___

BP: The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, trans. A. Hofstadter, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982; rev. edn, 1988.

BTMR: Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson, New York: Harper, 1962.

CT: The Concept of Time, trans. William McNeill, Oxford, Blackwell, 1992.

GA 1: Frühe Schriften, ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann, 1978.

GA 18: Grundbegriffe der aristotelischen Philosophie, ed. M. Michalski, 2002

GA 2: Sein und Zeit (1927), ed. Friedrich Wilhelm von Herrmann, 1977.

GA 24: Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie, ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Hermann, 3rd edn, 1997. GA 56/57: Zur Bestimmung der Philosophie, ed. Bern Heimbüchel, 1987.

GA 58: Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie, ed. Hans-Helmuth Gander, 1992.

GA 59: Phänomenologie der Anschauung und des Ausdrucks. Theorie der philosophischen Begriffsbil- dung, ed. C. Strube, 1993.

GA 60: Phänomenologie des religiösen Lebens, ed. Matthias Jung, Thomas Regehly, and Claudius Strube, 1995.

GA 61: Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles. Einführung in die phänomenologische Forschung, ed. Walter Bröcker and Käte Bröcker-Oltmanns, 2nd edn, 1994.

GA 63: Ontologie. Hermeneutik der Faktizität, ed. K. Bröcker-Oltmanns, 1988; 2nd edn, 1995.

GA 64: Der Begriff der Zeit (1924), ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann, 2004.

OHF: Ontology: The Hermeneutics of Facticity, trans. John van Buren, Bloomington: Indiana Univer- sity Press, 1999.

PIA: Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle: Initiation into Phenomenological Research, trans. Richard Rojcewicz, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001.

PIE: Phenomenology of Intuition and Expression: Theory of Philosophical Concept Formation, trans. Tracy Colony, London, Continuum, 2010.

PRL: The Phenomenology of Religious Life, trans. Matthias Fritsch and Jennifer Anna Gosetti-Feren- cei, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004.

S: Supplements, ed. John Van Buren, Albany: SUNY Press, 2002.

TDP: Towards the Definition of Philosophy, trans. Ted Sadler, London: Continuum, 2002.

metni tersten okumak adettir. Belki de bu sebeptendir ki Husserl o dönem, 1929'da kitabı okuyup ona dair yorum yazmaya koyulana kadar, Heidegger'in, kendi transandantal fenomenolojisinden ne kadar ayrıldığını fark etmemiştir.

Sonraki yıllarda, Heidegger Varlık ve Zaman'ın Şubat 1927'de yayımlandığını söylemiştir, Theodore Kisiel, The Genesis of Being and Time, s. 489'da ise onu Nisan 1927 olarak tarihlendirir. (Nisan 1926'da -Husserl'in doğum gününde- Heidegger Husserl'e kitabın elle yazılmış ithaf sayfasını hediye etmiştir. THE EARLY HEIDEGGER Dermot Voran

In this chapter I shall discuss the work of Martin Heidegger from 1912 to 1927, but I shall concentrate especially on the Freiburg and Marburg lecture courses leading up to Being and Time.

Franz Brentano, Von der mannigfachen Bedeutung des Seienden nach Aristoteles (Freiburg: Herder, 1862; reprinted, Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1960), translated by Rolf George as On the Several Senses of Being in Aristotle (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975).

Theodore Kisiel, The Genesis of Being and Time (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 229, has rightly pointed out that both "My Way to Phenomenology" and the letter to Richardson stress only Heidegger's involvement with phenomenology and hence are not reliable guides to his overall intelle- ctual development.

in Husserl's eyes, Heidegger gradually began to fit the role of Husserl's adopted son. Heidegger himself displayed less than filial loyalty in his public and private evaluations of the "old man."

Largely because of the poverty of his parents, Heidegger had begun his studies as a Catholic seminarian and theology student. His 1914 doctoral thesis, an analysis of the nature of judgment in which he criticized both Rickert and Lask, was entitled Die Lehre vom Urteil in Psychologismus (The Doctrine of Judgment in Psychologism, GA 1, 59-188)4 written under the direction of Arthur Schneider, who held the Chair of Christian Philosophy in Freiburg. It is a somewhat pedestrian critical discussion of psychologism that shows few hints of his later genius.

