Bilgi Argümanına Bir Yanıt Olarak Öznel Fizikselcilik

Frank Jackson (1982, 1986), görüngüsel bilginin, yani öznel deneyimlerimizin birinci kişi perspektifinden edinilen bilgisinin, fiziksel ve işlevsel terimlerle ifade edilebilecek nesnel bilgiye indirgenemeyeceğini ve bunun sadece birinci kişi perspektifinden bilinebilecek fiziksel olmayan olguların varlığını gösterdiğini iddia eder. Bu argüman, Jackson’ın fizikselcilik karşıtı bilgi argümanıdır. Bu çalışmada, analitik felsefe literatüründe bilgi argümanına verilen en yaygın fizikselci yanıtları kısaca taradıktan sonra, “öznel fizikselcilik” yanıtını ayrıntılı bir şekilde irdeliyorum. Öznel fizikselciliğin iki çeşidini, yani içerici ve dışlayıcı öznel fizikselcilik görüşlerini ayrı ayrı ele alıp, öznel fizikselciliğin her iki çeşidinin de kabul edilemez olduğu görüşünü savunuyorum. İçerici öznel fizikselcilik, ayrıntılı bir şekilde incelendiğinde, yeterince açık ve tutarlı bir görüş niteliği sergilemiyor. Dışlayıcı öznel fizikselcilik ise, temelde öznel olanın fizikselliğine kavramsal olarak izin verecek, kabul edilebilir bir fiziksellik tanımının ortaya konmaması nedeniyle bilgi argümanına güçlü bir yanıt olarak karşımıza çıkmıyor.

Anahtar Kelimeler:

öznel fizikselcilik, bilgi argümanı, fiziksellik, görüngüsel bilgi, bilinç, öznellik

Subjective Physicalism as a Response to the Knowledge Argument

According to Frank Jackson (1982, 1986), phenomenal knowledge, our first-personal knowledge of subjective experiences, cannot be reduced to objective knowledge that can be expressed in physical/functional terms, and this shows that there are non-physical facts that can only be known from the first-person perspective. This is Jackson’s knowledge argument against physicalism. In this paper, I first give a brief survey of the standard responses to the knowledge argument in the literature and, next, I critically evaluate a relatively less commonly defended response, namely subjective physicalism. I consider two versions of subjective physicalism, namely inclusive subjective physicalism and exclusive subjective physicalism. The former, as I argue, is not a clear and coherent enough theory to be acceptable, and the latter, as I argue, is not plausible since an intuitively acceptable definition of the physical, which would also allow fundamentally subjective/phenomenal properties to be physical, is yet to be proposed.

Keywords:

subjective physicalism, the knowledge argument, physicality, phenomenal knowledge, consciousness, subjectivity,

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