Finansal sıkıntılı şirketlerde yeniden yapılandırma süreçleri ve yeniden yapılandırma süreçlerinin seçimini etkileyen faktörler

Finansal sıkıntıdan kurtulmak isteyen şirketler iki yeniden yapılandırma sürecinden birini seçebilir: Mahkeme dışı özel yeniden yapılandırma" veya "iflas yasaları çerçevesinde mahkeme gözetiminde yeniden yapılandırma". Mahkeme dışı özel yeniden yapılandırmaların maliyeti genel olarak daha az olmakla birlikte direnme problemi olasılığı yüksektir. İflas sürecinde yeniden yapılandırmanın ise dava ve takiplerin durması, yeniden yapılandırma planının belli bir çoğunluğun kabul etmesi ile uygulamaya konulabilmesi gibi avantajları yanısıra; maliyetinin daha yüksek olması ve uzun zaman alması gibi nedenlerle şirketler tarafından "son çare" olarak da görülmektedir. Borç yeniden yapılandırma sürecinin seçiminde; şirketteki çıkar çatışmasının yaygınlığı, koordinasyon problemi, likidite sıkışıklığının şiddeti gibi şirket özellikleri de etkili olmaktadır. Bu çalışmanın amacı, yeniden yapılandırma süreçlerinin seçiminde etkili olan faktörleri incelenmek ve ilgili ampirik çalışmaların sonuçlarının özetlendiği bir literatür taraması yapmaktır.

Reorganization procedures in financially distressed firms and determinants of the choice of reorganization procedure

Firms have two alternative ways of restructuring to resolve financial distress: out-of-court reorganization (workouts or exchange offers mechanisms) and bankruptcy reorganization under bankruptcy codes (court supervised mechanisms). Out-of-eourt restructuring incurs relatively low costs but has high potential holdout problems. Bankruptcy reorganization under bankruptcy codes provides several benefits for distressed firms, such as: "automatic stay", "cram down" in bankruptcy reorganization. However, the disadvantages of a formal bankruptcy reorganization are its lengthy process and relatively high costs..Because of the disadvantages of legal bankruptcy reorganization, many firms generally turn to this procedure only as the last resort. Firm's decision on the choice of debt restructuring method is also influenced by firm characteristics determinants such as interest conflict, severity of a firm's liquidity crisis; extent of creditor's coordination problems. The aim of this study is to investigate determinants of the choice of reorganization procedures and to present the results of related empirical studies.

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