Aristoteles’in Kategoriler’i Formlar Teorisini Nasıl Eleştirir

Kategoriler’de, iki tür ontolojik yüklemleme ilişkisi ve karşılık gelen iki temel varlık ayrımı karşımıza çıkar. Aristoteles, bir taşıyıcı içinde olma ifadesiyle tözleri ilineklerden, bir taşıyıcı için söylenir olma ifadesiyle de tümelleri, özleri bakımından aynı olan tikellerinden ayırır. Anılan ayrımlar bize Aristoteles’in varlık görüşündeki iki temel prensibi verirler: Var olan çok anlamlıdır ve her zaman belirli bir şeydir. Bu bakımdan Kategoriler, şeylerin hem özlerini hem de ilineklerini açıklama ve böylece ilgili yüklemleme problemlerini çözme iddiasına sahiptir. Bu doğrultuda, metnin kendisinde doğrudan bir atıf bulunmasa da literatürde Kategoriler’in Platoncu formlara yönelik iki temel eleştiri getirdiği sonucuna varılır: (1) Formlar teorisi var olanları tek anlamlı varsayarak şeylerin ilineksel özelliklerini açıklamakta başarısız olur; (2) formlar teorisi ilişkisel bir yüklemleme modeli kabul ettiğinden şeylerin özlerini açıklamakta başarısız olur. Bu yazı, Kategoriler ve Platoncu formlar arasındaki bu eleştirel ilişkinin Metafizik’in A kitabında yer alan bir pasajda (990b22-991a3) açıkça görülebileceği iddiasını taşır. Bilhassa Afrodisyaslı Aleksandros’un şerhi ışığında ele alındığında, pasajda formlar teorisine yöneltilen karşıt argümanların kategoriler kuramını varsaydığı ve argümanlar ile tam da literatürde konu edilen iki eleştirinin yapıldığı görülür. Bunun devamı olarak pasajdan, Kategoriler’in kaçındığı fakat formlar teorisinin yüzleşmek zorunda olduğu bazı ontolojik zorlukları çıkarsamak da mümkündür. Bu yazı ile, anılan pasaj bir kanıt olarak sunulmakta ve böylece Kategoriler’de formlar teorisinin örtük bir eleştirisi bulunduğu yönündeki literatür okumalarına katkıda bulunulması amaçlanmaktadır. Bunun için önce Aristoteles’in bu metinde ortaya koyduğu yüklemleme kuramı açıklanmakta ve ardından anılan pasaj analiz edilmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler:

Kategoriler, formlar teorisi, Afrodisyaslı Aleksandros, yüklemleme, taşıyıcı

How Does Aristotle’s Categories Criticize the Theory of Forms?

Aristotle’s Categories posits two kinds of ontological predications and two corresponding distinctions of being. Aristotle distinguishes substances from nonsubstances by accidental predication (being in a subject), particulars from their universals by essential predication (being said-of a subject). These distinctions provide two fundamental principles regarding Aristotle’s ontology: (1) Being is said in many ways, and (2) being is always being something. In this respect, Categories has the claim of explaining both the essences and accidents of things and thereby solving the related problems of predication. Accordingly, although no direct reference can be found in the text itself, scholarly opinion has concluded Categories to offer two fundamental critiques of Platonic Forms: (1) The theory of Forms fails to explain the accidental features of things by assuming one kind of being, and (2) the theory of Forms fails to explain the essential natures of things because of its relational account of predication. This paper argues that the critical relationship between Categories and the Platonic Forms can be explicitly read in a passage in Book A of Aristotle’s Metaphysics (990b22-991a3). When considered in light of Alexander of Aphrodisias’ commentary on it in particular, one notices that the counterarguments directed against the theory of Forms in the passage assume the doctrine of categories and make precisely two criticisms as ascribed in the literature. Furthermore, one can infer from the passage some ontological difficulties that the Platonic Forms has to face while Categories avoids. This article aims to contribute to the scholarly idea of reading Categories against Plato’s theory of Forms by providing this passage as textual evidence. To this end, I will first explain Aristotle’s theory of predication as introduced in this treatise and then analyze the aforementioned passage.

Keywords:

