Adil Toplumda Şans -Birey Seçimlerinin Sosyolojisi ve Eşitlikçi Sosyal Politikalar İçin Bir Temellendirme-

Dezavantajlı bireyler deneyimledikleri dezavantajlardan ne derece sorumlu tutulabilir? Kuşkusuz bu soru, yapısal eşitsizliklerin dezavantajın oluşumunda oynadığı rollere vurgu yapan eşitlikçi bakış açıları ile bireyleri kendi yaşam koşullarından sorumlu tutan eşitlikçi olmayan/liberteryen bakış açıları arasındaki tarihsel kırılmaya yol açan en temel sorulardan biridir. Bu iki bakış açısı arasında uzlaştırıcı bir pozisyon olarak görece yeni ortaya çıkmış olan şans eşitlikçiliği yaklaşımı ise bu soruya analitik bir cevap sunmaktadır. İki farklı şans tanımının yer aldığı özgün bir kavramsal çerçeve üzerine kurulu olan şans eşitlikçiliği, bireylerin kendi kontrolleri dışında gelişen şans gibi etmenlerin sonucunda ortaya çıkan dezavantajlardan sorumlu tutulamayacağını belirtmektedir. Bu bakış açısı, kaçınılmaz olarak, bireylerin kendi seçimlerinin/kararlarının sonucu olarak ortaya çıkan dezavantajların sorumluluğunu üstlenmeleri gerektiği yönündeki normatif fikri de beraberinde getirmektedir. Bu çalışma, şans eşitlikçiliği yaklaşımının analitik çerçevesinin verili yapısı içinde, birey seçimlerine/kararlarına ilişkin değerlendirme unsurlarının oldukça muğlak olduğunu ve bunun da şans eşitlikçiliğinin birçok dezavantajı meşrulaştıran bir bakış açısına dönüşmesine sebep olabileceğini tartışmaktadır. Çeşitli hipotetik örnekler ve kimi görgül verilere dayanarak, şans eşitlikçiliğinin söz konusu riski, katmanlaşmış çağdaş toplumlarda birey seçimlerinin/kararlarının sosyolojik olarak kurulduğunu kabul ederek aşabileceğini işaret etmektedir. Bunu takiben, böylesi bir kabulün şans eşitlikçiliğinin (1) dışlayıcı sağ siyasal pozisyonlarca araçsallaştırılmasına engel olmak ve (2) eşitlikçi sosyal politikalarla işbirliği kurmasına olanak sağlayan bir alan açması gibi iki olumlu sonucu beraberinde getireceği ifade edilmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler:

Dağıtıcı Adalet, Şans, Seçim, Siyaset Sosyolojisi, Sosyal Politika

Luck in the Just Society -Sociology of Individual’s Choices and a Justification for Egalitarian Social Policies-

To what extent can individuals be kept responsible for the disadvantages they experience? This is undoubtedly one of the most fundamental questions that have led to a historical cleavage between egalitarian perspectives that underline roles of structural inequalities leading to disadvantages and anti-egalitarian/libertarian perspectives that tend to keep individuals themselves responsible for their own living conditions. Taking a mediating position between these perspectives, a relatively new normative framework, viz. luck egalitarianism, has recently provided an analytical answer to this question. Building upon an authentic conceptual framework in which two distinct forms of luck are defined, it claims that individuals cannot be kept responsible for their disadvantaged conditions so long as these conditions have appeared as consequences of factors that are beyond their own control, such as luck, which inescapably brings forth a normative idea that individuals should take responsibility of disadvantages that are consequences of their own choices/decisions. This paper discusses that evaluative aspects of individuals’ choices/decisions within the given configuration of luck egalitarianism’s analytical framework are excessively ambiguous, which can easily lead it to turn into a perspective morally justifying quite a number of disadvantages. Drawing on various hypothetical cases and empirical findings, it suggests that luck egalitarianism should recognize sociological formation of individuals’ choices/decisions in modern stratified societies to overcome such jeopardy. Following this, it addresses two positive implications of such recognition as (1) saving luck egalitarianism from being a means of right-wing exclusionary political positions and (2) opening up a space to incorporate egalitarian social policies.

Keywords:

Distributive Justice, Luck, Choice, Political Sociology, Social Policy,

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