OLASILIĞIN ROMEO’SU VE JULIET’İ

Olasılık gündelik dilde olduğu gibi olasılık felsefesinde de iki farklı anlamda kullanılır: Öznel olasılıkve nesnel olasılık. Kimi filozoflara göre gerçek olasılık öznel olasılıktır. Bu olasılık bir ilerisürüme duyulaninanç düzeyini yansıtan bir ölçüdür. Söz konusu ölçü, ilerisürüme tam inanılması durumunda 1, hiçinanılmaması durumunda 0, eşit ölçüde olmak üzere biraz inanılıp biraz inanılmaması durumunda ise 0.5 olur.Kimi filozoflar bu olasılığı gerçek olasılık biçiminde değerlendirmezler. Onlara göre gerçek olasılık nesnelolasılıktır. Nesnel olasılık bir denemedeki herhangi bir sonucun olmaktaki kolaylık düzeyini yansıtan birölçüdür. Olmaktaki kolaylık soyuttur ve bu nedenle de uzun dönemdeki göreceli sıklık ile somutlaştırılır. Bunagöre bir denemedeki bir sonuca ilişkin nesnel olasılık söz konusu sonuç denemelerin hepsinde gerçekleşiyorsa1, hiçbirinde gerçekleşmiyorsa 0, yarısında gerçekleşip yarısında gerçekleşmiyorsa ½ olur. Bu çalışma,olasılığın Romeo’su ve Juliet’i diye adlandırılabilecek yukarıdaki olasılık anlamlandırmalarını, olasılık kuramıtarihini dört döneme ayırarak incelemeyi amaçlamaktadır.

Romeo and Juliet of Probability

Probability is used in two different meanings in the philosophy of probability as well as everyday language: Subjective probability and objective probability. According to some philosophers, true probability is subjective probability. This probability is a measure reflecting the degree of belief attached to a hypothesis. The mentioned measure is equal to 1 if the hypothesis is believed completely, is equal to 0 if the hypothesis is disbelieved completely, and is equal to 0.5 if the hypothesis is believed and disbelieved equally. Some philosophers do not evaluate this probability as true probability. According to them, true probability is objective probability. Objective probability is a measure reflecting the degree of possibility for an outcome in a trial. The degree of possibility is abstract and it can be concretized by long run relative frequency of the outcome in a trial. Hence, the objective probability attached to an outcome in a trial is equal to 1 if the outcome occurs every time, is equal to 0 if it never occurs, and is equal to ½ if it occurs in half of the sequences of the trial. This paper aims to examine those interpretations, which may be named as Romeo and Juliet of probability, by dividing the history of probability theory into four periods.

