Türk hukukunda rekabet ihlallerine ilişkin tazminat davalarında passıng-on savunması ve dolaylı alıcı kuralının uygulanması: Abd ve ab uygulamaları ışığında değerlendirme ve öneriler

Bir hâkim durum veya kartelden kaynaklı hukuka aykırı fiyat artışı, çoğu durumda dağıtım zincirinin bir üst seviyesindeki alıcılar tarafından bir alt seviyedeki alıcılara aktarılmaktadır. Fiyat artışının bu şekilde dağıtım zinciri boyunca yansıtılması, hangi alıcı grubunun fiyat artışına karşı tazminat davası açma hakkına sahip olacağının belirlenmesini zorlaştırmaktadır. Hanover Shoe ve Illinois Brick kararlarında, ABD Yüksek Mahkemesi, rekabet ihlallerine ilişkin tazminat davalarının caydırıcılık amacını tazmin etme amacından üstün tutarak passing-on savunmasını reddedip fiyat artışına karşı yalnızca doğrudan alıcılara dava açma hakkı vermiştir. AB Komisyonu ise, AB Adalet Divanı’nın tazmin etme amacını öne çıkardığı Courage ve Manfredi kararlarını temel alarak passing-on savunması ve dolaylı alıcı kuralının her ikisine de izin vermiştir. Türkiye’de de passing-on savunması ve dolaylı alıcı kuralı açısından, rekabet hukukunun özel hukuk alanında daha etkin uygulanmasına hizmet edici bir politikanın oluşturulması gerekmektedir. Bu makale, ABD ve AB’deki tartışma ve uygulamalardan yararlanmak suretiyle konuya ilişkin bazı değerlendirme ve politika önerileri sunmayı amaçlamaktadır.

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