Davut BALCI, ALİ TARKAN ÇAVUŞOĞLU

15362

Seçimlerin Kamu Harcaması Kompozisyonu Üzerine Etkilerinin Ampirik Analizi: Türkiye Örneği

Bu çalışma, politik bütçe dalgalanmaları teorisi kapsamında, Türkiye’de seçimlerin kamu harcama kompozisyonu üzerindeki etkisini ampirik olarak incelemeyi amaçlamaktadır. Bu çalışmayı benzer çalışmalardan farklı kılan dört temel özellik bulunmaktadır. Öncelikle, 10 genel seçimin yapıldığı 1965–2004 dönemine ait 40 yıl gibi uzun bir zaman dilimini içermektedir. İkincisi, genel seçimlerin harcamalar üzerindeki etkilerinin analizinde, normal ve erken seçim ayrımı da göz önünde bulundurulmaktadır. Üçüncüsü, seçimlerin harcamalar üzerindeki etkileri sadece genel seçimler için değil yerel seçimler için de incelenmiştir. Son olarak, analizlerde kamu harcamalarının hem uzun hem de kısa dönem dinamiklerinin incelenmesini olanaklı kılan eşbütünleşme ve hata düzeltme modeli yaklaşımları kullanılmıştır. Çalışmada elde edilen sonuçlara göre Türkiye’de hem genel hem de yerel seçimler kamu harcama kompozisyonunu etkilemektedir. Bu etki genel seçim dönemlerinde cari harcamalarda ve transfer harcamalarında; yerel seçim dönemlerinde ise yatırım ve transfer harcamalarında artış şeklinde kendini göstermektedir.

An empirical analysis on the effects of elections on the public expenditure composition: The case of Turkey

This study aims to analyze the effects of elections on the composition of the public expenditure in Turkey empirically within the scope of the political-budget-cycles theory. This study differs from similiar studies with respect to four basic characteristics. First of all, the analyses cover the 1965–2004 time period, which is a forty-year long period that includes ten general elections. Secondly, in the analyses, the differentiation between predetermined and endogenous elections is taken into consideration. Thirdly, the analyses are carried out not only for general elections, but for local elections as well. Lastly, the cointegration and the vector error correction model approaches are used in the analyses, which enable the analysis of both the short- and long-run dynamics of public expenditures. According to results obtained in the study, both general and local elections affect the composition of the public expenditure in Turkey. This effect lends itself in current and transfer expenditures during general election periods, whereas in investment and transfer expenditures during local election periods.

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Amme İdaresi Dergisi-Cover
  • ISSN: 1300-1795
  • Yayın Aralığı: Yılda 4 Sayı
  • Başlangıç: 1968
  • Yayıncı: -
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Davut BALCI, ALİ TARKAN ÇAVUŞOĞLU