PDF

___

Arntzenius, F-Hall, N. (2003), “On What We Know About Chance”, British Journal of Philosophical Science, 54(2): 171-179.
Burnes, C. E. (1938), “The Concept of Probability-A Critical Survey of Recent Contribution”, Philosophy of Science, 5(1): 1-20.
Carnap, R. (1945a), “The Two Concepts of Probability”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 5(4): 513-532.
Carnap, R. (1945b), “On Inductive Logic”, Philosophy of Science, 12(2):72-97.
Carnap, R. (1953), “Inductive Logic and Science”, Proceedings of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 80(3): 189-197.
Condorcet, Jean-Antoine-Nicolas de Caritat marquis de (2014), Essai sur l'application de l'analyse à la probabilité des décisions rendues à la pluralité des voix (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
Cooper, Neil (1965), “The Concept of Probability”, The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 16(63): 226-238.
Cournot, A. A. (1843), Exposition de la théorie des chances et des probabilités (Paris: L. Hachette).
Daston, L. (1988), Classical Probability in the Enlightment (New Jersey: Princeton University Press).
Daston, L. (1994), “How Probabilities Came to Be Objective and Subjective”, Historia Mathematica, 21: 330-344.
Galavotti, M. C. (2005), Philosophical Introduction of Probability (Stanford/California: CSLI Publications).
Gillies, D. (2000), Philosophical Theories of Probability (London and New York: Routledge).
Gnedenko, B. V. (1978), The Theory of Probability (Translated from George Yankovsky) (Moscow: Mir Publishers).
Hacking, I. (1991), The Emergence of Probability (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
Hasofer, A. M. (1967), “Random Mechanisms in Talmudic Literature”, Biometrika, 54(1-2): 316-321.
Humphreys, P. (1985), “Why Propensities Cannot be Probabilities”, The Philosophical Review, 94(4): 557-570.
Kendall, M. (1970a), “The Beginnings of a Probability Calculus”, (E. S. Pearson-M. G. Kendall (1970), Studies in the History of Statistics and Probability II (London: Hafner Publishing Company)), 19-34.
Kendall, M. (1970b), “Where Shall the History of Statistics Begin”, (E. S. Pearson-M. G. Kendall (1970), Studies in the History of Statistics and Probability II (London: Hafner Publishing Company)), 45-46.
Keynes, J. M. (1921), A Treatise on Probability (Cambridge: Kings College).
Korkmaz, A. (2005), “Olasılık Kuramının Doğuşu”, Ankara Üniversitesi SBF Dergisi, 60(2): 171-193.
Laplace, M. de P. S. (1902), A Philosophical Essay on Probabilities (London: John Wiley and Sons).
Lewis, D. (1980), “A Subjectivist’s Guide to Objective Chance” (R. C. Jeffrey, Studies in Inductive Logic and Probability II içinde (Berkeley: University of California Press), 263-293.
Mellor, D. H. (2005), Probability: A Philosophical Introduction (London: Routledge).
Miller, D. W. (1994), Critical Rationalism: A Restatement and Defence (USA: Open Court Publishing Company).
Miller, D. W. (1996), “A Paradox of Information”, British Journal of Philosophy of Science, 17: 59-61.
Nagel, E. (1936), “The Meaning of Probability”, Journal of the American Statistical Association, 31(193): 10-30.
Pascal, B. (1972), Penseés (London: Penguin Books).
Pascal, B. (2000), Düşünceler (İstanbul: Kaknüs Yayınları).
Peirce, C. S. (1878a), “The Probability of Induction”, Popular Science Monthly, 12: 705-718.
Peirce, C. S. (1878b), “The Doctrine of Chance”, Popular Science Monthly, 12: 604-615.
Plato, J. V. (1994), Creating Modern Probability (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
Poisson, S. D. (1837), Récherches sur la Probabilité des Jugements en Matière Criminelle et en Matière Civile (Paris: Bachelier).
Popper, K. R. (1959), “The Propensity Interpretation of Probability”, The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 10: 37: 25-42.
Popper, K. R. (1998), Bilimsel Araştırmanın Mantığı (Çeviren İlknur Aka-İbrahim Turan) (İstanbul: YKY Yayınları).
Rabinovitch, N. L. (1977), “Probability in the Talmud” (M. G. Kendall-R. L. Plackett (Studies in the History of Probability and Statistics XXII (Bristol: Charless Griffin)), 15-19.
Ramsey, F. P. (2011), “Truth and Probability” (R.B. Braithwaite, The Foundations of Mathematics and other Logical Essays içinde (London and New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd.)), 156-198.
Reichenbach, H. (1978), Selected Writings, 1909-1953 (Editors Maria Reichenbach-Robert S. Cohen) (Dordrecht-Boston: Reidel).
Savage, L. J. (1954), The Foundations of Statistics (New York: Dover Publications).
Self, P. (1991), A History of Inverse Probability (New York: Springer).
Strevens, M. (1995), “A Closer Look at the “New Principle”, The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 46: 545-561.
Strevens, M. (1999), “Objective Probability as a Guide to the World”, Philosophical Studies, 95: 243- 275.
Thau, M. (1994), “Undermining and Admissibility”, Mind, 103: 491-505.
Zabell, S. L. (2011), “The Subjective and the Objective”, Handbook of Philosophy of Statistics, 7: 1149-1174).