Isaiah Berlın’in pozitif özgürlük kavramı ve eleştirdiği pozitif özgürlükçü yaklaşımlar

Bu makalenin amacı, “İki Özgürlük Kavramı” denemesinde, Isaiah Berlin’in bazı pozitif özgürlükçü yaklaşımlara yönelttiği eleştirisi ile kendi pozitif özgürlük anlayışını ayırarak, Berlin’in pozitif özgürlüğün bizatihi kendisini alaşağı etmediğini savunmaktır. Bu makalenin birinci bölümünde, Berlin’in pozitif özgürlük anlayışının, bireyin bir özne ve fail olarak kendisini ve kendi amaçlarını nasıl tasavvur etmişse o doğrultuda eylemeye ya da yapmaya özgür olması ve bunu dış kısıtlar üzerinde kısmen ya da bütünüyle egemenlik kurarak gerçekleştirmesi anlamına geldiği savunulmuştur. Negatif özgürlük, bireyin belirli bir serbestlik alanı içerisindeki imkânlarını belirleyen bir kavram olarak ele alınmıştır. İkinci bölümde, Berlin’in değer çoğulculuğu görüşünden hareketle, tek bir ahlaki kendini gerçekleştirme idealinin siyasal bir doktrin olarak uygulanmasına dayanan pozitif özgürlükçü yaklaşımlara yönelttiği eleştiri analiz edilmiştir. Berlin’in eleştirisinin, bu yaklaşımların bireylerin tahakküm yoluyla rasyonel benliğin amaçlarını gerçekleştirmeye zorlanmalarını özgürleşme olarak tanımlamasından kaynaklandığı savunulmuştur. Sonuç olarak, Berlin’in eleştirdiği pozitif özgürlükçü yaklaşımların, onun pozitif özgürlük anlayışının özünü oluşturan bireysel öznelliğin ve failliğin gerçekleşmesi düşüncesiyle keskin bir tezat oluşturduğu gösterilerek Berlin’in pozitif özgürlüğün bizatihi kendisini alaşağı etmediği öne sürülmüştür.

İsaiah Berlin’s concept of positive freedom and the approaches to positive freedom that berlin criticizes

This article argues that in “Two Concepts of Liberty” Isaiah Berlin criticizes some conceptions of positive freedom but he does not deny the meaning and significance of positive freedom itself. In the first part, it is argued that positive freedom, for Berlin, means freedom to do as a subject and doer who determines herself and her aims according to her own desires. Freedom in this sense implies an agent who can realize her aims by being either partially or completely sovereign over external constraints on her actions. Following Charles Taylor and Quentin Skinner, essence of positive freedom is identified as the realization of ends independently of removing the constraints. In the second part, it is argued that Berlin criticizes the positive conceptions of freedom that are based on an ideal of rational self-realization and can transform this ideal into an organic political doctrine. These conceptions, for Berlin, justify oppressing individuals to conform to a single ideal of rational self-realization as a process of liberation, and the rationalist assumptions underlying them conflict with Berlin’s view of value pluralism. Consequently, this article reveals a sharp contrast between Berlin’s definition of positive freedom and the conceptions of positive freedom that he criticizes.

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