YOLSUZLUK OLGUSUNA YÖNELİK YAPILAN AMPİRİK ÇALIŞMALAR ÜZERİNE NOTLAR

Bu çalışmanın amacı, yolsuzlukla ilgili olarak yapılmış ampirik çalışmaların bulgularını değerlendirmektir. Bunlardan birinci grup çalışma yolsuzluğun nedenlerine ilişkin iken, ikinci grup çalışma yolsuzluğun sonuçlarına ilişkindir. Birinci grup çalışmaların bulgularına göre; kanun hâkimiyeti, kamu harcamaları, bürokratik kalite, doğal kaynak bolluğu, sanayileşme politikaları, rekabet gücü, kamu sektöründe maaş ve ücret haddi ile yolsuzluk karşıtı kanunlar, yolsuzluğun ana nedenleridir. İkinci grup çalışmaların bulgularına göre yolsuzluk; düşük ekonomik büyüme hızına, yüksek enflâsyon değişkenliğine, düşük doğrudan yabancı yatırımların azalmasına, kamu gelirlerinin azalmasına, sermaye yoğun kamu yatırımlarının artmasına, kayıt dışı ekonominin artmasına, eğitim ve sağlık harcamalarının azalmasına, askerî harcamaların artmasına ve gelir eşitsizliğinin artmasına neden olmaktadır.

Notes on Empirical Studies of Corruption

The purpose of this study is to evaluate the empirical findings of studies applied on the subject of corruption. A first group of studies is about the determinants of corruption and a second group of studies is about the consequences of corruption. According to the findings of the first group of studies: rule of law, government expenditure, bureaucratic quality, natural resource abundance, industrialization policies, degree of competitiveness, wages and salaries in public sector and anti-corruption laws are found to be the main determinants of corruption. According to the findings of the second group of studies: low level of economic growth, high level of inflationist pressure variability, low level of foreign direct investment, decreasing level of government revenues, increase in level of capital intensive public investment, increase in the size of underground economy, decrease in educational and health expenditures increase in military spending, worsening income distribution are found to be the main consequences of corruption.     

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