Categories, theory of Forms, Alexander of Aphrodisias, predication, substratum,

PDF

___

Ackrill, L. John. Aristotle: Categories and De Interpretatione. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963. google scholar
Ackrill, L. John. Aristotle the Philosopher. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981. google scholar
Alexander of Aphrodisias. On Aristotle’s Metaphysics 1. Translated With Notes by W.E. Dooley. S. J. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1989. google scholar
Allen, E. Reginald. “Individual Properties in Aristotle’s Categories”. Phronesis 14-1 (1969): 31-39. google scholar
Anagnostopoulos, Georgios. “Aristotle’s Works and the Development of His Thought”. A Companion to Aristotle. Edited by G. Anagnostopoulos, 14-27. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009. google scholar
Annas, Julia. “Aristotle on Substance, Accident and Plato’s Forms”. Phronesis, 22-2 (1977): 146-160. google scholar
Aristotle. Categories and De Interpretatione. Translated With Notes and Glossary by John L. Ackrill. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963. google scholar
Aristoteles. Kategoriler. Çeviren Gurur Sev. İstanbul: Pinhan Yayıncılık, 2019. google scholar
Aristoteles. Kategoriler. Çeviren Saffet Babür. Ankara: İmge Kitabevi Yayınları, 2002. google scholar
Aristoteles. Metafizik. Çeviren Gurur Sev. İstanbul: Pinhan Yayıncılık (4. Baskı), 2018. google scholar
Aristoteles. Metafizik. Çeviren Ahmet Arslan. İstanbul: Divan Kitap, 2019. google scholar
Aristotle. Metaphysics. Translated With Introduction and Notes by C. D. C. Reeve. Indianapolis: Hacket Publishing, 2016. google scholar
Aristoteles. Yorum Üzerine. Çeviren Saffet Babür. Ankara: İmge Kitabevi Yayınları, 2018. google scholar
Barnes, Jonathan. “Metaphysics”. The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle. Edited by Jonathan Barnes, 66-108. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995. google scholar
Cherniss, Harold. F. Aristotle’s Criticism of Plato and the Academy, Vol. I. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1944. google scholar
Code, Alan. “Aristotle: Essence and Accident”. Philosophical Grounds of Rationality: Intentions, Categories, google scholar
Ends. Edited by Richard E. Grandy and Richard Warner, 411-439. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986. google scholar
Cornford, Francis Macdonald. Plato’s Theory of Knowledge. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1935. google scholar
Duerlinger, James. “Predication and Inherence in Aristotle’s ‘Categories’”. Phronesis 15-2 (January 1970): 179-203. google scholar
Fine, Gail. On Ideas: Aristotle’s Criticism of Plato’s Theory of Forms. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2004. google scholar
Frede, Michael. “The Title, Unity, and Authenticity of the Aristotelian Categories”. Essays in Ancient Philosophy 11-28. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987. google scholar
Frede, Michael. “Categories in Aristotle”. Essays in Ancient Philosophy 29-48. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987. google scholar
Grafton-Cardwell, Patrick. “Understanding Mediated Predication in Aristotle’s Categories”. Ancient Philosophy 41-2 (Fall 2021): 443-462. google scholar
Hamlyn, W. David. “Aristotle on Predication”. Phronesis 6-2 (1961): 110-126. google scholar
- --. “The Communion of Forms and the Development of Plato’s Logic”. The Philosophical Quarterly 5-21 (October 1955): 289-302. google scholar
d’Hoine, Pieter. “Aristotle’s Criticism of Non-Substance Forms and its Interpretation by the Neoplatonic Commentators”. Phronesis 56 (2011): 262-307. google scholar
Jaeger, Werner. Aristotle: Fundamentals of the History of His Development. Translated by Richard Robinson. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1948. google scholar
Jones, R. J. “Are the Qualities of Particular Things Universal or Particular?” The Philosophical Review, 58-2 (1949): 152-170. google scholar
Loux, J. Michael. Metaphysics: A Contemporary Introduction. New York and London: Routledge, 2006. google scholar
- --. Primary Ousia: An Essay on Aristotles Metaphysics Z andH. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2008 [1991]. google scholar
Mann, Wolfgang-Rainer. The Discovery of Things: Aristotle’s Categories and Their Context. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000. google scholar
Matthews, B. Gareth. “Aristotelian Categories”. A Companion toAristotle. Edited by Georgios Anagnostopoulos, 144-161. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009. google scholar
Matthews, B. Gareth and S. Marc Cohen. “The One and the Many”. The Review of Metaphysics 21-4 (June 1968): 630-655. google scholar
Moravcsik, J. M. E. “Aristotle on Predication”. The Philosophical Review 76-1 (January 1967): 80-96. google scholar
Owen, E. L. Gwilym. “Dialectic and Eristic in the treatment of the Forms”. Aristotle on Dialectic: The Topics; Proceedings of the Third Symposium Aristotelicum. Edited by Gwilym E.L. Owen, 103-125. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968. google scholar
- --. “The Platonism of Aristotle”. Proceedings of the British Academy, (1965): 125-150. google scholar
Owens, Joseph. The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian ‘Metaphysics’: A Study in the Greek Background of Mediaeval Thought. Toronto: Pontifical Institude of Mediaeval Studies, 1978. google scholar
Plato. Complete Works. Edited by John M. Cooper, Associate Editor D. S. Hutchinson. Indianapolis/ Cambridge: Hackett Publishing, 1997. google scholar
Peters, E. Francis. Antik Yunan Felsefesi Terimleri Sözlüğü. Çeviren ve Hazırlayan Hakkı Hünler. İstanbul: Paradigma Yayıncılık, 2004. google scholar
Ross, W. David. Aristotle’s Metaphysics, Vol. I. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1924. google scholar
Sirkel, Riin. “The Problem of Katholou (Universals) in Aristotle”. Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Repository. 62. PhD diss., The University of Western Ontario, 2010. Erişim 5.12.2022, https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/etd/62. google scholar
Sharma, Ravi. “What is Aristotle’s “Third Man” Argument Against the Forms?” Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 28 (2005): 123-160. google scholar
Shields, Christopher. Aristotle. London: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2007. google scholar
Studtman, Paul. “Aristotle’s Early and Late Ontologies”. Philosophy Compass 6 (7) (2011): 469-476. google scholar
Vlastos, Gregory. Platonic Studies. Princeton: University Press, 1973. google scholar
White, F.C. “Plato’s Middle Dialogues and the Independence of Particulars”. The Philosophical Quarterly 27108 (July 1977): 193-213. google scholar