DEVLET BAŞKANININ HALK TARAFINDAN SEÇİLDİĞİ ÜLKELERDE YÜRÜTMENİN FESİH YETKİSİ

Bu çalışma başkanın halk tarafından seçildiği başkancı sistem,başbakanlı başkanlık ve başkancı parlamenter sistem olarak adlandırılansistemlerdeki devlet başkanının fesih yetkisini incelemektedir. Genelkabul, yürütmenin fesih yetkisinin parlamenter sisteme ait olduğudur.Bununla birlikte özellikle 20. yüzyılın ikinci yarısının başlamasındanitibaren başkanın halk tarafından seçildiği ve güçlü anayasal yetkilerininolduğu sistemlerde başkanın görev süresi dolmadan parlamentoyufeshedebildiği görülmektedir. Bu anayasal tercihin amacı ise geneldesiyasi kilitlenmeleri yeni seçimler vasıtasıyla çözmektir. Çünkü bu siyasikrizler kuvvetler ayrılığından kaynaklandığı için başkan ve parlamentoçoğunlukla bir anlaşmaya varamamaktadır. Fransa ve Portekiz gibi bazıülkelerde, başkanın parlamentoyu feshetmesi konusunda anayasadaherhangi bir sebepsel sınırlandırma bulunmamaktadır. Bununlabirlikte Peru, Ukrayna gibi ülkelerde başkan yalnızca bir hükûmet kriziolduğunda parlamentoyu feshedebilir. Son olarak Ekvador, Namibya veTürkiye (2017 sonrası) gibi ülkelerde anayasa, başkanın parlamentoyufeshetmesi durumunda hem başkalık hem de parlamento seçimlerininbirlikte yapılacağını düzenlemektedir.

The Dissolution Power of the Executive Branch in Countries where the Head of the State is Elected by the Population

This study examines the president’s dissolution power of parliament within the systems that have a strong president who is selected by the people and that are named as primer-presidential, president-parliamentary and presidentialist. The general acceptance is that the dissolution power belongs to parliamentary system. However, particularly after beginning of second half of the 20. century, in the systems that the president is elected by the people and has strong powers, the president can terminate the parliament before the expiry of the term. The aim of this constitutional choice is generally to solve political deadlocks by new elections. Due to that the deadlocks origated from separation of power, the president and parliament mostly don’t tend to any agreement. In some countries such as France and Portugal, there is not any causal restriction on the dissolution power of the president in the constitution. However, in some countries such as Peru, Ukraine and Turkey (2007-2017), the president can dissolve the parliament only when there is a government crisis. This crisis frame the causal restriction in terms of the president. Lastly, in some countries such as Ecuador, Namibia and Turkey (post-2017), the constitution regulates that when the president dissolves the parliament, both the presidential election and parliamentary elections are held together.

___

  • AÇIL, Murat (2018). Latin Amerika Ülkelerinde Başkanlık Sistemi, İstanbul: Onikilevha Yayıncılık.
  • ALTAN, Cemal (2009). “Türkiye’de Erken Genel Seçimleri Etkileyen Faktörlerin İncelenmesi”, SÜ İİBF Sosyal ve Ekonomik Araştırmalar Dergisi, C. 8, Sa. 16.
  • AMORIM NETO, Octavio ve LOBO, Marina Costa (2008). “Portugal’s SemiPresidentialism (Re)considered: An Assessment of the President’s Role in the Policy Process, 1976-2006”, European Journal of Political Research, Vol. 48, ss. 234-255.
  • ANAYURT, Ömer (2019). Anayasa Hukuku Genel Kısım, Ankara: Seçkin Kitabevi, 2. Baskı.
  • ATAR, Yavuz (2019). Türk Anayasa Hukuku, Ankara: Seçkin Yayınevi, 13. Baskı.
  • BALKE, Nathan S. (1990). “The Rational Timing of Parliamentary Elections”, Public Choice, Vol. 65, ss. 201-216.
  • BARDAKÇI, Mehmet (2016). “2015 Parliamentary Elections in Turkey: Demise and Revival of AKP’s Single-Party Rule”, Turkish Studies, Vol. 17, No. 1, ss. 4-18.
  • BERGMAN, Torbjörn, MÜLLER, Wolfgang C,STROM ve Kaare, BLOMGREN, Magnus (2003). “Democratic Delegation and Accountability: Cross-national Patterns”, Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies, (Ed. Kaare Strom, Wolfgang C. Müller, Torbjörn Bergman), New York: Oxford University Press.
