Epistemic Defeat, Deontology and Internalism

Öz What, on the view of many epistemologists, underlies the rationale for internalism is the deontological thought that epistemic justification proceeds in terms of how well our believing that p stands vis-à-vis relevant epistemic duties. However, in “Deontology and Defeat”, Bergmann argues that the view that justification is to be analyzed in deontic terms does not motivate internalism, as many are inclined to suppose. I argue that Bergmann’s argument fails to show this, for the reason that his argument is based on equating S’s belief that his second-order belief that p is epistemically irrational with the notion of epistemic defeat, the presence of which is sufficient but not necessary for epistemic irrationality.

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