BRENTANO'NUN YÖNELİMSEL İÇKİN VAROLUŞ KAVRAMI

Yönelimsel içkin varoluş kavramı Brentano'nun felsefesinin mihenk taşıdır. Ancak bu kavramı izah etmek birkaç bakımdan zordur. Bu zorlukların ilk meşhur nedeni Brentano'nun bazı fikirlerini sonradan değiştirmesidir. İkincisi ise kitabının (Psikoloji) İngilizce basımında bulunan bazı dipnotların yanlış anlamalara neden olmasıdır. Bu çalışmanın ana konusu, Brentano'nun hangi fikirlerini değiştirdiğini ve ünlü kitabında yer alan başlıca hataları belirtmektir. Dolayısıyla böyle bir çalışma Brentano'yu yeni tanımaya başlayanlar için yol gösterici bir kaynak olacaktır.

BRENTANO'S CONCEPT OF INTENTIONAL INEXISTENCE

The concept of intentional inexistence is the touchstones of Brentano's philosophy. To explain this concept, however, is difficult in some respect. The first famous reason for these difficulties is that Brentano changed his views later on. The second reason is that some footnotes in English edition of his book (Psychology) cause misunderstandings. The main object of this study is to clarify the ideas that Brentano changed his mind about and major mistakes in his famous book. Hence such a study will be a guiding source for those who newly become familiar with Brentano.

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