.
EHLERS, L ve KLAUS, B. (2014), Strategy-Proofness Makes the Difference: Deferred-Acceptance with Responsive Priorities, Mathematics of Operations Research, yayın aşamasında.
ERGİN, H. (2002), Efficient Resource Allocation on the Basis of Priorities, Econometrica 70, 2489- 2497.
GALE, D. ve SHAPLEY, L.S. (1962), College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage, American Mathematical Monthly 69, 9-15.
GROVES, T. (1973), Incentives in Teams, Econometrica 41, 617-631.
HOLMSTRÖM, B. (1979), Groves’ Scheme on Restricted Domains, Econometrica 47, 1137-1144.
KESTEN, O. (2009), Coalitional Strategy-proofness and Resource Monotonicity for House Allocation Problems, International Journal of Game Theory 38, 17-21.
KOJIMA, F. ve ÜNVER, U. (2014), The "Boston" School-Choice Mechanism: An Axiomatic Approach, Economic Theory 55, 515-544.
KÜÇÜKŞENEL, S. (2013), The Effects of Outside Options on Optimal Auction Outcomes, METU Studies in Development 40, 83-95.
MALİYE BAKANLIĞI (2014), İnternet Adresi: http://www.bumko.gov.tr/, Erişim Tarihi: 07.02.2014.
MIYAGAWA, E. (2001), House Allocation with Transfers, Journal of Economic Theory 100, 329- 355.
MYERSON, R. (1981), Optimal Auction Design, Mathematics of Operations Research 6, 58-73.
OHSETO, S. (1999), Strategy-Proof Allocation Mechanisms for Economies with an Indivisible Good. Social Choice and Welfare 15, 121–136.
PAPAI, S. (2000), Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange, Econometrica 68, 1403- 1433.
SCHUMMER, J. (2000), Eliciting Preferences to Assign Positions and Compensation. Games and Economic Behavior 30, 293–318.
SHAPLEY, L.S. ve SCARF, H. (1974), On Cores and Indivisibilities, Journal of Mathematical Economics 1, 23-28.
SVENSSON, L.-G. ve LARSSON, B. (2002), Strategy-Proof and Nonbossy Allocation of Indivisible Goods and Money, Economic Theory 20, 483-502.
VICKREY, W. (1978), Counterspeculation, Auctions, and Competitive Sealed Tenders, Journal of Finance 16, 8-37.