Cihan DOĞAN

6017

Kontrol Sağlamayan Azınlık Payı Devralmaları: Rekabet Politikası Açısından Değerlendirme

Birleşme veya devralma işlemlerinin 2010/4 Sayılı Tebliğ kapsamında Rekabet Kurulu’nun iznine tabi olabilmesi için, işlem neticesinde kontrolde kalıcı bir değişiklik yaratmış olması aranmaktadır. Fakat, kontrolde kalıcı değişiklik sonucunu doğurmayan ve özellikle faaliyet gösterdikleri pazarlar arasında yatay ya da dikey örtüşme bulunan teşebbüsler arasında gerçekleşen azınlık pay devirleri, iktisadi teorinin de ortaya koyduğu üzere, ciddi rekabet hukuku endişeleri doğurabilecektir. Örnek kabilinden olmak üzere, rakip teşebbüsten alınan ve kontrol sağlamayan azınlık payları, devralan teşebbüste tek taraflı olarak fiyat artırma motivasyonu yaratabilecektir. Nitekim devralan teşebbüs fiyat artırma sonucu kaybedeceği muhtemel talebin bir kısmını, rakibinden devralmış olduğu azınlık payı dolayısıyla geri kazanabilecek ve bu sayede potansiyel bir fiyat artışı neticesinde toplam net kârını artırabilecektir. Bununla birlikte, rakip teşebbüsten alınan kontrol sağlamayan azınlık payı, devralan teşebbüsün kartelden sapma motivasyonunu düşürecek ve karteli daha sürdürülebilir kılacaktır. Nitekim devralan teşebbüs kartelden sapması durumunda azınlık payı sahibi olduğu rakip teşebbüsün göreceği zararın bir kısmına kendisi katlanmak durumunda kalacaktır
Anahtar Kelimeler:

Birleşme ve Devralmalar, Azınlık Payı Devralınması, Tek

Acquisitions Of Non-Controlling Minority Shareholdings: Assessment From A Competition Policy Perspective

In order for a merger or an acquisition transaction to fall within the scope of Communiqué No. 2010/4, a permanent change in control is required. However, acquisition of non-controlling minority shareholdings could raise certain competition law concerns especially in cases where there is a horizontal or vertical overlap among the activities of the parties. To illustrate, an acquisition of non-controlling minority shareholding from a competitor could create an incentive for the acquirer to unilaterally increase its price since such acquisition will allow the acquirer to recapture some of its lost profits through the minority shareholding and thus will be able to gain more profit from a potential price increase. Similarly, an acquisition of non-controlling minority shareholding from a competitor could reduce the incentive of the acquirer to deviate from the cartel and thus enable the cartel to be more sustainable. Intuitively, the acquirer will have to bear some of the loss made by the other cartel participant in which it has minority shareholding
Keywords:

