2011 İngiltere isyanlarını anlamak: İngiltere hükümetinin söylemi ve karşı olgular

4 Ağustos 2011 tarihinde Mark Duggan adlı çete üyesi olduğu iddia edilen bir gencin polis tarafından vurularak öldürülmesi sonucu başlayan protesto gösterileri 6-10 Ağustos tarihleri arasında yağmalama, kundaklama ve şiddet olaylarına dönüştü. Meydana gelen şiddet ve yağmalama olaylarının nedenleri İngiltere siyasal iktidarı tarafından yetersiz ebeveynlik, yavaş çekim ahlaki çöküş, fırsatçılık, magandalar, eşkıyalar, çeteler gözü dönmüş sınıf-altı olarak değerlendirildi. İngiltere hükümeti meydana gelen olaylar karşısında,nedenler üzerine kapsamlı bir araştırmaya girişmedi; tam tersine, olay örgüsünü ahlaki yozlaşma ve kriminalleşmeye referansla muhafazakâr bir söylem içerisinden değerlendirdi. Muhafazakâr Partinin, İngiltere toplumunun sosyal ve kültürel sorunlarını özetlemek için kullandığı sloganı, parçalanmış toplum söylemi, kitlesel yağmalama ve kundaklama olaylarının nedeni olarak gösterildi. İsyanlar sürecinde ve sonrasında kamu harcamalarındaki kesintiler, yoksulluk, ırk ayrımcılığı, aşırı polisiye denetim İngiltere hükümeti ve popüler basın tarafından dile getirilmedi. Koalisyon hükümeti ve ana akım basın isyan sürecinde ve hemen sonrasında hiçbir veriye dayanmaksızın çizdiği isyancı profili kamuoyunu ve yargılama sürecini önemli ölçüde etkiledi: Muhafazakâr-liberal demokrat İngiltere hükümetinin, erozyona uğramış değerlere olan vurgusunu temel alan popüler basının fırsatçı, eşkıya, maganda gibi sıfatlarla kriminalize ettiği isyancıların yargılanma süreçleri, İngiltere adalet sisteminin normal işleyişine göre daha hızlı ve ağır cezalarla sonuçlandı. İngiltere hükümeti ve popüler basının isyanın nedenlerine ilişkin açıklamaları kamuoyu ve yargılama sürecinde etkili olmasına karşın hem muhalefet tarafından hem da akademik, entelektüel çevrelerce yetersiz karşılandı. İngiltere kamuoyunda akademik ve konuya duyarlı çevrelerin inisiyatifiyle hükümet söylemini hedef alan eleştireler dile getirildi ve Guardian/London School of Economics (LSE) işbirliğinde isyanın asli nedenlerini anlamaya yönelik kapsamlı ampirik bir araştırma yürütüldü. Bu yazının amacı, 2011 İngiltere isyanlarının İngiltere hükümeti ve popüler basın tarafından nasıl basitçe kriminalize edildiğini; olayların perde arkasında ise, tam tersine, politik, sosyal ve ekonomik nedenlerin yattığını serimlemektir. Bu bağlamda, İngiltere hükümeti ve popüler basının ahlaki erozyon ve kriminalizayon söylemi, isyan sonrası oluşan mevcut literatür çerçevesinde eleştirilmekte; öncelikle İngiltere hükümetinin isyana yaklaşımı ve buna yönelik eleştiriler sunulmaktadır. Bu eleştiriler çerçevesinde, olayların kriminalite söylemiyle açıklanma çabasının belirli bir siyasal stratejiye tekabül ettiği ve İngiltere siyasal iktidarının ahlaki çürüme ve yozlaşmaya olan vurgusunun isyanı politize edecek zemini oluşturan sosyal ve ekonomik boyutları nasıl ötelediği deşifre edilmektedir. Son olarak, Guardian/LSE işbirliğinde yürütülen araştırmanın sonuçlarından hareketle, isyana sebebiyet veren olgular değerlendirilmektedir. Bu bağlamda, İngiltere hükümetinin genel ahlaki çürüme ve kriminalite söyleminin kundaklama, yağmalama ve şiddet olaylarının asli nedenlerine tekabül etmediği; tam tersine, 6-10 Ağustos 2011 tarihleri arasında yaşanan olayların arkasında, kalabalıkların gündelik hayatlarında deneyimledikleri sınıfsal kutuplaşma, yoksulluk, yoksunluk, ayrımcılık, polisin yoğun durdurma ve arama faaliyetleri gibi hem politik karar ve tercihlerin ürünü hem de küresel kapitalizmin makro dinamiklerindeki dönüşümle bağlantılı toplumsal sorunların belirleyici olduğu tartışılmaktadır.

Understanding the 2011 England riots: The discourse of the British government versus the counterfacts

After an alleged gang member Mark Duggan was shot dead by the police on 4 August 2011, the demonstrations rapidly transformed into looting, arson and violence between 6 and 10 August 2011. The British political power defined the reason for the riots which were sparked after the death of Duggan as poor parenting , slow-motion moral collapse , opportunism , yobs , thugs , gangs ,feral under-class . The British government did not initiate any research to explain why the riots occurred; on the contrary, the government voraciously construed the riots within a conservative discourse of criminalisation and moral erosion. In this regard, the discourse of broken society , deployed to mark out social and cultural problems of Great Britain by the Tories, was introduced to explain the massive scale of arson, looting and violence. Public sector cuts, poverty, racial discrimination and strict policing were not depicted by the British government and popular press. The representation of rioters, drawn by the popular press without relying on any empirical data, has had far-reaching effects on the public opinion of riots-sentencing and the criminal justice process. The figures gathered from the courts indicate that those who participated in the riots and appeared in the courts received immediate custody at nearly three times the rate as those normally sentenced for similar offences, and that the average length of their sentence was nearly four times longer than those convicted for similar offences as well. Although the causes for the riots held by the British government and the representation of rioters as black-hoody gangs by the popular press were so effective in taking shape of the public opinion and the criminal justice process, those explanations for the riots were found inadequate and biased by the opposition and in academic circles. Thus the discourse of the British government on the riots was strictly criticized. The dominance of countless conservative-attuned interpretations in the mainstream press and the biased-driven government approach required a comprehensive empirical study to understand what led to the course of events. In response to the government s approach, comprehensive empirical research was conducted through the collaboration of Guardian and London School of Economics (LSE) Social Policy Department. The aim of this article is to exhibit how the 2011 England riots were simply criminalised by the British government and the popular press, and to emphasise that social and economic politicallybased causes were underlying those events. In this context, the discourse of the British government and popular press which refers to moral collapse and criminalisation is criticised in the light of the post-riot literature. First of all, the discursive approach of the British government on the riots and the critique of that is presented to reader. Secondly, it is argued that the criminalisation of rioters, whose emphasis is upon moral collapse, has responded to a definite political strategy by concealing the social and economic problems which otherwise may have politicised the riots. Finally, it is by drawing on the results of the research conducted by Guardian/LSE that the facts causing the riots are understood. That said, it has to be pointed out that moral collapse and criminalisation are not the preliminary reason for looting, arson and violence. Social and economic problems such as poverty, depravity, social exclusion, discrimination and strict policing based on stop and search are the consequences of both political decisions and dynamics of the transformation of global capitalism in the last three decades.

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