Amerikan Kongresi’nde Partilerin Etkisi

Her ne kadar Amerikan dış politikası ve bu dış politikanın farklı bölgelere etkisi konusunda detaylı akademik çalışmalar yapılmış olsa da, Amerikan iç siyaseti ile ilgili çalışmalar son derece sınırlı kalmış-tır. Amerikan dış politikasında başkanlık makamının daha büyük bir etkisi olması nedeniyle, yapılan çalışmalar da daha çok Başkanlık makamı üzerine yoğunlaşmaktadır. Bu çalışma Amerikan iç ve dış siyasetinin bir diğer önemli belirleyicisi olan Kongre’ye odaklanmaktadır. Bu bağlamda özellikle Ame-rikan Kongresi çalışmalarında partilerin Kongre üzerindeki etkisini ölçmeye çalışan literatüre katkıda bulunmak amaçlanmaktadır. Hali hazırda literatürde mevcut olan çalışmalar daha çok kayıtlı oyların (roll-call) istatistiki analizi üzerinden gerçekleştirilmektedir. Her ne kadar bu metot çok popüler olarak kullanılsa da, partilerin etkisinin net bir şekilde ölçülmesini tam olarak sağlayamadığı gerekçesiyle eleştirilmektedir. Bu bağlamda eldeki çalışma Kongre’deki parti etkisini ölçmek için, Avrupa demokra-silerini çalışan siyaset bilimcilerin yoğun olarak kullandığı alternatif bir yöntem önermektedir.

Uncovering the Party Effect in the US Congress

Although there has been a voluminous literature on American foreign policy and its effect on several regions, research on American domestic politics has been relatively scarce. Due to its significant impact on foreign policy formation, the Presidency received a lot of scholarly attention. This paper, on the other hand, focuses on another important actor in American foreign and domestic policy: The United States Congress. In this respect, we specifically aim to contribute to the literature on American Congress which aims to uncover the party effect on legislative behavior. Current studies on the topic usually rely on roll-call votes. Although this method has been quite popular, recent studies indicate problems in terms of measuring the true effect of the party. Hence, this study proposes an alternative method which has been widely used in the European Politics literature. The proposed methods involves using expert surveys to determine the level of party effect.

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