Merger and Acquisitions, Acquisition of Minority Shareholdings,

PDF

___

  • ALTAY, S.A. (2009), Anonim Ortaklıklar Hukuku’nda Sermayeye Katılmalı Ortak Girişimler (Equity Joint Ventures), Vedat Kitapçılık, İstanbul.
  • ASLAN, Y. (2007), Rekabet Hukuku (Competition Law), Ekin Yayınevi, Bursa.
  • BADTKE, F. and R. DIAMANTATOU (2016), “Should the acquisition of noncontrolling minority shareholdings be treated as concentrations?” Journal of European competition law & practice. Vol. 7 (2016), no.1, pp. 1-7.
  • BALITZKI, A. and R. PUGH (2016), “Mind the Gap? An Analysis from a German Competition Law Perspective of the European Commission’s Proposal to Review Non-Controlling Minority Shareholdings Under European Merger Control Law”, International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law, Volume 47, Issue 5, pp. 595-616.
  • BARDONG, A., D. BOSCO, P. FREEMAN, J.P. GUNTHER, P.
  • KALBFLEISCH, D. SPECTOR and B. VAN GHELCKE (2011), “Merger control and minority shareholdings: Time for a change?” Concurrences N° 3-2011.
  • BAS, K. (2015), “Reforming the Treatment of Minority Shareholdings in the EU: Making the Problem Worse Instead of Better?” World Competition 38, no. 1, pp. 77–106.
  • BERFIN AKYUZ, H. (2007), Türk Rekabet Hukuku Kapsamında Şirketlerde Birleşme ve Devralmalar (Mergers and Acquisitions under Turkish Competition Law Regime), Adalet Yayınevi, Ankara.
  • BISHOP, S. and M. WALKER (2010), The Economics of EC Competition Law: Concepts, Application and Measurement, Sweet & Maxwell, London.
  • BRESNAHAN, T. and S. SALOP (1986), “Quantifying the competitive effects of production joint ventures”, International Journal of Industrial Organization, 4, pp. 155-175.
  • BRITO, D., R. RIBEIRO and H. VASCONCELOS (2013), “Quantifying the Coordinated Effects of Partial Horizontal Acquisitions”, CEPR Discussion Papers 9536, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  • BRITO, D., A. OSÓRIO, R. RIBEIRO and H. VASCONCELOS (2015), “Unilateral Effects Screens for Partial Horizontal Acquisitions: The Generalized HHI and GUPPI”, available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2627103 accessed on 05.12.2016.
  • BURNSIDE, J. A. (2013), “Minority Shareholdings: An Overview of EU and National Case Law”, e-Competitions Bulletin Minority Shareholdings, Art. N° 56676.
  • CHARLETY, P. and M. C. FAGART and S. SOUAM (2009), “Incentives for Partial Acquisitions and Real Market Concentration”, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 165(3), pp. 508-534.
  • COMPETITION & MARKETS AUTHORITY, Mergers: Guidance on the CMA's Jurisdiction and Procedure, para. 4.16 and 4.17, accessed on 14.10.2016.
  • COURNOT, A. (1938), Researches into the Mathematical Principles of Theory of Wealth (Homewood, RD Irwin, 1986).
  • DOGAN, C. (2017) “Private Enforcement of Turkish Competition Law: A Brief Overview”, Global Competition Litigation Review, 10(2), p. 62-71.
  • ELLIOTT, P and ACKER J.V. (2015), “A critical review of the European Commission's proposal to subject acquisitions of non-controlling minority stakes to EU merger control”, European Competition Law Review, 36(3), pp. 97-100.
  • ERDEM, E. (2007), Türk-İsviçre Rekabet Hukuklarında Birleşme ve Devralmalar (Mergers and Acquisitions under Turkish-Swiss Competition Law), Rekabet Hukuku ile İlgili Makaleler, Beta Yayınevi, İstanbul.
  • ERDEM, E. (2003), Türk ve AT Rekabet Hukukunda Birleşme ve Devralmalar (Mergers and Acquisitions under Turkish and EU Competition Law), Beta Yayınevi, İstanbul.
  • ESIN, I. and T. LOKMANHEKİM (2003), Uygulamada Birleşme ve Devralmalar (Mergers and Acquisitions in Practice), Beta Yayınevi, İstanbul.