  • BULMER, Elliot (2016). Dissolution Power, Stocholm: International Idea Constitution-Building 16.
  • CANDAN, Kadir (2017). “1989 Sonrası Doğu Bloku Ülkelerinde Demokratikleşme Süreci: Polonya Cumhuriyeti’nde Yarı-Başkanlık Sisteminin Dönüşümü”, Karşılaştırmalı Hükümet Sistemleri-Yarı-Başkanlık Sistemi, Ankara: TBBM Araştırma Hizmetleri Başkanlığı.
  • COLE, Alistair (2005). French Politics and Society, Routledge, Second Edition New York.
  • COPSEY, Nathaniel (2008). “The Ukranian Parliamentary Elections of 2007”, Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, https://doi. org/10.1080/13523270802003129, ss. 297-309.
  • ÇAĞLAR, Taha Enes (2019). “Parlamentonun Feshi”, Yayımlanmamış Yüksek Lisans Tezi, İstanbul: Marmara Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü.
  • EHRMANN, Henry W (1963). “Direct Democracy in France”, The American Political Science Review, Vol. 57, No. 4, ss. 883-901.
  • EKİNCİ, Ahmet (2019). “Latin Amerika Ülkelerinde Başkanın Sorumluluğunu İşletmek İçin Parlamentoların Kullandığı Araçlar”, TBB Dergisi, 144. Sayı, ss. 13-58.
  • EKİNCİ, Ahmet (2020). Yükselen Bir Hükümet Sistemi Tercihi Olarak Tek Başlı Karma Hükümet Sistemleri, Ankara: Yetkin Yayınları.
  • EKİNCİ, Ahmet, KAPLAN ARIK, Aslıhan (2020) “Devlet Başkanının Anayasal Dönem Sınırını Uzatan ya da Ortadan Kaldıran Anayasa Değişikliklerinin Anayasa Değiştirme İktidarının Kötüye Kullanılması Bağlamında Değerlendirilmesi”, Yıldırım Beyazıt Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi, 2020/1, ss. 71-122.
  • ELGIE, Robert (2001) “Cohabitation”: Divided Government French-Style”, Divided Gobernment in Comparative Perspective, (Ed. Robert Elgie), New York: Oxford University Press.
  • ELGIE, Robert (2007). “Varieties of Semi-Presidentialism and Their Impact on Nascent Democracies”, Taiwan Journal of Democracy, Vol. 3, No.2, ss. 53-71.
  • FREEDOM HOUSE: “Countries and Territorries”, https://freedomhouse.org/ countries/freedom-world/scores, (Erişim Tarihi: 19/3/2020).
  • FREIRE, Andre, LOBO, Marina Costa (2006). “The Portuguese 2005 Legislative Election: Return to the Left”, West European Politics, Vol. 29, No. 3, ss. 581- 588.
  • GALLARDO LASTRA, A. G (2014). “Destitucion del Presidente y Disolucion de la Asamblea Nacional en los Articulos 130 y 148 de la Constitucion del Ecuador de 2008”. Dissertacion Previa a la Obstencion del Titulo de Abogada, Quito: Pontificia Universidad Catolica del Ecuador Facultad de Jurisprudencia.
  • Goldey, D. B. (1998). “The French General Election of 25 May-1June 1997”, Electoral Studies, Vol. 17, No. 4, ss. 536-555
  • GOPLERUD, Max, SCHELITER, Petra (2015). “An Index of Assembly Dissolution Powers”, Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 49, No. 4, ss. 427- 456.
  • GÖZLER, Kemal (2011). Anayasa Hukukunun Genel Teorisi, Bursa: Ekin Kitabevi.
  • GÖZLER, Kemal (2017a). “‘Fesih’ ve ‘Seçimlerin Yenilenmesi’ Farklı Kavramlar Mıdır? “Cumhurbaşkanının Meclisi Fesih Yetkisi Yoktur” İddiası Üzerine Bir İnceleme”, http://www.anayasa.gen.tr/fesih-yenileme. html#_ftn10, (Erişim Tarihi: 29/3/2020).
  • GÖZLER, Kemal (2017b). Elveda Anayasa, Bursa: Ekin Kitabevi, 3. Baskı.
  • GÖZTEPE, Ece (2010). Federal Alman Anayasası’nda Güvensizlik Oyu Sonucu Yasama Meclisinin Feshi Kurumu, Prof. Dr. Tuncer Karamustafaoğlu’na Armağan, Ankara: Adalet Yayınevi, s. 335-373.
