Siyasetin Yargısallaşması Üzerine Bir Literatür Değerlendirmesi

Siyasetin yargısallaşması yargı organlarının, yasama organları üzerinde kontrol mekanizması aracılığıyla, yasama organı üzerine siyasal bir etki yaratabilmesidir. Siyasaldır, çünkü siyaset tarafından oluşturulmakta ve siyasal kurumları kontrol edebilmektedir. Bu çalışma, yüksek mahkemeler ve siyaset arasındaki ilişkiyi, siyasetin yargısallaşması ile anayasal denetimin inşa edilmesi veya dönüştürülmesiyle ilgili farklı teorik yaklaşımları tartışmaktadır. Siyasetin yargısallaşması, yasama ve yürütme erklerini sınırlaması açısından siyasetle yakından ve doğrudan ilişkilidir. Genelde yargı, özelde de anayasa mahkemesi gibi yüksek mahkemeler, önemli birtakım ulusal hatta uluslararası konulardaki denetim yetkileriyle yasama, yürütme, silahlı kuvvetler, uluslararası aktörler, STK’lar arasında başat bir aktör haline gelmiştir. Tüm demokrasilerde kuvvetler ayrılığının en önemli göstergelerinden biri olarak anayasal denetimi bazıları, siyasilere duyulan güvensizlik çerçevesinde, eski iktidar sahiplerinin ve/veya devlet elitlerinin bir tür hegemonik koruyucusu olarak değerlendirirken, bazıları ise anayasa yargısının bireysel haklar ve özgürlüklerin korunması için olmazsa olmaz olduğunu öne sürmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler:

Siyasetin Yargısallaşması, Hegemonyanın Korunması, Bireysel Haklar, Yargısal Denetim

Literature Framework on Judicialization of Politics

Judicialization of politics is a kind of political power through which judicial bodies have a control mechanism on legislative bodies. It is political because, judicial bodies are established by politicians. This study analyses different theoretical approaches of judicialization of politics in respect of the relationship between high courts and politics, and establishment and/or conversion of the judiciary. The judicialization of politics has different aspects as it is closely related to politics and limiting excessive powers of legislative and executive. Judicial bodies, generally high courts have become important and powerful actors among executive, legislative, military, international actors, and NGOs through control power over important domestic and even some international affairs. While some consider constitutional control as a kind of hegemonic preservation of former power holders and/or state elites in the framework of distrust of politicians, others argue that constitutional justice is essential for the protection of individual rights and freedoms.

Keywords:

Judicialization of Politics, Hegemonic Preservation, Individual Rights, Judicial Review,

