A decomposition of transferable utility games: structure of transferable utility games

We define a decomposition of transferable utility games based on shifting the worth of the grand coalition so that the associated game has a nonempty core. We classify the set of all transferable utility games based on that decomposition and analyze their structure. Using the decomposition and the notion of minimal balanced collections, we give a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for a transferable utility game to have a singleton core.

A decomposition of transferable utility games: structure of transferable utility games

We define a decomposition of transferable utility games based on shifting the worth of the grand coalition so that the associated game has a nonempty core. We classify the set of all transferable utility games based on that decomposition and analyze their structure. Using the decomposition and the notion of minimal balanced collections, we give a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for a transferable utility game to have a singleton core.

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  • †An allocation rule Γ is additive if for each v, w∈ G, Γ(v) + Γ(w) = Γ(v + w).