  • GÜL, Cengiz (2020). Demokrasi Teorisi Açısından Başkanlık/Cumhurbaşkanlığı Sisteminin Demokratik Değeri, Ankara: Adalet Kitabevi.
  • HAMILTON, Alexander, MADISON, James, JAY, John (2008). The Federalist Papers, No. 51, (Ed. Lawrence Goldman), New York: Oxford University Press.
  • ITO, Takatoshi (1990). “The Timing of Elections and Political Bussiness Cycles in Japan”, Journal of Asian Economics, Vol. 1, No. 1, ss. 135-156.
  • JALALI, Carlos (2011). “The President is Not a Passenger: Portugal’s Evolving Semi-Presidentialism”, Semi Presidentialism and Democracy, (Ed. Robert Elgie, Sophia Moestrup, Yu-Shan Wu), Londra: Palgrave Macmillian, ss. 156-174.
  • KARAMUSTAFAOĞLU, Tuncer (1982). Yasama Meclislerini Fesih Hakkı, Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Yayınları.
  • KARATEPE, Şükrü (2017). Sistem Söyleşileri, Ankara: A Kitap.
  • KAYSER, Mark Andreas (2005). “Who Surfs, Who Manipulates? The Determinants of Opportunistic Election Timing and Electorally Motivated Economic Intervention”, American Political Science Review, Vol. 99, No. 1, ss. 17-27.
  • KROK-PASZLOWSKA, Ania (2001). “Divided Government in Poland”, Divided Government in Comparative Perspective, (Ed. Robert Elgie), New York: Oxford University Press.
  • LANDAU, David, ROZNAI, Yaniv ve DIXON, Rosalind (2019). “Term Limits and the Unconstitutional Amendment Doctrine: Lessons From Latin America”, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3208187, (e.t.10.10.2019).
  • LIJPHART, Arendt (2006). Demokrasi Motifleri: Otuz Altı Ülkede Yönetim Biçimleri ve Performansları, (Çev. Güneş Ayas, Utku Umut Bulsun), İstanbul: Salyangoz Yayınları.
  • MANCILLO, Alfredo Serrano (2019). “Fin de Ciclo (corto) en Ecuador” CELAG, https://www.celag.org/fin-de-ciclo-corto-en-ecuador/, (e.t. 25.3.2020).
  • MIERZEJEWSKI Melanie (2014). “When the Colors Fade: Party Politics, Institutionalization, and Democratization in Ukraine and Georgia”, Yayımlanmamış Doktora Tezi, Chicago: Graduate College of the University of Illinois.
  • MOLCHANOV, Mikhail A. (2008). “Ukraine’s Orange Revolution: Great Promise, Untimely Demise”, Post-Communist World, 2008, https://www. researchgate.net/publication/294621677_Ukraine’s_Orange_Revolution_ Great_Promise_Untimely_Demise, (Erişim Tarihi: 22/3/2020).
  • MORGAN-JONES, Edward, SCHLEITER, Petra (2018). “Presidential Influence on Parliamentary Election Timing and the Electoral Fate of Prime Ministers”, The Journal of Legislative Studies, Doi:10.1080/13572334. 2018.1477273.
  • NEGRETTO, Gabriel (2013). Making Constitutions, New York: Cambridge University Press.
  • ÖZSOY, Şule (2009). Başkanlı Parlamenter Sistem, İstanbul: XII Levha Yayınları.
  • ÖZSOY BOYUNSUZ, Şule (2017). Dünyada Başkanlık Sistemleri, İstanbul: İmge Kitabevi.
  • PRZEWORSKI, Adam, ASADURIAN, Tamar, BOHLKEN, Anjali Thomas (2012). “The Origins of Parliamentary Responsibility”, Comparative Constitutional Design, (Ed. Tom Ginsburg), New York: Cambridge University Press.
  • SAYARI, Sabri (2016). “Back to a Predominant Party System: The November 2015 Snap Election in Turkey”, South European Society and Politics, Vol. 21, No. 2, ss. 263-280.
  • SCHLEITER, Petra, MORGAN-JONES, Edward (2009). “Constitutional Power and Competing Risks: Monarchs, Presidents, Prime Ministers, and the Termination of East and West Cabinets”, American Political Science Rewiew, Vol. 103, No. 3, ss. 496-512.
  • SHEVEL, Oxana (2015). “The Parliamentary Elections in Ukraine, October 2014”, Electoral Studies, Vol. 39, ss. 159-16.
  • SHUGART, Mattheww Soberg, CAREY, John (1992). Presidents and Assemblies, New York: Cambridge University Press.
