Sandel’in 'Mükemmeliyet’e Karşı Argümanlar’ındaki Doğruluk Payının Sorgusu

Michael J. Sandel, The Case Against Perfection adlı kitabında insanları tedavi etmeyi değil onları geliştirmeyi amaçlayan tıbbi ve genetik müdahalelere karşı itirazlar sunmaktadır. Sandel’in görüşleri Frances M. Kamm tarafından kuvvetle eleştirilmiştir. Bu makale Sandel’in görüşlerini Kamm’ın itirazlarına verdiği ce-vap ışığında yeniden değerlendirmekte ve Sandel’in görüşlerinde bu konuda dü-şünürken hala yol gösterici unsurlar olup olmadığını araştırmaktadır.

Looking for the Kernel of Truth in Sandel’s The Case Against Perfection

In his book, The Case Against Perfection, Michael J. Sandel has offered several reasons against biomedical human enhancements that would apply to all such enhancements. However, his views have been subject to forceful objec-tions by Frances M. Kamm. The aim of this paper is to evaluate Sandel’s posi-tion in light of his response to Kamm’s critique to determine and articulate what, if anything, is worth preserving in Sandel’s account in future thinking about enhancements.

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