Seçmenlerin, bir hedefe ulaşmak amacıyla en çok tercih ettikleri partiden başka bir partiye oy vermeleri “stratejik” oy verme davranışı olarak tanımlanır. Stratejik oy verme, yaklaşım olarak seçmenlerin her durumda en çok tercih ettikleri partiye oy verdiğini varsayan temel kuramlar ayrışır. Bu çalışma, stratejik oy verme davranışına literatürdeki farklı yaklaşımları açıklamayı ve bu davranışın ortaya çıkmasında etkili olan bireysel ve yapısal unsurları sistematik bir şekilde ele almayı amaçlamaktadır. Bu davranışın ortaya çıkmasında analitik düşünme gücü gibi bireysel unsurlar etkili olabildiği gibi, ülkenin demokrasi geçmişi, seçilen temsilci sayısı, seçim barajı ve seçim sisteminin türü gibi yapısal unsurlar da etkili olabilmektedir.
It is defined as “strategic” voting behavior in which voters cast their votes for a party other than the most preferred with a goal to achieve. Strategic voting, as an approach, breaks down the basic theories assuming that people vote for the most preferred party in any case. This study aims to explain the different approaches in the literature to strategic voting behavior and to systematically review the individual and structural factors that are affecting this type of behavior. Individual elements such as analytical thinking power and structural factors such as country’s democratic past, number of elected representatives, election threshold and type of electoral system are factors affecting strategic voting behavior.
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