  • SHUGART, Mattheww Soberg (2005). “Semi-Presidential Systems: Dual Executive and Mixed Authority Patterns”, French Politics, Vol. 3, ss. 232- 351.
  • SHUGART, Mattheww Soberg (2006). “Comparative Executive-Legislative Relations”, The Oxford Handbook of Political Institutions, (Ed. R. A. W. Rhodes, Sarah A. Binder, Bert A. Rockman), New York: Oxford University Press.
  • SMITH, Alastair (2003). “Election Timing in Majoritarian Parliaments”, B. J. Pol. S., Vol. 33, ss. 397-418.
  • STROM, Kaare, SWINDLE, Stephen M. (2000). The Strategic Use of Parliamentary Dissolution Powers”, Parliamentary Control of Executive, Directed by Thomas Lancaster, Manuel Sanchez de Dios, Joint Sessions of Workshops of the European Consortium for Political Research, Copenhagen.
  • SULA, Piotr, SZUMIGALSKA, Agnieszka (2013). “The Guardian of the Chandelier or a Powerful Statesman? The Historical, Cultural and Legislative Determinants of the Political Role of the President of Poland”, Presidents Abote Parties? Presidents in Central and Eastern Europe, Their Formal Competencies and Informal Power, ss. 101-120.
  • SZARSKA, Joseph (1997). “Snatching Defeat From the Jaws of Victory: The French Parliament Elecions of 25 May and 1 June 1997”, West European Politics, Vol. 20, No. 4, ss. 192-199.
  • TAŞ, Hakkı (2018). “Contained Uncertainy: Turkey’s June 2018 Elections and Their Consequences”, Giga Focus, No. 4.
  • THIÉBAULT, Jean-Louis (2003). “France: Delegation and Accountability in the Fifth Republic”, Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies (Ed. Kaare Strom, Wolfgang C. Müller, Torbjörn Bergman), New York: Oxford University Press ss. 325-347.
  • ULUŞAHİN, Nur (2013). “Cumhurbaşkanının Halk Tarafından Seçilmesinin Siyasal Sistemimize Etkileri: Türkiye’de Hükümet Sisteminin Geçirdiği Dönüşüm ve Geleceğe Yönelik Beklentiler”. Yeni Türkiye Dergisi. Sa. 51.
  • von BEYME, Klaus (2000). Parliamentary Democracy-Democracy, Destabilization, Reconsolidation, 1789-1999, Londra: Palgrave Mcmillian, Londra
  • YALANSIZ, Nedim (2006). Türkiye’de Koalisyon Hükümetleri 1961-2002, İstanbul: Büke Kitapları.
  • ANADOLU AGENCY, “Perú: Tribunal Constitucional definió que disolución del Congreso por parte del Ejecutivo fue legal”, https://www.aa.com.tr/es/pol%C3%ADtica/ per%C3%BA-tribunal-constitucional-defini%C3%B3-quedisoluci%C3%B3n-del-congreso-por-parte-del-ejecutivo-fuelegal-/1702626, (Erişim Tarihi: 22/3/2020).
  • BARRÍA Cecilia: “Crisis en Ecuador: 4 razones que explican la crisis que llevó a Lenín Moreno a decretar el “paquetazo” que desató las protestas” BBC Mundo, https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-49978717, ) Ekim 2019, (Erişim Tarihi: 25/3/2020).
  • BBC MUNDO: “Disolución del Congreso en Perú: renuncia Mercedes Aráoz, nombrada “presidenta en funciones” por el Parlamento en sustitución de Vizcarra”, https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-americalatina-49902304, (Erişim Tarihi: 22/3/2020).
  • BBC MUNDO: “Elecciones Perú 2020: los resultados preliminares muestran un Congreso fragmentado y al desplome del fujimorismo”, https://www.bbc. com/mundo/noticias-america-latina-51262879, (Erişim Tarihi: 22/3/2020).
  • de la QUINTANA, Jimene: CNN Espanol, “Tribunal Constitucional de Perú vota a favor de la legalidad en la decisión de Martín Vizcarra de disolver el Congreso”, https://cnnespanol.cnn.com/2020/01/14/alerta-peru-tribunalconstitucional-vota-a-favor-de-la-legalidad-en-la-decision-de-martinvizcarra-de-disolver-el-congreso/, (Erişim Tarihi: 22/3/2020).
  • EMMOTT, Robin: “Ex-Ecuador president Correa denies planning coup attempt from exile”, Reuters, 8 Ekim 2019, (25.3.2020).
