Enflasyon Hedeflemesi Rejimi Para Politikası Güvenilirliğini Arttırır mı?

Enflasyon hedeflemesi rejimi, sayısal bir enflasyon hedefinin açıklanmasını, Merkez Bankası’nın açıklamış olduğu bu hedefe sadık kalma sözü ile, iletişim ve şeffaflık stratejisine dayalı bir para politikasıdır. Enflasyon hedefi para politikası- nın nihai amacıdır. Aynı zamanda bu rejim güvenilirlik (kredibilite) sorununu çö- zebilecek bir politika olarak sayılmaktadır. Bu alanda yapılmış olan çalışmalar te- orik ve ampirik olarak kredibilite sorunu riskine karşı alınabilecek önlemleri ince- lemiştir. Literatürde yer alan bu önlemlerin çoğunu, enflasyon hedeflemesi rejimi, zaten içinde barındırmaktadır. Politika özellikleri gereği zaman tutarsızlığı prob- lemini de ortadan kaldırarak, enflasyon hedeflemesi rejimi, güvenilirlik derecesi- ni arttırmaktadır.

Does Inflation Targeting Increase the Credibility of Monetary Policy?

Inflation targeting is a monetary policy based on the announcement of a target inflation rate and an engagement of respect to the announced target by the Cent- ral Bank and on a strategy of communication and transparency. Then the target inflation is the final goal of the monetary policy. It’s also a policy that allows sol- ving the credibility problem. The present paper identifies the means by which inf- lation targeting improves the credibility. The previous theoretical andempirical re- searches on this subject are about how to avoid this credibility issue. The inflati- on targeting regime already includes most of these measures. Due to the natu- re of policy, it disables the problem of time inconsistency whilst inflation targeting regime increases the credibility.

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