PDF

___

Alston, P., Bustelo, M. R., ve Heenan, J. (Eds.). (1999). The EU and human rights (Vol. 1). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Bickel, A. M. (1986). The least dangerous branch: the Supreme Court at the bar of politics. Yale: Yale University Press.
Bork, R. (2002). Taking Fault with New York's Fault-Based Divorce: Is the Law Constitutional. John's J. Legal Comment., 16, 165.
Brumberg, D. (2001). Dissonant politics in Iran and Indonesia. Political Science Quarterly, 116(3), 381-411.
Caldeira, G. A., ve Gibson, J. L. (1992). The etiology of public support for the Supreme Court. American journal of political science, 36(3), 635-64.
Cappelletti, M. (1989). The judicial process in comparative perspective. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Correa Sutil, J. (1993). The Judiciary and the Political System in Chile: The dilemmas of judicial independence during the transition to democracy. Transition to Democracy in Latin America: The Role of the Judiciary, 89-106.
Dahl, R. A. (1989). Democracy and its Critics. New Haven: Yale University Press.
De Tocqueville, A. (1945). Democracy in America, ed. Phillips Bradley. New York: Knopf, 2, 154-57.
Dickson, J. (2008). How many legal systems? Some puzzles regarding the identity conditions of, and relations between, legal systems in the European Union. Problema, vol. 2.
Domingo, P. (2005). Judicialization of politics: The changing political role of the judiciary in Mexico. In The judicialization of politics in Latin America (pp. 21-46). Palgrave Macmillan, New York.
Dotan, Y., ve Hofnung, M. (2005). Legal Defeats—Political Wins: Why Do Elected Representatives Go to Court?. Comparative Political Studies, 38(1), 75-103.
Dworkin, R. (1986). Law's empire. Harvard: Harvard University Press.
Eisgruber, C. L. (2001). Can Law Schools Teach Values. USFL Rev., 36, 603.
Ely, J. H. (1980). Democracy and distrust: A theory of judicial review. Harvard: Harvard University Press.
Eskridge Jr, W. N., ve Ferejohn, J. (2008-2009). Constitutional Horticulture: Deliberation-Respecting Judicial Review. Tex. L. Rev., 87, 1273.
Feeley, M. M., ve Rubin, E. L. (2000). Judicial policy making and the modern state: How the courts reformed America's prisons. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Ferejohn, John. 1995. “Law, Legislation and Positive Political Theory.” J. Banks and E. Hanushek (eds.) içinde. Modern Political Economy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Ferejohn, J. (2002). Judicializing politics, politicizing law. Law and contemporary problems, 65(3), 41-68.
Galleguillos, N. (1998). From confrontation to friendly persuasion: an analysis of judicial reform and democratization in post-Pinochet Chile. Canadian Journal of Latin American and Caribbean Studies, 23(46), 161-192.
Garoupa, N. (2008). Providing a framework for reforming the legal profession: insights from the European experience. European Business Organization Law Review (EBOR), 9(3), 463-495.
George, A. L. and Bennett, A. (2005). Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press
Gibson, J. L., ve Caldeira, G. A. (2003). Defenders of democracy? Legitimacy, popular acceptance, and the South African Constitutional Court. The Journal of Politics, 65(1), 1-30.
Gibson, J. L., Caldeira, G. A., ve Baird, V. A. (1998). On the legitimacy of national high courts. American Political Science Review, 92(2), 343-358.
Gillman, H. (2002). How political parties can use the courts to advance their agendas: Federal courts in the United States, 1875–1891. American Political Science Review, 96(3), 511-524.
Ginsburg, T. (2003). Judicial review in new democracies: Constitutional courts in Asian cases. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Ginsburg, T. (2008). The Global Spread of Constitutional Review. In Keith Whittington and Daniel Keleman, eds., Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2487330
Goldstein, J. L., Goldstein, J., Kahler, M., Keohane, R. O., ve Slaughter, A. M. (Eds.). (2001). Legalization and world politics. MIT Press.
Graber, M. A. (2006). Dred Scott and the problem of constitutional evil. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Guarnieri, C. (2003). Courts as an instrument of horizontal accountability: the case of latin Europe. Democracy and the Rule of Law, 5, 223.
Guarnieri, C., Pederzoli, P., ve Thomas, C. A. (2002). The power of judges. Oxford: Oxford University Press, USA.
Henkin, L. (1990). The age of rights. Columbia: Columbia University Press.
Hilbink, E. C. (1999). Legalism against democracy: the political role of the judiciary in Chile. San Diego: University of California
Hirschl, R. (2002). Resituating the judicialization of politics: Bush v. Gore as a global trend. Canadian Journal of Law ve Jurisprudence, 15(2), 191-218.
Hirschl, R. (2004). " Juristocracy"--Political, not Juridical. The Good Society, 13(3), 6-11.
Hirschl, R. (2004). The political origins of the new constitutionalism. Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies, 11(1), 71-108.
Hirschl, R. (2006). The new constitutionalism and the judicialization of pure politics worldwide. Fordham L. Rev., 75, 721.
Hirschl, R. (2007). The Courts. Canadian Journal of Political Science/Revue canadienne de science politique, 40(1), 249-250.
Hirschl, R. (2008). The judicialization of mega-politics and the rise of political courts. Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci., 11, 93-118.
Jackson, V. C., ve Tushnet, M. V. (Eds.). (2002). Defining the field of comparative constitutional law. Praeger Publishers.
Jacob, H., Blankenburg, E., Kritzer, H. M., Provine, D. M., ve Sanders, J. (1996). Courts, law, and politics in comparative perspective. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Kavanagh, A. (2004). Comparative Perspectives on Constitutional Law: Implications for the Human Rights Act 1998. European Public Law, 10(1), 161-178.
