Benleştiren (Saf) Ben ve Benleşen (Ampirik) Ben

Ben, benlik, kendilik, kişi, kişilik, kimlik gibi terimler, çeşitli katmanlarda olduğu varsayılan aynılık (sameness), süreklilik, özdeşlik (identity), süredurum (persistence) gibi olguları ifade etmek için kullanılır (özne ve nefis terimleri ancak bazı anlamları itibariyle bu gruba dahil edilebilirler). Felsefe ve psikolojide bu konulara yönelik ilgi sürekli artmaktadır. İnsan zihninde özdeşliğin kaynağı olan kalıcı bir prensibin varlığı düşünce tarihinde binlerce yıldır tartışılmıştır. Psikolojide ise kuramların nasıl bir benlik/kendilik anlayışı üzerine kurulması gerektiğine dair tartışmalar devam etmektedir. Bu tartışmalar psikoterapi okullarını da derinden etkilemektedir. Bugüne kadar büyük oranda psikopatoloji ile sınırlı olan tartışmalara son 40-50 yıl içinde büyük gelişmelerin kaydedildiği ve artık bağımsız bir disiplin haline gelen gelişim (development) konusunun da dahil olmasıyla bozuluş kadar oluşumun da göz önüne alındığı daha tamamlayıcı bakış açıları önerilebilmektedir.Bu çalışmada insan zihnini düzenleyici bir öge olarak kendilik kavramına olan ihtiyaç; biri doğuşta mevcut olan (saf veya minimal) ve diğeri ilk dakikalardan itibaren gelişmeye başlayan (ampirik) iki temel kendilik kavramı; son yıllarda oldukça rağbet gören minimal kendilik ve öyküsel kendilik ikilisinin yerine, minimal kendilik ve ampirik kendilik ikilisinin önerilmesinin gerekçeleri incelenecektir. Minimal-ampirik kendilik ikilisinin, benliğin değişmeyen özü (essence) ve değişen özellikleri (accidents); deneyimle değişmeyen merkezî benlik ve deneyimle çeşitlenen benlik yapıları; bilen benlik ve bilinen benlik tartışmalarına getirebileceği çözüm tartışılacak ve bu ikilinin psikolojideki karşılığı ve psikoterapi anlayışına getirebileceği katkılar üzerinde durulacaktır.

Anahtar Kelimeler:

minimal kendilik, empirik kendilik, saf kendilik, öyküsel kendilik, benlik, kişilik

‘Pure I’ That Makes Me and ‘Empirical I’ That Has Become Me

Terms such as ego, self, person, personality, identity are used to refer to phenomena such as sameness, continuity, identity, persistence (subject and nafs can be included in this group only in some sense) at different levels. The interest in these issues in philosophy and psychology is constantly increasing. The existence of a permanent principle as a source of identity in the human mind, has been discussed in the history of thought for thousands of years. In psychology, the debate about what kind of ego/self the theories should be based on continues. These debates have a profound effect on psychotherapy schools. With the inclusion of developmental theories which have become an independent discipline after their progress in the last 40-50 years, a more complementary points of view, considering formation as well as ‘dis-order’ are possible to be proposed in the debates, which have been limited to a great extent to psychopathology to date.In this study, the need for the concept of self as an organizing element of the human mind; two fundamental concepts of self, one at birth (pure or minimal) and the other starting to develop from the first minutes (empirical); the reasons for proposing a minimal self and empirical self pair instead of the minimal self and narrative self pair which have become very popular in recent years, will be examined. The solution that brings minimal-empirical self pairing in the debates regarding, the unchanged essence and the changing properties of the self; the central self structure that do not change with experience and the self structures that is diversified with experience; and in the debates about knowing self and known self, will be discussed. Corresponding entities and the facts of these selves in psychology, and the contributions to the understanding of psychotherapy will also be noted.

Keywords:

minimal self, empirical self, pure self, narrative self, ego, personality,

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