___

• ACEMOGLU, D., JOHNSON, S. ve ROBINSON, J. A., “The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation”, American Econo- mic Review, 91(5), 2001, s. 1369–1401.
• ACEMOGLU, D., JOHNSON, S., ve ROBINSON, J. A., “Reversal of Fortune: Geog- raphy and Institutions in the Making of the Modern World Income Distributi- on”, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117(4), 2002,s. 1231–1294.
• ACEMOGLU, D. ve ROBINSON, J., Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty (1st ed.), Crown Business, 2012.
• ACEMOGLU, D. ve ROBINSON, J. A., “Economic Backwardness in Political Perspe- ctive”, American Political Science Review, 100(1), 2006, s. 115–131.
• BECK, T., “Legal Institutions and Economic Development” (SSRN Scholarly Paper No. ID 1669100), Rochester, NY, Social Science Research Network. http:// papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1669100, 2010.
• BERNSTEIN, L., “Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relati- ons in the Diamond Industry”, The Journal of Legal Studies, 21(1), 1992, s. 115–57.
• BLUHM, Richard ve Adam SZIRMAI, Institutions and Long-run Growth Perfor- mance: An Analytic Literature Review of the Institutional Determinants of Economic Growth, United Nations University, Maastricht Economic and Social Research and Training Centre on Innovation and Technology, 2012, Re- PEc - IDEAS.
• BOCKSTETTE, V., CHANDA, A. ve PUTTERMAN, L., “States and Markets: The Advantage of an Early Start”, Journal of Economic Growth, 7(4), 2002, s. 347–369.
• CASS, David, “Optimum Growth in an Aggregative Model of Capital Accumulation”, The Review of Economic Studies, 32(3), 1965, s. 233–240.
• CLAY, Karen, “Trade, Institutions, and Credit”, Explorations in Economic History, 34(4),1997, s. 495-521.
• COASE, Ronald H.,“The Nature of the Firm”. Economica, 4(16), 1937, s. 386–405.
• COASE, Ronald H., “Problem of Social Cost”, The. Journal of Law and Economi- cs, 3 (1), 1960, s. 1-44.
• DIAMOND, J. M., Guns, Germs and Steel: The Fates of Human Societies, W. W. Norton & Company Incorporated, 1997.
• DIAMOND, L., “The State and Violence”, Perspectives on Politics, 8(01), 2010, s. 293–296.
• DIXIT, A., “Trade Expansion and Contract Enforcement”, Journal of Political Eco- nomy, 111(6), 2003, s. 1293–1317.
• EASTERLY, W. R., The Elusive Quest for Growth: Economists’ Adventures and Misadventures in the Tropics, MIT Press, 2002.
• EASTERLY, William, ve Ross LEVINE, “Tropics, Germs, and Crops: How Endow- ments Influence Economic Development”, Journal of Monetary Economi- cs, 50(1), 2003, s. 3-39.
• FAFCHAMPS, Marcel,Market Institutions in Sub-Saharian Africa: Theory and Evidence,MIT Press, 2004.
• GALLUP, J. L., SACHS, J. D. ve MELLINGER, A. D., “Geography and Economic Development”, International Regional Science Review, 22(2), 1999, s. 179– 232.
• GENÇ, M. ve ÖZVAR, E., Osmanlı Maliyesi: Kurumlar ve Bütçeler, Karaköy, İs- tanbul, Osmanlı Bankası Arşiv ve Araştırma Merkezi, 2006.
• GLAESER, E. L. ve SHLEIFER, A., “Legal Origins”, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117(4), 2002, s. 1193– 1229.
• GREIF, Avner, Paul MILGROM, ve Barry R WEINGAST. “Coordination, Commit- ment, and Enforcement: The Case of the Merchant Guild”, Journal of Politi- cal Economy, 1994, s. 745–776.
• GREIF, A., “Cultural Beliefs and the Organization of Society: A Historical and Theo- retical Reflection on Collectivist and Individualist Societies”, Journal of Po- litical Economy, 102(5), 1994, s. 912–950.
• GÜRAN, T., Ottoman Financial Statistics, Budgets, 1841–1918, Ankara: State Ins- titute of Statistics, 2003.
• HABER, S., MAURER, N. ve RAZO, A., The Politics of Property Rights: Politi- cal Instability, Credible Commitments, and Economic Growth in Mexico, 1876-1929, Cambridge University Press, 2003.
• HILLMANN, H., ve AVEN, B. L., “Fragmented Networks and Entrepreneurship in Late Imperial Russia”, American Journal of Sociology, 117(2), 2011, s. 484– 538.
• HOFFMAN, Philip T., Growth in a Traditional Society: The French Countryside, 1450-1815, Princeton University Press, 2000.
• KARAMAN, K.K., “Intra-state Conflict as a Cause for Undertaxation and Underde- velopment”, PhD Thesis, Stanford University, 2008.
• KARAMAN, K.K. ve PAMUK, Ş., “Different Paths to the Modern State in Europe: The Interaction Between Warfare, Economic Structure, and Political Regime”, American Political Science Review, 107, 2013, s. 603-626.