  • EUROPEAN COMMISSION (2014) Competition Policy Brief, Minority Power - EU Merger Control and the acquisition of Miority Shareholdings available at accessed on 15.09.2016.
  • EUROPEAN COMMISSION, White Paper, Towards more effective EU merger control, COM (20140 449 final, July 9, 2014), available at accessed on 05.11.2016.
  • EUROPEAN COMMISSION (2014), Commission Staff Working Document Accompanying the document White Paper Towards more effective EU Merger Control, Brussels, SWD 221 available at: accessed on 13.10.2016.
  • EUROPEAN COMMISSION (2013), Non-controlling minority shareholdings and EU merger control, Annex to the Commission Staff Working Document, Towards more Effective EU Merger Control, accessed on 13.10.2016.
  • EZRACHI, A. and D. GILO (2006), “EC Competition Law and the Regulation of Passive Investments Among Competitors”, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 26, No. 2, pp. 327–349.
  • FARRELL, J. and C. SHAPIRO (1990a), “Horizontal Mergers: An Equilibrium Analysis”, 80(1) The American Economic Review pp. 107-126.
  • FARRELL, J. and C. SHAPIRO (1990b), “Asset ownership and market structure in oligopoly”, 21 Rand Journal of Economics, pp. 275-292.
  • FLATH, D. (1991), “When is it rational for firms to acquire silent interests in rivals?” International Journal of Industrial Organization, 9, pp. 573-583.
  • FOROS, Ø., H. J. KIND and G. SHAFFER (2010), “Mergers and Partial Ownership”, CESifo Working Paper Series No. 2912; Simon School Working Paper No. FR 10-11.
  • FRENZ, W. (2016), Handbook of EU Competition Law, Springer, Aachen.
  • FRIEND, M. (2012), “Regulating minority shareholdings and unintended consequences”, European Competition Law Review, 33(6), pp. 303-306.
  • GABRIELSEN, T. S., E. HJELMENG and L. SORGARD (2011), “Rethinking Minority Share Ownership and Interlocking Directorships: The Scope for Competition Law Intervention”, European Law Review 36(6) pp. 837-860.
  • GIBSON DUNN (2015), Antitrust Merger Enforcement Update and Outlook, www.gibsondunn.com/publications/documents/2015-Antitrust-MergerEnforcement-Update-and-Outlook.pdf accessed on 14.11.2016.
  • GILO, D., Y. MOSHE and Y. SPIEGEL (2006), “Partial Cross Ownership and Tacit Collusion”, Rand Journal of Economics, vol. 37, pp. 81-99.
  • GONZALEZ-DIAZ, F. E. (2012), “Minority Shareholdings and Interlocking Directorships: The European Union Approach”, CPI Antitrust Chronicle, vol 1.
  • GÜNGÖRDÜ, A. (2003), AT ve Türk Rekabet Hukukunda Yoğunlaşmalarda Kontrol Unsuru (The Control of Concentrations under Turkish and EU Competition Law), Rekabet Kurumu Yayınları, Ankara.
  • GUVEN, P. (2003), Türk Rekabet Hukuku ve Avrupa Birliği Rekabet Hukukunda Birleşme ve Devralmaların Denetlenmesi (The control of Mergers and Acquisitions under Turkish and EU Law), Yetkin Yayınevi, Ankara.
  • GUVEN, P. (2008), Rekabet Hukuku (Competition Law), Yetkin Kitabevi, Ankara.
  • HATTON, C. and D. CARDWELL (2010), “Treatment of minority acquisitions under EU and international merger control”, European Competition Law Review, Volume 31, Issue 11, pp. 436-438.
  • HOVENKAMP, H. (1999), Federal Antitrust Policy, The Law of Competition and Its Practice, Second Edition, Hornbook Series, West Group, USA.
  • IVALDI, M., B. JULIEN, P. REY, P. SEABRIGHT and J. TIROLE (2003), “The Economics of Tacit Collusion”, No. 186, IDEI Working Papers, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
  • JOVANOVIC, D. and C. WEY (2014), “Passive partial ownership, sneaky takeovers, and merger control”, Economics Letters 125 (1), pp. 32–35.
  • KAPLOW, L. (2012), “On the choice of welfare standards in competition law”, in Daniel Zimmer (ed.), The Goals of Competition Law, Edgar Elgar Publishing, pp. 3-26.
