Devletin Hacmini Belirleyen Faktörler: Ampirik bir Analiz

Bu çalışmanın amacı ülkeler arasındaki devletin boyutundaki faklılıkları ortaya koyacak çeşitli politik, ekonomik ve demografik faktörleri belirlemektir. Çalışmada, Dünya Bankası’nın veri tabanında bulunan 81 ülkenin 1990-2015 dönemi yıllık verileri kullanılarak söz konusu değişkenler ile devletin ekonomik hacmi arasındaki ilişki panel veri analiz yöntemi ile test edilmiştir. Devletin boyutunu ölçmede devletin nihai tüketim harcamalarının gayri safi yurt içi hasılaya oranı ölçüm birimi olarak kullanılmıştır. Başlıca bulgularımız şunlardır. Politik kutuplaşma (political polarizaiton), gelir eşitsizliği, nüfus yoğunluğu, kişibaşı gayri safi yurtiçi hasıla büyümesi, ülkenin federal bir yapıda olması ile devletin boyutu arasında anlamlı ve negatif bir ilişki, demokrasi, siyasi ayrışma (fractionalizaiton) ve dini ayrışma (religious fractionalizaiton) ile devletin boyutu arasında ise anlamlı ve pozitif bir ilişki vardır.

Determinants of Government Size: An Empirical Analysis

The purpose of the study is to identify various political, economic and demographic factors that will set out the differences in the size of government across countries. In this study, the effect of political, economic and demographic factors on government size will be analyzed by using panel data analysis method by using 1990-2015 data of the 81 countries included in the World Bank Database. In order to measure the size of government, namely, the dependent variable is government final consumption expenditure as a share of the gross domestic product. Our main findings are as follows. Between political polarization, income inequality, population density, per capita gross domestic product growth, the countries' federal structure and the size of government have a meaningful and negative relationship while democracy, fractionalization, religious fractionalization and the size of government have a significant and positive relationship.

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