Saldırgan Devralma Tekliflerine Karşı Yönetim Kurulunun Takdir Yetkisi: Türk Hukuku İçin Öneriler

Saldırgan devralma girişimlerine karşı yönetim kurulu üyelerinin takdir yetkisi geçmişten bugüne tartışmalı bir konu olagelmiştir. Özellikle anglo-sakson hukuk sistemini (common law) benimseyen ülkelerde dikkat çekici bir ayrışma söz konusudur. Birleşik Devletler ve Birleşik Krallık, bu konuda farklı tarihsel arka planlarından kaynaklanan, temelden farklı iki yaklaşımın öncülerindendir. Bunların yanı sıra Avrupa Birliği de, özellikle aday ülke olan Türkiye için önemli bir yasa koyucu aktördür. Ancak Türkiye’de, saldırgan devralma girişimlerine karşı yönetim kurulu üyelerinin takdir yetkisine ilişkin açıkça düzenlenmiş bir kural yer almamaktadır. Bu nedenle, bahsedilen konuda Türkiye’de bir yasal boşluk olduğu görülmektedir. Bu makale ilgili konudaki temel yaklaşımları incelemekte ve bu inceleme ışığında Türk hukuku için önerilerde bulunmaktadır.

DIRECTORS’ DISCRETION AGAINST HOSTILE TAKEOVER BIDS: SUGGESTIONS FOR TURKISH LAW

The discussion of directors’ roleagainst hostile takeover bids has alwaysbeen an important topic in the companylaw. Especially in common law countries,there is a remarkable divergence in thisissue. The United States and the UnitedKingdom have been the pioneers of twosubstantially different approaches whichderived from their different backgroundin this particular topic. Apart fromthem, the European Union is anotheressential legislative actor, especially forTurkey as a candidate country. However,there is a legal gap in Turkey as thereis not any explicit policy in Turkish lawregarding directors’ role against hostiletakeover bids. This article scrutinisesthe fundamental approaches aboutdirectors’ discretion against hostiletakeover bids, and in light of this, itsuggests a proposal for the Turkish law.

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