  • KESICI, B. (2017), Rekabet Hukukunun Ihlalinden Kaynaklanan Haksız Fiil Sorumluluğu (Tort Liability Arising from the Competition Law Infringement), On Iki Levha Yayınevi, Istanbul.
  • KOPPENFELS, U. V. (2015), “A Fresh Look at the EU Merger Regulation? The European Commission’s White Paper ‘Towards More Effective EU Merger Control’”, Liverpool Law Review, Volume:36, Issue:1, pp. 7-31.
  • LEVY, N. (2013), “EU Merger Control and Non-Controlling Minority Shareholdings: The Case Against Change”, European Competition Journal Vol. 9, Issue 3, pp. 721-753.
  • MOAVERO MILANESI, E. and A. WINTERSTEIN (2012), “Minority shareholdings, interlocking directorships and the EC Competition Rules - Recent Commission practice”, EC Competition Policy Newsletter, No. 1, pp. 15-18.
  • MONTAG, F. and M. WILKS (2015), “EU merger review of the acquisition of non-controlling minority shareholdings: where to now?” Zeitschrift für Wettbewerbsrecht. Volume 13, Issue 2, pp. 69-92.
  • MOTTA, M. (2009), Competition Policy, Theory and Practice, Cambridge University Press, 12th printing.
  • NAIN, A. and Y. WANG (2012), The Anti-Competitive Effects of Minority Stake Acquisitions, available at: accessed on 08.11.2016.
  • NERA (1999), Merger Appraisal in Oligopolistic Markets, Prepared for the Office of Fair Trading by National Economic Research Associates, November 1999, Research Paper 19.
  • OECD (2009), Directorate for Financial and Enterprise Affairs Competition Committee, “Antitrust issues involving minority shareholding and interlocking directorships” DAF/COMP (2008)30. OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING (2010), Minority Interests in Competitors, A
  • Research Report Prepared by DotEcon Ltd.
  • OKUTAN NILSSON, G. (2009), Türk Ticaret Kanunu Tasarısı’na Göre Şirketler Topluluğu Hukuku (Corporate Group Law under the Draft Turkish Commercial Law), On İki Levha Yayınevi, İstanbul.
  • O’DONOGHUE, R. and J. PADILLA (2006), The Law and Economics of Article 82 EC, Hart Publishing, Oxford.
  • PASLI, A. (2009), Anonim Ortaklığın Devralınması (Acquisition of Joint Stock Company), Vedat Kitapçılık, İstanbul.
  • PINI, G. D. (2012), “Passive-Aggressive Investments: Minority Shareholdings and Competition Law”, European Business Law Review, Vol. 23, No. 5, pp. 575 - 725.
  • REED, B.J. (2010), “Private Equity Partial Acquisitions: Towards a New Antitrust Paradigm”, 5 Virginia Law & Business Review, pp. 303-347.
  • REITMAN, D. (1994), “Partial Ownership Arrangements and the Potential for Collusion”, The Journal of Industrial Economics, Vol. 42, No. 3, pp. 313-322
  • REYNOLDS, R. J. and B. SNAPP (1986), “The Competitive Effects of Partial Equity Interests and Joint Ventures”, International Journal of Industrial Organization Vol. 4, issue 2, pp. 141-153.
  • ROTH QC, P., ROSE V. (2008), Bellamy & Child European Community Law of Competition, Sixth edition, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
  • RUSSO, F., M. P. SCHINKEL, A. GUNSTER and M. CARREE (2010), European Commission Decisions on Competition, Cambridge University Press.
  • RUSU, C. S. (2014), “EU Merger Control and Acquisitions of (Non-Controlling) Minority Shareholdings - The State of Play”, CLaSF WP Series No. 10.
  • SALOP, S. C. and O'BRIEN, D. P. (2000), “Competitive Effects of Partial Ownership: Financial Interest and Corporate Control”, 67 Antitrust Law Journal. pp. 559-614.
  • SANLI, K.C. (2000), Rekabetin Korunması Hakkındaki Kanunda Öngörülen Yasaklayıcı Hükümler ve Bu Hükümlere Aykırı Sözleşme ve Teşebbüs Birliği Kararlarının Geçersizliği (Prohibitive Provisions of Law on Protection of Competition and Invalidity of the Agreements and Decisions of Association of Undertakings Contrary to These Prohibitive Provisions), Competition Authority Publication, Ankara.
