Popper and the theory of evolution

Bu makale, evrim teorisinin bilimsel statüsü hakkında, bu teorinin gerçek anlamda bilimsel bir karaktere sahip olup olmadığı hakkında Popper’ın ortaya koyduğu fikirleri incelemektedir. Önce Popper’ın bilimsel olma iddiasındaki bir bilgi türünün karşılaması gerektiğini düşündüğü kriterlere ilişkin bakış açısını sunuyorum. Devamında, Popper’ın bilim felsefesi alanındaki temel savlarını ve bu savların evrim teorisinin epistemolojik yapısına yönelik imalarını tartışıyorum. Evrim teorisinin biyolojik gerçekliğe ilişkin temel konumu, evrimci argümantasyonunun yapısını ortaya çıkarma gayesiyle betimlenmektedir. Popper’ın, 1977’ye dek, evrim teorisinin “metafizik bir araştırma izlencesi” olduğunu, ve verimli ve kapsamlı bir izlence olduğunu, öne sürdüğünü, ama geç dönem düşüncesinde bu iddiasından vazgeçtiğini ve evrim teorisine bilimsel bir statü kazandırmaya giriştiğini, ancak bunun da tüm bir yanlışlamacı stratejinin mantığı açısından, beraberinde getirdiği bazı gerilimlerin bulunduğunu not ediyorum

Popper ve evrim teorisi

This article examines the ideas Popper propounded about the scientific status of the theory of evolution, about whether the theory has a truly scientific character. I first present Popper’s perspective on the criteria that need to be met by the kind of knowledge that claims to be scientific. In the following, I discuss Popper’s basic theses in the philosophy of science and their implications for an assessment of epistemological structure of evolutionary theory. Basic position of evolutionary theory concerning biological reality is roughly described, with a view to bringing out the structure of evolutionary argumentation. I note that while Popper, up to 1977, maintains that the evolutionary theory is a “metaphysical research programme”, a comprehensive and fertile one, he, in his later thought, abandons this claim and attempts to carve out a scientific status for the evolutionary theory, which, however, involves some tensions for the whole logic of the falsificationist strategy.

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