Uniqueness of the reserve price with asymmetric bidders

İkinci fiyat müzayedelerinde, N sayıda alıcının özel değerlerinin değişik birikimli dağılım fonksiyonundan belirlendiği durumlarda, optimal rezerve fiyatını analiz ediyoruz. Satıcı, alıcıların özel değerlerinin hangi "birikimli dağılım fonksiyonundan" çekildiğini bilmemektedir. Bu durumda, optimal rezerv fiyatının tekliğini sağlayan yeterli koşulları gösteriyoruz. Daha sonra, satıcının rezerv fiyat kullanmayacağı durumlar için yeterli koşulları buluyoruz. Satıcı, rezerv fiyat kullanmadığı zaman müzayede etkin olmaktadır.

Alıcıların asimetrik olduğu açık arttırmalarda rezerv fiyatın tekliği

We analyze the optimal reserve price in a second price auction when there are types of bidders whose valuations are drawn from different distribution functions. The seller cannot determine the specific "distribution type" of each bidder. In this paper, we give sufficient conditions for the uniqueness of the optimal reserve price. Then, we give sufficient conditions that ensure the seller will not use a reserve price; hence, the auction will be efficient

___

CANTILLON, E. (2008) "The Effect of Bidders' Asymmetries on Expected Revenue in Auctions", Games and Economic Behavior, 62-1, 1-25.
DASTIDAR, K. G. (2015) "Basic Auction Theory Revisited", International Journal of Economic Theory, 11, 89-106.
ENGLEBRECHT-WIGGANS, R. (1987) "On Optimal Reservation Price in Auctions", Management Science, 33, 763-770.
ENGLEMAIER, F. AND SCHMÖLLER, A. (2010) "Determinants and Effects of Reserve Prices in Online Auctions", University of Munich Discussion Paper. No: 326
KRISHNA, V. (2009) Auction Theory, Academic Press.
KUCUKSENEL, S. (2013) "The Effects of Outside Options on Optimal Auction Outcomes", METU Studies in Development, 40-1,83-96.
LEBRUN, B. (1999) "First Price Auctions in the Asymmetric N Bidder Case", International Economic Review, 40-1, 125-142.
LEVIN, D. and SMITH, J.L. (1996) "Optimal Reservation Prices in Auctions", Economic Journal,106-438, 1271-1283.
MASKIN, E. and LAFFONT, J.J. (1980) "Optimal Reservation Price in the Vickery Auction", Economics Letters, 6, 309-313.
MASKIN, E. and RILEY, J. (2000) "Asymmetric Auctions", Review of Economic Studies, 67-3, 413- 438.
MCAFEE, P. and MCMILLAN, J. (1987) "Auctions with Entry", Economics Letters, 23, 343-347.
MCAFEE, P. and VINCENT, D. (1997) "Sequentially Optimal Auctions", Games and Economic Behavior, 18-2, 246-276.
MYERSON, R.B. (1981) "Optimal Auction Design", Mathematics of Operation Research, 6-1, 58- 73.
PLUM, M. (1992) "Characterization and Computation of Nash-Equilibria for Auctions with Incomplete Information", International Journal of Game Theory, 20-4, 393-418.
RILEY, J.G. and SAMUELSON, W.F. (1981) "Optimal Auctions", American Economic Review, 71- 3, 381-392.