THOMAS SCHELLING’İN KURAMSAL ÇALIŞMALARININ SOĞUK SAVAŞ STRATEJİLERİNE KATKILARI

Sosyal, siyasal ve ekonomik olaylara ilişkin yaptıkları oyun kuramsal analizler vasıtasıyla, çatışma veişbirliğine yönelik anlayışa sağladıkları katkı sebebiyle 2005 yılında Robert J. Aumann ile ekonomi dalındaNobel ödülüne layık görülen Thomas Crombie Schelling, yaşamı boyunca birçok farklı konuda çalışmalaryapmış bir ekonomisttir. 1951’de Harvard Üniversitesi’nde ekonomi doktorasını tamamladığı dönemde dünya,Soğuk Savaş’ın etkisi altında ve nükleer savaş tehdidi ile karşı karşıyaydı. Bu sebeple Schelling, nükleersilahlanma ve caydırıcılık gibi konularla ilgilenmeye başladı. Nükleer caydırıcılık ve pazarlık stratejileriyleilgili düşüncelerini oyun kuramsal uygulamalar ile ortaya koydu. Yapmış olduğu uygulamaların oyun kuramıhakkında bilgisi olmayan insanların dahi anlayacağı şekilde olması ve matematik yüklü olmamasıçalışmalarının geniş kitlelere ulaşmasını sağlamaktaydı. Bu çalışmada Thomas C. Schelling’in çalışmaları veortaya koyduğu farklı stratejik yaklaşımlar incelenecektir. Türkçe literatürde Thomas C. Schelling veçalışmalarına ilişkin herhangi bir eser bulunmaması sebebiyle bu çalışmanın bundan sonra Türkçe literatürdeSchelling’le ilgili yapılacak çalışmalar için bir başlangıç niteliği taşıması amaçlanmaktadır.

Contribution of Thomas Schelling’s Theoretical Studies to Cold War Strategies

Thomas Crombie Schelling, who won the Nobel Economy Prize with Robert J. Aumann in 2005 for contributing the understanding of conflict and cooperation through game theoretical analysis on social, political and economic issues, is an economist who has studied on different subjects throughout his life. When he completed his Phd in Harvard University in 1951, the world was under the influence of Cold War and facing the threat of nuclear war. For that reason, Schelling started to deal with the subjects like nuclear armament and deterrence. He introduced his thoughts about nuclear deterrence and bargaining strategies by game theoretical applications. The fact that his applications were comprehensible even to those who did not have knowledge about game theory and they were not mathematically loaded, made them reachable to large masses. In this study, Thomas C. Schelling’s studies and his distinctive strategic approaches will be examined. Since there is no work about Thomas C. Schelling and his studies in Turkish literature, it is aimed that this study will be a preliminary to the studies going to be made about Schelling in Turkish language in the future.

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