Bilimde Değerlerin Rolü Işığında Bilime Güven

Günümüz bilim felsefesi, sosyal ve etik değerlerin bilimsel akıl yürütmedeki kaçınılmaz rolünü vurgulamaktadır. Değerlerin bu rolü, toplumun bilime güveninin hangi temeller üzerine inşa edilmesi gerektiği sorusunu gündeme getirir. Bu makale, bu soruya cevap sunan üç yaklaşımı sunup değerlendirmektedir. Yüksek epistemik standartlar yaklaşımına göre, bilim insanları sadece oldukça kesin sonuçları halkla paylaşmalıdır. Bu makale, bu yaklaşımın sadece tümevarımsal riskler konusunda bize yardımcı olduğunu, diğer epistemik riskler konusunda aydınlatıcı olmadığını savunur. Bu yaklaşımın diğer bir eksiği ise bazı durumlarda bilimsel bulguların yetersiz kullanılmasına yol açmasıdır. Demokratik değerler yaklaşımı, bilimsel araştırmaların demokratik süreçler ışığında belirlenen değerleri kullanması gerektiğini ileri sürer. Bu makale, bu yaklaşımın bilimin uluslararası ve zamanlar arası doğasıyla gerilim içinde olduğunu ve pratik açıdan eksikleri olduğunu savunur. Boulicault ve Schroeder’in önerdiği karma yaklaşım, ilk iki yaklaşımın unsurlarını ve Wilholt’un metodolojik konvansiyonların önemine dair gözlemlerini harmanlar. Bununla birlikte, bu yaklaşım üç yaklaşımın faydalarını bir araya getiremez. Bu yaklaşımın diğer bir sorunuysa üç farklı yaklaşımın aynı anda kullanılmasının güçlüğüdür. Makale, bu yaklaşımların hiçbirinin kapsamlı bir çözüm sunmadığı sonucuna varırken, etkili bir çözümün yerine getirmesi gereken temel kriterleri sunar. Bu kriterler arasında pratik uygulanabilirlik, bilimsel bilgiyi tam olarak kullanma, sadece tümevarımsal risklerin değil, genel olarak epistemik risklerin başarıyla yönetilmesi, bilimin sosyal organizasyonu ile uyum ve teşvik uyumluluğu bulunmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler:

bilim ve değerler, bilime güven, tümevarımsal risk, epistemik risk

Trust in Science in Light of the Role of Values in Science

The philosophy of science has recently highlighted the ineliminable role of social and ethical values in scientific reasoning, which poses challenges for ensuring trust in science. This article evaluates three approaches to building public trust in science, given the role of values. According to the high epistemic standards approach, scientists should only share results with the public that are highly certain. This paper argues that this approach doesn’t address all types of epistemic risks and can lead to underutilization of scientific findings. The democratic values approach maintains that scientific research should use democratically determined values. This paper argues that, while this approach addresses the shortcomings of the first approach, it also creates difficulties in the international and intertemporal coordination of research and has practical shortcomings. The hybrid approach offered by Boulicault and Schroeder combines elements of the first two approaches with Wilholt’s insights about the role of methodological conventions. However, it fails to combine the benefits of these approaches. The classification of research into discrete categories, essential for executing this approach, also proves to be difficult. The paper concludes that none of these approaches offers a comprehensive solution and highlights the key criteria that an effective solution should fulfill. These criteria include being applicable, fully utilizing scientific knowledge, addressing not just inductive risks but epistemic risks broadly, being aligned with the social organization of science, and being incentive-compatible.

Keywords:

Science values in science, trust in science, inductive risk, epistemic risk,

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