TÜRKİYE'DE KURUMSAL NAKİT MEVCUDU VE KURUMSAL YÖNETİM KALİTESİ ARASINDAKİ İLİŞKİ

Bu çalışma, kurumsal yönetim kalitesinin 2009-2013 yılları arasında Borsa İstanbul-100 endeksinde listelenen firmaların nakit mevcutları üzerindeki etkisini incelemektedir. Sistem-GMM panel regresyonları kullanılarak hipotez test edilmiştir. Kurumsal yönetim kalitesinin düşüşüyle, kurumsal nakit mevcudunun arttığı sonucuna varılmıştır. Öyleyse, yatırımcı korumasının zayıf olduğu durumlarda, yöneticiler firma kaynaklarını kendi çıkarları için kullanırken, hissedarların çıkarlarını gözönüne almamaktadırlar. Bu çatışma kurumsal yönetim kalitesinin artışı ile çözülebilir.

CORPORATE CASH HOLDINGS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE QUALITY IN TURKEY

This paper investigates the role of corporate governance quality on corporate cash holdings of the firms listed in Borsa Istanbul 100 Index for the period 2009-2013. System- GMM panel regressions are used in order to test the hypothesis. It is found that as the corporate governance quality decreases, cash holding ratios of the firms increase. Therefore, in case of poor investor protection, the managers use the firms' resources for their own interests at the expense of shareholders. This conflict can be solved with the increased corporate governance quality

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Uluslararası Yönetim İktisat ve İşletme Dergisi-Cover
  • ISSN: 2147-9208
  • Başlangıç: 2005
  • Yayıncı: Zonguldak Bülent Ecevit Üniversitesi
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