Bernd RUDOLPH, Florian HAAGEN, Melek BOYACIOĞLU ACAR

Kurumsal Çerçeve Şartlarının Almanya'da Risk Sermayesi Finansmanına Etkileri

Finans teorisi farklı ülkelerdeki finansal sözleşmelerin düzenlenmesinde kurumsal çerçeve şartlarının anlamını son yıllarda yoğun bir şekilde incelemektedir. Bu çalışma, bu bağlamda risk sermayesi finansmanının Anglosakson ve Alman piyasaları açısından farklı niteliklerdeki tipik sözleşme yapılarını karşılaştırmaktadır. Burada kurumsal özelliklerin menfaatleri optimal şekilde dengeleyen sözleşmeler oluşturulmasına etki edip etmediğinin değerlendirilmesi gerekir. Dönüştürülebilir imtiyazlı hisse senetleri, kara iştirakli dönüştürülebilir imtiyazlı hisse senetleri ve gizli iştiraklerin karşılaştırmalı bir analizi sonucunda, Almanya'da yaygın bir finansman şekli olarak kullanılan gizli iştirakin, dönüştürülebilir finansal araçlarla kıyaslandığında, aynı ölçüde cazip nitelik taşıyabileceği gösterilmektedir. Buna bağlı olarak sözkonusu finansman şekli, Anglosakson finansman uygulamalarına eş düzeyde bir alternatif oluşturabilecektir. Kurumsal çerçeve şartları da finansman yapısının seçiminde etkili olmaktadır. Netice itibariyle Amerika'da yapılan araştırma sonuçlarının Alman sermaye piyasasına aynen uyarlanmaması yerinde olacaktır. JEL Sınıflaması: G24, G32, G35

During the last years finance theory has been considering the meaning of institutional framework in the process of forming financial contracts in various countries. In this context the following paper compares the different, for Anglo-Saxon and German market typical contract structures of venture capital financing. Thereby it has to be questioned, whether the institutional features has an influence over the incentive-optimal contract creation. Through a comparative analysis of convertible preferred stocks, participating preferred stocks and sleeping partnership, it has been pointed out that sleeping partnership, as the common type of financing form in Germany, can create comparable incentives with the convertibles. As a result this type of financing can equally be faced with the Anglo-Saxon financial practices. Therefore institutional framework has an influence on the choice of financial structure. Consequently the American research results can not directly be transferred into German venture capital market.

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