Bilinç Bilmecesinin Kısa Bir Analizi

Bilinç problemi ya da daha geleneksel bir ifadeyle zihin-beden problemi, tüm felsefi teorilere ve nörobilim, yapay zekâ ve teknolojideki ilerlemelere rağmen canlılığını ve önemini korumaya devam etmektedir. Bilinç problemi, antik çağlardan günümüze kadar hem filozoflar hem de bilim insanları tarafından ele alınmıştır. En genel manasıyla, zor problem olarak da bilinen bilinç problemi, öznel zihinsel durumların, fiziksel bir et parçasından nasıl ortaya çıktığı problemidir. Bu makalenin temel amacı, günümüzde hala önemini koruyan bu bilinç bilmecesinin kategorik ve açıklayıcı bir analizini sunmaktır. Bu amaçla öncelikle bilinç kavramının literatürdeki tanımları derinlemesine incelenecektir. Sonrasında bilincin bilim için ehlileştirilemeyen, onu bizim için zor bir probleme dönüştüren özelliklerine değinilecek ve Chalmers'ın bilincin kolay problemleri ve zor problemi ayrımıyla bilinç bilmecesi açıklanacaktır. Son olarak bilinç problemine yönelik geleneksel çözüm odaklı yaklaşımlar arasında kategorik bir ayrım yapılarak bilinç bilmecesine ilişkin bu açıklayıcı analizin tamamlanması amaçlanmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler:

Bilinç Kavramı, Bilinç Bilmecesi, Öznel Bilinç, Bilincin Zor Problemi, Geleneksel Çözüm Odaklı Yaklaşımlar

A Brief Analysis of the Puzzle of Consciousness

The challenging problem of consciousness, or more traditionally the mind-body problem, continues to maintain its vitality and importance despite all philosophical theories and advances in neuroscience, artificial intelligence and technology. The problem of consciousness has been addressed by both philosophers and scientists from ancient times to the present. In the most general sense, the problem of consciousness, also known as the hard problem, is the problem of how subjective mental states arise from a physical piece of meat. The main purpose of this article is to present a categorical and explanatory analysis of this puzzle of consciousness, which is still important today. For this purpose, first of all, the definitions of the concept of consciousness in the literature will be examined in depth. Afterwards, the characteristics of consciousness that are untamed for science, which turns it into the hard problem for us, will be touched upon, and the puzzle of consciousness will be explained with Chalmers' distinction between easy problems and the hard problem of consciousness. Finally, it is aimed to complete this explanatory analysis on the puzzle of consciousness by making a categorical distinction between traditional solution-oriented approaches to the problem of consciousness.

Keywords:

Concept of Consciousness, The Puzzle of Consciousness, Subjective Consciousness, The Hard Problem of Consciousness, Traditional Solution-Oriented Approaches,

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