• KARAMAN, K.K. ve PAMUK, Ş., “Ottoman State Finances in European Perspective, 1500–1914”, The Journal of Economic History, 70(03), 2010, s. 593–629.
• KHAN, Nisar A, ve Saghir Ahmad ANSARI, “Application of New Institutional Eco- nomics to the Problems of Development: A Survey”, Journal of Social and Economic Development, 10(1), 2008, s. 1-32.
• KNACK, S. ve KEEFER, P., “Institutions and Economic Performance: CrossCountry Tests Using Alternative Institutional Measures”, Economics and Politics, 7(3), 1995, s. 207–227.
• KOOPMANS, Tjalling C., “On the Concept of Optimal Economic Growth”, The Eco- nometric Approach to Development Planning, Amsterdam: North Holland, 1965.
• KURAN, T., “The Provision of Public Goods under Islamic Law: Origins, Impact, and Limitations of the Waqf System”, Law & Society Review, 35(4), 2001, s. 841–898.
• KURAN, T., “Absence of the Corporation in Islamic Law: Origins and Persistence”, The American Journal of Comparative Law, 2005, s. 53,785.
• KURAN, T., The Long Divergence: How Islamic Law Held Back the Middle East, Princeton ; Oxford: Princeton University Press. 2011.
• LA PORTA, R., LOPEZ-DE-SILANES, F., SHLEIFER, A. ve VISHNY, R., “Law and Finance”, Journal of Political Economy, 106, 1998, s. 1113–1155.
• LA PORTA, R., LOPEZ-DE-SILANES, F., SHLEIFER, A. ve VISHNY, R., “The Qu- ality of Government”, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 15(1), 1999, s. 222–279.
• LUCAS Jr., Robert E., “On the Mechanics of Economic Development”, Journal of Monetary Economics, 22 (1), 1988, s. 3–42.
• MÉNARD, Claude, ve Mary M SHIRLEY, Handbook of New Institutional Econo- mics, Springer, 2005.
• NORTH, Douglass C., The Rise of the Western World: A New Economic History, Cambridge University Press, 1973.
• NORTH, Douglass C., Structure and Change in Economic History, New York: Norton. 1981
• NORTH, Douglass C., ve Barry R. WEINGAST, “Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Cen- tury England”,The Journal of Economic History, 49(04),1989, s. 803–832.
• NORTH, Douglass. C., Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Perfor- mance, Cambridge University Press, 1990.
• NORTH, D. C.,97–112. “Institutions”, Journal ofEconomic Perspectives, 5(1), 1991, s.
• NORTH, D. C., WALLIS, J. J. ve WEINGAST, B. R., Violence and Social Orders: A Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human History (1st ed.), Cambridge University Press, 2009.
• OGILVIE, Sheilagh C., Institutions and European Trade: Merchant Guilds, 1000- 1800, Cambridge University Press, 2011.
• ÖZMUCUR, S., ve PAMUK, Ş., “Real Wages and Standards of Living in the Ottoman Empire, 1489-1914”, Journal of Economic History, 62(2), 2002, s. 293–321.
• ÖZVEREN, Y. E., “Economic History in Turkey: Advent, Present Condition and Prospects”, South African Journal of Economic History, 22(1-2), 2007, s. 142–166.
• PAGANO, M. ve VOLPIN, P., “The Political Economy of Finance”, Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 17(4), 2001, s. 502–519.
• PAMUK, Ş., “Institutional Change and the Longevity of the Ottoman Empire, 1500– 1800”, Journal of Interdisciplinary History, 35(2), 2004a, s. 225–247.
• PAMUK, Ş., A Monetary History of the Ottoman Empire, Cambridge University Press. 2004b.
• PAMUK, Ş., “Political Power and Institutional Change: Lessons from the Middle East”, Economic History of Developing Regions, 27(sup1), 2012, s. 41–56.
• RODRIK, Dani, Arvind SUBRAMANIAN, ve Francesco TREBBI, “Institutions Rule: The Primacy of Institutions over Geography and Integration in Econo- mic Development”, Journal of Economic Growth, 9(2), 2004, s. 131-165.
• ROMER, Paul M., “Increasing Returns and Long-run Growth”, The Journal of Poli- tical Economy, 1986, s. 1002–1037.
• ROMER, Paul M., “Endogenous Technological Change”, Journal of Political Eco- nomy, 1990, s. 71–102.
• SOLOW, R. M., “A Contribution to the Theory of Economic Growth”, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 70(1), 1956, s. 65–94.
• STASAVAGE, David “Transparency, Democratic Accountability, and the Economic Consequences of Monetary Institutions”, American Journal of Political Science, 47(3), 2003, s. 389–402.
• SWAN, T. W., “Economic Growth and Capital Accumulation”, Economic Record, 32(2), 1956, s. 334–361.
• TABELLINI, G., “Culture and Institutions: Economic Development in the Regions of Europe”, Journal of the European Economic Association, 8(4), 2010, s. 677–716.
• WILLIAMSON, Oliver E., Markets and Hierarchies, New York, 1975.
• WILLIAMSON, Oliver E., The Economic Insttitutions of Capitalism, Simon and Schuster, 1985.