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Kıt Kaynakların Paylaştırılması: Talepler Problemi Literatürü Üzerine Bir İnceleme

Bu makale, literatürde “talepler problemi” olarak bilinen, hak sahiplerinin taleplerini karşılamada yetersiz bir kaynağın, kaynak üzerindeki mülkiyet iddiaları gözetilerek paylaştırılması modelini inceler. Bu modelin miras dağıtımından tayınlamaya, iflas eden şirketin mallarının alacaklılara tahsisinden vergilendirmeye kadar birçok farklı uygulaması bulunur. Makalede, aksiyomatik bir yaklaşım benimsenerek talepler problemine çözüm sunan dağıtım kurallarının matematiksel aksiyom olarak ifade edilen özellikleri irdelenir. Ayrıca, literatürde öne çıkan orantılı kural ve eşitlikçi kurallar gibi dağıtım kuralları aksiyomatik karakterizasyonları ile incelenir. Son olarak, bu çalışma, yetersiz kaynağın, kaynak üzerinde birbiriyle çelişen iddiaları bulunan talep sahipleri arasında adil ve hakça dağıtılması konusunda kapsamlı bir çerçeve sunar.

Anahtar Kelimeler:

Talepler Problemi, Tayınlama, İflas Problemi, Miras, Vergilendirme, Adil Dağıtım

Allocating Scarce Resources: A Survey of Claims Problems

This paper studies the allocation of a scarce resource among competing claimants, which is commonly known as the “claims problem”. This model has numerous practical applications ranging from estate division to rationing, bankruptcy, and even basic taxation problems. An axiomatic approach is used to examine the properties of division rules that are expressed as mathematical axioms. The paper provides an analysis of prominent division rules, such as the proportional and egalitarian rules, along with their axiomatic characterizations. Ultimately, the paper presents a comprehensive framework for achieving a fair and equitable allocation of limited resources among competing claimants.

Keywords:

Claims Problem, Rationing, Bankruptcy, Inheritance, Taxation, Division Rules,

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