  • “Indigenous Ecuadorians too strong to be ignored after dealt to end protests”, The Guardian,https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/oct/16/ecuadorindigenous-protesters-bittersweet-triumph, (Erişim Tarihi: 25/3/2020).
  • FINN, Daniel: “Lenín Moreno Has Betrayed Ecuador. Now the Country Is in Revolt. AN INTERVIEW WITH GUILLAUME LONG”, JAKOBIN, 17 Ekim 2019, https://jacobinmag.com/2019/10/ecuador-protests-leninmoreno-correa-imf?__cf_chl_jschl_tk__=f9b7ad70d62283c7208c712ec27 bb2f77c7cf37b-1585137425-0-Aa7Gbkso-q5pBfE2HZ8ILZqzGQxVp3P_ OmY-ncPOrup5j1eIxJlDD9_DdMDNnAr64mcS3CIRaqz3iTt Ri0GK6BMUmIf5mUbFhqUzGBDROuV8lIzLp8TCwhMZi1K7y7w6kO3kd5Oa1wQIBvIYwhHN24SYtA-s6Ol0Mjtdh1dj4INlnnuC WCo6lGuy4w6cRV2a8OH1RD3FF1y09T_VDDRiYJ185UPeyAneXmOc HpbHQGXGbAxXOQA-iFaV8O0RjfmQxf86bbwW05kTLdaBLyL_zVtc_ zjz8yT6d-9ebfVVRjiBNEpdb0ztSoDdYFde9DPav3D9x1uBFNzgHg9naNT ZtAPXH2SgbbSaKpP3S-7qeaVZFSOK8VLWcf_7OBKG1AykGhtSeLp5Ez 63mPKEDpD3DI, (Erişim Tarihi: 25/3/2020).
  • Fixed-term Parliament Act, http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2011/14/ section/2/enacted, (Erişim Tarihi: 20/3/2020).
  • INTERFAX: “Zelensky’s rep in Constitutional Court rules out possibility of declaring unconstitutional decree on Rada dissolution, snap elections”, https://en.interfax.com.ua/news/general/592294.html, (Erişim Tarihi: 22/3/2020).
  • LA REPUBLİCA: “En media hora se decidió lista de candidatos al TC”, https:// larepublica.pe/politica/2019/09/20/en-media-hora-se-decidio-lista-decandidatos-al-tc-pedro-olaechea-congreso-fujimorismo/, (Erişim Tarihi: 22/3/2020).
  • NEW YORK TIMES: “Ukraine’s New President Dissolves Parliament and Calls a Snap Election”, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/20/world/europe/ ukraine-zelensky-parliament-election.html, (Erişim Tarihi: 22/3/2020).
  • OLIVA, Nicolás: Crisis en Ecuador: de Protestas y Privilegos, CELAG, 4 Ekim 2019, https://www.celag.org/crisis-en-ecuador-de-protestas-y-privilegios/, (Erişim Tarihi: 25/3/2020).
  • PERU 21: “CIDH objeta falta de transparencia en proceso de selección para el TC”, https://peru21.pe/politica/cidh-objeta-falta-de-transparencia-enproceso-de-seleccion-para-el-tc-noticia/ (Erişim Tarihi: 22/3/2020).
  • PERU 21: “Pleno rechazó cuestión previa para suspender la elección de los miembros del TC”, https://peru21.pe/politica/pleno-rechazo-cuestionprevia-para-suspender-la-eleccion-de-los-miembros-del-tc-noticia/, (Erişim Tarihi: 22/3/2020).
  • “Profile: Yulia Tymoshenko”, BBC News, 23 Mayıs 2014, https://www.bbc. com/news/world-europe-15249184 (Erişim Tarihi: 27/3/2020).
  • RFERL: “Final Ukraine Election Results Confirm Zelenskiy Landslide”, https://www.rferl.org/a/final-ukraine-election-results-confirm-zelenskiylandslide/30076731.html, (Erişim Tarihi: 22/3/2020).
  • “President of Ukraine”, https://www.president.gov.ua/en/president/ biografiya, (Erişim Tarihi: 22/3/2020).
  • Quartz: “Ukraine’s newly elected president already plays the role on TV”, https://qz.com/1600884/volodymyr-zelensky-elected-as-ukrainespresident-after-playing-the-role-on-tv/, (Erişim Tarihi: 22/3/2020).
  • http://www.ysk.gov.tr/doc/dosyalar/docs/Milletvekili/1Kasim2015/ KesinSecimSonuclari/96-A.pdf, (Erişim Tarihi: 22/3/2020).