On the 6th of January 2014, the Obama administration said it would send an additional 800 troops to South Korea, with the aim of preventing any likely provocation due to the deepening of worries about the stability of the North Korea regime. Worries that became acute especially after the North Korean leader Kim Jong-Un executed his uncle. The US Secretary State John Kerry, in a joint press conference with his South Korean partner, also said that Washington will remain fully committed to the defense of the Republic of South Korea (ROK) throughmethods including extended deterrence and putting the full range of US military capabilities in place1 . Last year, in March 2013, with heightened tensions in the region accruing especially as a result of the negative effects of the 2010 North Korean low level conventional assaults on South Korea, the two sides, namely Washington and Seoul, decided to sign a military agreement. 

Today, the status of the UED that had been extended to Washington’s allies and partners as a result of the changing geopolitical conditions is under strain. Con- sequently, its credibility has been questioned resulting from the Asian theatre’s uncertain future. The UED in the case of Korea as well as in other theaters, has been primarily aimed at achieving four common objectives. In the first case, the ‘‘deterrence of denial’’ via the US existing nuclear umbrella, wherein the enemy has been persuaded not to make a nuclear assault against Washington’s allies and partners (in this case, the ROK). However, if the ‘‘deterrence of denial’’ fails, the US has made it clear that it will be ready to punish its partners’ opponents by the use of force i.e. through ‘the ‘deterrence of punishment’’. The second aim of extending the nuclear guarantee is to assure Washington’s partners that the UED is viable and credible4. Thirdly, Washington, by assuring its allies and partners in extending the UED, want to guarantee that these states will not develop their own nuclear capabilities. In this manner, the US is still looking to limit the legitimate number of nuclear weapons to no more than what has been principally accepted under the NPT formula during the 1970s. Finally, successive governments in the US, during the Cold War and after, have looked to stop a new WMD proliferation cascade emerging both regionally and globally with the help of the UED. More importantly, the UED in today’s complex security conditions is expected to pre- vent not only the likelihood of nuclear/and WMD assaults on Washington’s allies and partners but is also predicted to avert the likelihood of low level conventional assaults on them