I hold the philosophical, more exactly, the phenomenological handling of the mystical, moral-theological, and ascetic writings of medieval scholasticism to be especially crucial in its decisive insight into this fundamental characteristic of Scholastic psychology. (GA 1, 205, my translation)

In his efforts to gain an academic position, Heidegger tailored his curriculum vitae and interests. Thus he presented himself as someone interested in the neo-Scholastic revival of medieval philosophy. Later Karl Jaspers would record in his Autobiography that in conversation with Heidegger he expressed his surprise that "The dedication of Heidegger's first book to Rickert, of his second to Husserl, emphasizes a connection with people of whom he had spoken to me with contempt."5 Heidegger was certainly career oriented.

On January 21, 1919, benefitting greatly from the support of Husserl, Heidegger officially became a salaried member of the Freiburg philosophy seminar.6 Four days M. Heidegger, Die Lehre vom Urteil in Psychologismus. Eik kritisch-positiver Beitrag zur Logik (Le- ipzig: Barth, 1914).

Quoted in Elizabeth Hirsch, "Remembrances of Martin Heidegger in Marburg," Philosophy Today (Summer 1979), 160-9.

See Karl Schuhmann, Husserl-Chronik. Denkund Lebensweg Edmund Husserls (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1977), 231. For the significance of Husserl's achievement in gaining funding for a paid assistantship, see Hugo Ott, Martin Heidegger. A Political Life, trans. Allan Blunden (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), 115-16. Heidegger had been a Privatdozent but Husserl secured funding for him. It is not clear that Heidegger was actually Husserl's assistant in the formal sense.

Every history and history of philosophy constitutes itself in life in and for itself, life which is itself historical in an absolute sense. (GA 56/57, 21/ TDP, 18)

It is clear that Heidegger is interested in a way of capturing life, while still having sympathy for it. Heidegger questions the manner in which Rickert and other neo- Kantians had misunderstood the nature of value and validity, but he is also critical of phenomenology--saying the concept of "lived experience" (Erlebnis) has now been devalued to the point of meaninglessness (GA 56/57, 66/ TDP, 55) but he is still trying to remain true to the experience and attend to what is given in it, filtering out all misinterpretation.

(Existenzialien, GA 60, 232/ PRL, 173), its own "worldliness and valuableness" (Welt- und Werthaftigkeit, GA 60, 322/PRL, 244), and its own basic conceptions on which philosophy must not try to impose its own conceptual schemes from without:

Real philosophy arises not from preconceived concepts of philosophy and religion. Rather the possibility of its philosophical understanding arises out of a certain religiosity [Religiosität]--for us the Christian religiosity. . . . The task is to gain a real and original relationship to history, which is to be explicated from out of our own historical situation and facticity. (GA 60, 124-5/PRL, 89)

Dasein, as existing, is there for itself, even when the ego does not expressly direct itself to itself in the manner of its own peculiar turning around and turning back, which in Heidegger was not alone in wanting to free religion from its philosophical superstructure. Ernst Tro- eltsch and Rudolf Bultmann were proposing something similar.

phenomenology is called inner perception as contrasted with outer. The self is there for the Dasein itself without reflection and without inner perception, before all reflection. Reflection, in the sense of a turning back, is only a mode of self-apprehension, but not the mode of primary self-disclosure. (GA 24, 226/BP, 159)

In these years Heidegger is also elaborating on the meaning of hermeneutics. In his 1921/22 course on Aristotle he is already speaking of "phenomenological hermeneutics" (GA 61, 187/PIA, 141; see also S, 122) and the fundamental intentional movement of life as care (curare). By 1923, he is characterizing hermeneutics not as any kind of interpretative method but rather as Dasein's own "wakefulness" (Wachsein) with regard to its own existence; hermeneutics is the self-interpretation of facticity (GA 63, 15/ OHF, 12). As Heidegger writes in his Natorp Bericht:

Indeed Husserl had even planned to publish a version of it in Volume VII of his Jahrbuch (1924/1925). On Heidegger's time in Marburg see Elisabeth Hirsch, "Remembrances of Martin Heidegger in Mar- burg," Philosophy Today, 23(1979), 160-9.

In the tradition of proofreading, it is customary to read the text backward so that typographical errors are more visible as one is not disrupted by the flow of the text. It is possibly for this reason that Husserl did not at that time realize how far Heidegger had departed from his own transcendental phenomeno- logy until he sat down to read and comment on the book in 1929.

In later years Heidegger recalled that Being and Time was published in February 1927, whereas The- odore Kisiel, The Genesis of Being and Time, 489, dates it to April 1927. On April 8, 1926--Husserl's birthday--Heidegger presented Husserl with a handwritten dedication page for the book.