SÜLEYMAN KÜRŞAT ÇINAR

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Patronaj ilişkilerinde Latin Amerika örneği: Kır-kent ayrımına bir bakış

Bu makale, patronaj ilişkilerinin Latin Amerika'daki evrimini kır-kent ayrımı çerçevesinde değerlendirmektedir. Konunun teorik çerçevesi incelendikten sonra, Latin Amerika'daki şehirleşme trendlerine göz atılacak, daha sonra bilhassa Meksika ve Venezüella örnekleri üzerinde durularak Latin Amerika'daki patronaj ilişkilerinde kır-kent ayrımının farklılıkları irdelenecektir. Makale, patronaj ilişkilerinde olgusal olarak süreklilik gösteren kırkent ayrımının analitik seviyede anlamlı farklılıklar içerdiğinin altını çizmektedir. Buna göre, kırsal bölgelerdeki patronaj ilişkileri, normatif saygı bağlarına, Weber'ci bir "geleneksel otorite"ye ve yerel siyasi liderle halk arasında daha duygusal bağlara dayanırken, kentsel patronaj ilişkileri ise siyasi partilerin daha baskıcı yöntemler izlediği, Downs'çu bir rekabetten beslenmektedir. Makale, hangi tarihsel, sosyoekonomik ve siyasi dinamiklerin, hangi tip siyasi patronaj ilişkilerine neden olduğunu görmek için yerel analizlere daha derinlemesine yer veren çalışmalara ihtiyaç duyulduğunun altını çizmekte, Latin Amerika örneğinden yola çıkarak literatüre katkıda bulunmayı amaçlamaktadır

Patron-client relationships in Latin America: A survey of rural-urban divide

This article examines the evolution of patron-client relationships in Latin America through the prism of the rural-urban divide. In light of a theoretical discussion as well as an empirical investigation of clientelism in Latin America, specifically focusing on the cases of Mexico and Venezuela, the article underlines the differences between rural vs. urban forms of clientelism. This article maintains that, while rural and urban forms of clientelism should be analyzed conceptually on a continuum, they differ analytically substantially for further analysis. To this end, the article suggests that in rural modes of clientelism, normative bonds of deference and loyalty with a Weberian notion of "traditional authority" and affective ties between political patrons and clients are more observable whereas urban modes of clientelism usually yield Downsian competition between political machines with more coercive motives. This article demonstrates the need in the existing literature for more contextualized analyses that take into account differences between historical, socioeconomical, and political antecedents of rural vs. urban clientelism and their divergent political reflections and aims to contribute to the extant literature based on Latin American politics.

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ODTÜ Gelişme Dergisi-Cover
  • ISSN: 1010-9935
  • Yayın Aralığı: Yılda 3 Sayı
  • Başlangıç: 2018
  • Yayıncı: ODTÜ İİBF
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