NACİYE AYLİN ATAAY SAYBAŞILI

229

TEPE YÖNETİCİ ÜCRETLERİNİN FİRMA PERFORMANSINA ETKİSİ: KURUMSAL YÖNETİŞİMİN ROLÜ

Çalışma öncelikle tepe yönetici ücretlerinin firma performansına etkilerini ve kurumsal yönetişim mekanizmalarının bu ilişkideki aracılık rolünü 20092013 yıllarını kapsayan bir panel veri modeli aracılığıyla belirlemeyi hedeflemektedir. Ayrıca, ilgili yazına gelişen bir ülke bakış açısını getirmek ve gelişmiş ülkelere göre firma ortaklık yapısı ve yönetim kurulu özellikleri açısından farklı özellikler gösteren Türkiye ortamında tepe yönetici ücretlerinin örgütsel sonuçları konusunda bulgular sunmak çalışmanın önemli bir diğer hedefidir. İlk olarak vekalet kuramını destekleyecek şekilde tepe yönetici ücretlerindeki artışın şirketlerin aktif karlılığını arttırdığı belirlenmiştir. İkinci olarak, tepe yönetici ücretlerinin firma performansı üzerindeki etkilerinin bazı kurumsal yönetişim mekanizmalarının etkinliğine bağlı olarak değiştiği bulunmuştur. Sahip kontrol ve yönetiminin daha baskın olduğu firmalarda yönetim kurulu bağımsızlık oranı arttıkça ve tepe yönetici rol ikiliği azaldıkça, diğer bir deyişle yönetim kurulunun doğrudan denetim gücü arttıkça, yönetici ücretlerinin firma performansı üzerindeki etkilerinin daha güçlü olduğu belirlenmiştir. Diğer bir deyişle şirket ortaklık yapısı ve bazı yönetim kurulu özelliklerinin tepe yönetici ücretlerini destekleyerek ve tamamlayarak firma performansına katkı sağladığı sonucuna ulaşılmıştır

IMPACT OF TOP MANAGEMENT TEAM COMPENSATION ON FIRM PERFORMANCE: ROLE OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE

The study aims to investigate the impact of top management team compensation on firm performance and identify the moderating roles of corporate governance (CG) mechanisms through a panel data model covering the years 4 Galatasaray Üniversitesi, İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi, İşletme Bölümü.* 2009-2013. This study also aims to contribute to the literature by providing insights regarding performance implication of executives compensation from an emerging economy perspective, namely from Turkey where firms’ ownership structures and board characteristics diverse significantly from that of the developed countries. First, we found that in line with the agency theory assumptions, an increase in executive compensation has a positive effect on return on asset of the firms. Second, we also found that this effect alters depending on the effectiveness of some of the CG mechanisms. The effect of compensation on firm performance becomes stronger in owner controlled and managed firms as the independence rate of the board increases and the CEO duality decreases, in other words as the monitoring power of the board increases. We conclude that the ownership structures and some of the board characteristics contribute to the firms’ performance by supporting and completing executive compensation
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Mali Çözüm-Cover
  • ISSN: 1303-5444
  • Yayın Aralığı: Yılda 6 Sayı
  • Başlangıç: 1991
  • Yayıncı: İstanbul Serbest Muhasebeci Mali Müşavirler Odası
Arşiv
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