  • SANXI L., H. MAB, C. ZENGB (2015), “Passive cross holding as a strategic entry deterrence”, Economics Letters 134, pp. 37–40.
  • SCHMIDT, J. P. (2013), “Germany: Merger control analysis of minority shareholdings - A model for the EU?”, Concurrences N° 2-2013, pp. 207- 212.
  • SCHAEFFER, F. and M. C. HARPER, A Fundamental Shift: Brazil’s New Merger Control Regime and Its Likely Impact on Cross-Border Transactions, http://www.jonesday.com/files/Publication/ee7ed7df-d4fd-4ff4-bf76- 55a933c7cf49/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/f4ef687d-1c40-4ffca1e9-5ae02b69463f/ABA%20Antitrust%20Source%20Article%20-%20 A%20Fundamental%20Shift.pdf accessed on 14.11.2016.
  • SHELEGIA, S. and SPIEGEL, Y. (2012), “Bertrand competition when firms hold passive ownership stakes in one another”, Economics Letters, 114(1), pp. 136–138.
  • SINGH, M. and A. MEHTA (2016), “Acquisition of non-controlling minority shares: competitive concerns and implications”, European Competition Law Review, pp. 122-127.
  • STUHMEIER, T. (2016), “Competition and Corporate Control in Partial Ownership Acquisitions”, Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade September 2016, Volume 16, Issue 3, pp. 297–308.
  • SULLIVAN, L. A. and W.S. GRIMES (2000), The Law of Antitrust: An Integrated Handbook, Hornbook Series, West Group, USA.
  • TEKINALP, U. (2009), “Türk Ticaret Kanunu Tasarısının Şirketler Topluluğuna İlişkin Düzenlemesinde Kontrol İlkesi” (The Concept of Control Under the Draft Turkish Commercial Code’s Provisions Concerning the Corporate Group Law), Prof. Dr. Hüseyin Hatemi’ye Armağan, C. II, Vedat Kitapçılık, Istanbul, pp. 1543 – 1557.
  • Turkish Competition Authority, Guidelines on Cases Considered as a Merger or an Acquisition and the Concept of Control. U.S. Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission, Horizontal Merger
  • Guidelines (2010), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/ merger-review/100819hmg.pdf accessed on 09.11.2016.
  • ÜNAL, S. M. (2008), Sanayi İktisadı ve Rekabet Hukuku Açısından Rakipler Arası Azınlık Hisse Devirleri (Acquisition of Minority Shareholdings Among Competitors from Competition Law and Industrial Organization Perspective), Rekabet Uzmanlığı Tezi, Ankara.
  • WHISH, R. and D. BAILEY (2012), Competition Law, Oxford University Press, Seventh Edition.
  • WILKINSON, L.A. and J. F. WHITE (2007), “Private equity: antitrust concerns with partial acquisitions”, Antitrust 21 (2), pp. 28–34.
  • WILLIAMSON, G. and M. HUSUNU (2014), “Non-Controlling Minority Shareholdings in EU Merger Control”, Business Law International, Vol. 15, Issue 2, pp.123 - 132.
  • YPMA, P., P. MCNALLY, L. BOUCON and I. KOKKORIS (2016), Support study for impact assessment concerning the review of Merger Regulation regarding minority shareholdings, available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/ publications/reports/KD0416839ENN.pdf accessed on 05.11.2016.
  • ZEVGOLIS, E.N. and P.N. FOTIS (2016), “A Rule of Reason Approach in the Assessment of Passive Minority Interests”, accessed on 10.11.2016.
Rekabet Dergisi-Cover
  • ISSN: 1302-552X
  • Yayın Aralığı: Yılda 5 Sayı
  • Başlangıç: 2000
  • Yayıncı: Rekabet Kurumu
Arşiv
Sayıdaki Diğer Makaleler

Seçici Dağıtım Sistemleri Açısından Atiker Kararı

Hamdi PINAR

Kontrol Sağlamayan Azınlık Payı Devralmaları: Rekabet Politikası Açısından Değerlendirme

Cihan DOĞAN

Doğu Avrupa Geçiş Ekonomilerinde Rekabet ve Gelir Düzeyi İlişkisi

Seymur AĞAZADE