Kelsen, H. (1941). Pure Theory of Law and Analytical Jurisprudence, The. Harv. L. Rev., 55, 44.
Klug, H. (2000). Constituting democracy: Law, globalism, and South Africa's political reconstruction. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Koopmans, T. (2003). Courts and political institutions: a comparative view. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Kramer, L. D. (2004). The people themselves: popular constitutionalism and judicial review. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Kühn, Z. (2006). The Changing Face of Central European Judiciary: The Judicial Application of Law Under Communism and Its Aftermath (Doctoral dissertation, University of Michigan Law School.
Landes, W. M., ve Posner, R. A. (1975). The independent judiciary in an interest-group perspective. The Journal of Law and Economics, 18(3), 875-901.
Larkins, C. (1998). The judiciary and delegative democracy in Argentina. Comparative Politics, 423-442.
Luhmann, N. (1985). A Sociological Theory of Law. London: Routledge.
Magalhaes, P. C. (1999). The politics of judicial reform in Eastern Europe. Comparative Politics, 43-62.
Magalhães, P. C. (2003). The limits to judicialization: Legislative politics and constitutional review in the Iberian democracies (Doctoral dissertation, The Ohio State University).
Mattli, W., ve Slaughter, A. M. (1995). Law and politics in the European Union: a reply to Garrett. International organization, 49(1), 183-190.
McDowell L. (1998). Elites in the city of London: some methodological considerations. Environment and Planning A. 30: 2133–2146.
Moravcsik, A. (2000). The origins of human rights regimes: Democratic delegation in postwar Europe. International Organization, 54(2), 217-252.
O'Brien, D. M. (Ed.). (2016). Judges on judging: views from the bench. Washington DC: Cq Press.
Peerenboom, R. (2004). Human rights and rule of law: What's the relationship. Geo. J. Int'l L., 36, 809.
Pildes, R. H. (2004). The constitutionalization of democratic politics. Harv. L. Rev., 118, 29.
Posner RA. (2008). How Judges Think. Cambridge. MA: Harvard Univ. Press
Powell, H. J. (2008). Constitutional conscience: The moral dimension of judicial decision. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Ramseyer, J. M. (1994). The puzzling (in) dependence of courts: A comparative approach. The Journal of Legal Studies, 23(2), 721-747.
Romano, C. P. (1998). The proliferation of international judicial bodies: the pieces of the puzzle. NYUJ Int'l L. ve Pol., 31, 709.
Roosevelt, K. (2006). The myth of judicial activism: making sense of Supreme Court decisions. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Ryssdal, R. (1981). The Relation between the Judiciary and the Legislative and Executive Branches of the Government in Norway. NDL Rev., 57, 527.
Sager, L. G. (2008). Justice in Plainclothes: a theory of American constitutional practice. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Scheingold, S. A. (1974). The Politics of Rights: Lawyers. Public Policy, and Political Change. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Schwartz, H. (2000). The struggle for constitutional justice in post-communist Europe. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Segal, J. A., ve Cover, A. D. (1989). Ideological values and the votes of US Supreme Court justices. American Political Science Review, 83(2), 557-565.
Shapiro, M. (1999). The success of judicial review. In Constitutional Dialogues in Comparative Perspective (pp. 193-219). Palgrave Macmillan, London.
Shapiro, M., ve Sweet, A. S. (2002). On law, politics, and judicialization. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Sieder, R., Cepeda Espinosa, M. J., Schjolden, L., ve Angell, A. (2005). The Judicialization of Politics in Latin America. New York: Palgrave Macmillan US.
Slaughter, A. M. (1999). Judicial globalization. Virginia Journal of International Law, 40, 1103.
Smithey, S. I., ve Ishiyama, J. (2000). Judicious choices: designing courts in post-communist politics. Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 33(2), 163-182.
Stephen M.. Griffin. (1996). American Constitutionalism: From Theory to Politics. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Stone Sweet, A. 2000. Governing with Judges: Constitutional Politics in Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Sweet, A. S. (1999). Judicialization and the Construction of Governance. Comparative Political Studies, 32(2), 147-184.
Sweet, A. S., ve Brunell, T. L. (2004). The judicial construction of Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Tate, C. N., ve Vallinder, T. (Eds.). (1995). The global expansion of judicial power. NY: NYU Press.
Tribe, L. H. (2008). The invisible constitution. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Tushnet, M. (1999). Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Tushnet, M. (2003). Weak Courts, Strong Rights: Judicial Review and Social Welfare Rights in Comparative Constitutional Law. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
Vanberg, Georg. (2005). The Politics of Constitutional Review in Germany. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Weiler, J. H. (1994). A quiet revolution: The European Court of Justice and its interlocutors. Comparative political studies, 26(4), 510-534.
Weiler, J. H. (1999). The Constitution of Europe: Do the New Clothes Have an Emperor? Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Whittington, K. E. (2007). Political Foundations of Judicial Supremacy: The President, the Supreme Court, and Constitutional Leadership in US History. Political Foundations of Judicial Supremacy. NY: Cornell University Press.
Zuckerman, H.A. (1972) Interviewing an ultra-elite. The Public Opinion Quarterly 36: 159–175.
Zurn, C. F. (2007). Deliberative democracy and the institutions of judicial review. New York: Cambridge University Press.