Deneyimsel Şeffaflığın Türleri

Öz: Özel olarak “deneyimin şeffaflığı”, genel olarak ise “içgörü” üzerine değerlendirmeler çağdaş zihin felsefesinde merkezi bir role sahiptir. Buna karşın, bana öyle geliyor ki, deneyimin şeffaflığı ve içgörü üzerine düşünceler tam bir netliğe kavuşmuş olmaktan uzaktır: farklı şeffaflık iddiaları arasındaki ayrımlar yeterince fark edilmemiş ve içgörünün kendi başına neyi destekleyip desteklemediği açıklıkla aydınlığa kavuşturulmamış durumdadır. Bu makalenin temel amacı, farklı şeffaflık iddiaları arasındaki zengin çeşitliliği ortaya serip tartışmaya kavramsal netlik kazandırmaktır. Makale üç temel bölümden oluşmaktadır. Birinci bölüm, Moore’un içgörü ve deneyimin şeffaflığı üzerine görüşlerini tartışmaktadır. Genel kanının aksine, Moore’un deneyimin şeffaf olmadığını göstermeye çalıştığını iddia edeceğim. İkinci bölüm, Harman’ın şeffaflık tezinin fenomenist şeffaflık tezinden farklarına işaret etmektedir. Üçüncü bölüm ise, Harman’ın şeffaflık tezinin iki ayrı versiyonu olan “deneyimsel-eylem şeffaflığı” ve “zihinsel-tasvir şeffaflığı” arasında ayrım yapmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler:

deneyimin şeffaflığı, içgörü, deneyimin eylem-nesne modeli, temsilcilik, George Edward Moore, Gilbert Harman

Varieties of Experiential Transparency

Abstract: Considerations on the transparency of experience in particular, and introspection in general, play a central role in the contemporary philosophy of mind. However, despite various attempts to rectify matters, it seems to me that appeals to transparency and introspection are sometimes mired in confusion: neither there is an explicit and general recognition of the fact that different transparency claims are often treated as one and the same, nor is there sufficiently robust clarity in what introspection itself can support. The central aim of this paper is to achieve some conceptual clarity by bringing to the surface for examination the rich variety of different experiential transparency claims that are left implicit in the literature. The paper falls into three main sections. Section 2 discusses Moore’s views on introspection and the transparency of experience. Contra common opinion, I argue inter alia that Moore is concerned with showing that experience is not transparent (in a sense to be specified). Section 3 introduces “Harmanian transparency”, as it arises in the context of the debate between representationism and phenomenism, and distinguishes it from “phenomenist transparency.” Section 4 distinguishes two varieties of Harmanian transparency, i.e. “experiencing-act transparency” and “mental-paint transparency.”

Keywords:

transparency of experience, introspection, act-object model of experience, representationism, George Edward Moore, Gilbert Harman,

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