Bu çalışma, Levinas'ın etiği ilk felsefe olarak konumlandırmasıyla sonuçlanan düşünsel serüveninin nasıl başladığını ve hangi aşamalardan geçerek geliştiğini ana hatlarıyla ortaya koymayı amaçlamaktadır. Haklı bir adlandırmayla "etiğin filozofu" olarak tanınan Levinas'ın sorumluluk çerçevesinde somutlaştırdığı düşüncelerinin arka planında, bu adlandırmayı ortaya çıkaran ve Heidegger ontolojisine yönelik eleştirilerine temel oluşturan aşkınlık anlayışı yer almaktadır. Aşkınlık düşüncesinin doğrudan ilgili olduğu varlık incelemesinden hareket eden ilk bölüm, Levinas'ın varoluşu varolanla ilgisinde nasıl ele aldığını ortaya koymaya çalışmaktadır. Bir varolan olarak Ben'in varoluşundan kurtulma doğrultusunda Başkası aracılığıyla tanıştığı başkalığı ve Ben-Başkası ilişkisinin prototipini ele alan ikinci bölüm, aşkınlığın olanağını sağladığı ileri sürülen ilk yanıt üzerine yoğunlaşmaktadır. Çalışmanın son bölümü ise, Levinas'ın aşkınlık düşüncesini yüz yüze bir sorumluluk ilişkisinde somutlaştırmasını ve aşkınlığı sağlayabilecek tek gerçek olanak olarak ortaya konan etik ilişkinin Levinasçı dayanaklarını ele almaktadır.

This study aims to reveal an outline of Levinas' intellectual process within themain theme of transcendence. Although he is known as the "philosopher ofethics", this appellation requires a meticulous attention and needs to be examinedwith its origin. The idea of transcendence, being the focus of Levinas' quest,stems from the criticism of ontology, specifically Heidegger's fundamentalontology. Considering this fact, the study starts with Levinas' account of Being, incomparison to ontology and its criticism. Levinas begins his analysis of Being bymentioning that Being has a dual aspect. Sharing Heidegger's thought onontological difference, Levinas underlines the difference between beings andBeing and names them "existents and existence". According to Levinas, the I -the existent - is enchained to its existence and this enchainment is experienced asa weight that makes the I feel suffocated. Because of this burden or the anonymityof existence (il y a), the I's initial feeling is to escape from it. Although gaining aposition in il y a by the birth of consciousness - the hypostasis - means a rupturein Being, it still does not mean a real exit or an excendence for Levinas.After the announcement of hypostasis, Levinas states that the I, which is at stakeat that point, is far from being a real subject. Focusing on its ontologicalexperiences, Levinas is of the opinion that the I's engagement with itsenvironment depends on its consciousness. For him, at that stage the I approacheseverything on the basis of knowing and understanding. So, despite one can pointto an I, this I is a being which still drowns in its existence.The second part of this study proceeds with the possibility of transcendence,which comes up in Time and the Other. For Levinas, the only way to an exit ispossible with the entrance of an exteriority, namely the otherness. Byencountering the otherness, the I comes to the limit of itself and catches the keyfor a transcendence. The relationship with the Other constitutes the central pointof transcendence. Analysing this face-to-face relationship, Levinas first sees thisrelationship as an erotic one. First of all, this erotic relationship reveals the factthat the Other is not an alter ego. In love, the otherness of the Other cannot bereduced to the I, and thanks to this encounter, the I gets the chance to get rid ofitself. As Levinas shows, this analysis provides a basis to understand why face-tofaceencounter surpasses the reason and how it can maintain the asymmetry of therelationship.Levinas' first detailed inquiry on transcendence ends with a concrete answer:Transcendence is possible through fecundity. Altough Levinas changes his mindabout love in Totality and Infinity, he sustains his answer for the idea oftranscendence. But one should note that his main concern in that book is theformal structure of transcendence rather than its content. So it can be said that thegeneral frame is determined by the explanation of face-to face relationshipcompatible with his criticism of ontology.The third and the last part of this study handles the concretization oftranscendence, which Levinas unfolds in Otherwise than Being or BeyondEssence. To him, becoming a real subject or achieving transcendence is possibleonly by undertaking the responsibility of the Other via saying that comes from the face of the Other. Starting from Totality and Infinity, with the phenomenology ofthe face, Levinas announces the idea of infinity. Stating that the face cannot bereduced to a plastic image, he claims that "the face is the locus of the word ofGod". So, the relationship with the Other makes the I an ethical subject, andthrough this asymmetrical responsibility the I can achieve a real transcendence.To sum up, this study tries to demonstrate Levinas' idea of transcendence in itschronological appearance consistent with the transformation of his thoughts. Likethe face being God's locus, transcendence is the place where one can trackLevinas' philosophy. His criticism of ontology and the questioning of "Being quaBeing" leads him to ethics, which gives him the reputation of "the philosopher ofethics". Here, contrary to the Western philosophy, the subject's uniqueness gainsa totally different meaning and the subject becomes "the one" only by being forthe Other. In Levinas' philosophy, the responsibility which sets the I free from itsexistence is like the ticket to freedom. But this responsibility is an everlastingassignment and the I has to cherish the Other as if anything that might happen tohim/her would be the I's fault. As a final remark it should be underlined that, farfrom providing a defence for Levinas' philosophy, this study primarily aims toindicate the origin for any kind of justification.