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YÖNETICILERIN ÜCRETLENDIRILMESI VE FIRMA PERFORMANSI: GELIŞMEKTE OLAN ÜLKE ÖRNEĞI

Sermaye sahipleri (patronlar) kendi şirketlerini yönetmesi için çalışanları işe almakta ve bu çalışanların (vekil) sermayedarın çıkarları doğrultusunda hareket edeceklerini varsaymaktadırlar. Ancak vekillerin çalışmalarının patron tarafından sürekli olarak gözlemlenmesi mümkün değildir. Patron ve vekilin çıkar birliği genellikle ücret sözleşmesine konan piyasa ve/veya muhasebe sonuçları ve bunlara dayalı ücret sözleşmeleri ile sağlanmaya çalışılır. Bu çalışma Borsa İstanbul’a kayıtlı 151 şirketin 2006 ve 2015 yılları arasındaki verilerini inceleyerek, vekil yöneticilerin ücret sözleşmelerinin hem muhasebe sonuçlarına hem de piyasa verilerine dayandırıldığını bulmuştur. Özellikle fiili yıl muhasebe sonuçları ve geçmiş yıl piyasa verilerine dayalı yaratılan hissedar değeri, yöneticilerin ücretlerinin belirlenmesinde önemli rol oynamaktadır. Araştırmanın sonuçlarına göre geçmiş yılda hissedarlara sağlanan her 10,000 TL’lik ek değer yöneticilere sağlanan ücretlerde yaklaşık 5 TL’lik artışa neden olmaktadır. Ayrıca fiili yıl net karındaki her 1000 TL’lik artış yöneticilerin aynı yılki ücretlerinde yaklaşık 2 TL’lik artışa neden olmaktadır. Yaratılan toplam değerin ancak küçük bir kısmını vekiller ile paylaştıran ücret sözleşmelerinin tam bir çıkar birliği sağlaması ve vekalet sorununu çözmesi beklenmemektedir.

EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION AND FIRM PERFORMANCE:EVIDENCE FROM AN EMERGING COUNTRY

Shareholders delegate daily operation to their agents with the assumption that they would work totally fortheir benefit. However, individual efforts of agents are not directly observable by the principal (shareholders). Toalign the interests of agents and those of shareholders, compensation schemes are based on either market or accounting measures (or a combination of the two). This paper, using longitudinal data of 151 listed Turkish firmsover the years of 2006 to 2015, found that total compensation amount paid to executives and directors is sensitive to both accounting and market measures. It is revealed that current year net profit and lagged total shareholder value created played important role in the determination of compensation level of executives. The estimations revealed that TL 10,000 return provided to shareholders in the previous year caused TL 5 increase inexecutives’ total compensation, whereas TL 2 of TL 1000 current year net profit of the firms is given to the executives. It is believed that compensation contracts which are sharing only a fraction of created shareholder valuewith the agent cannot align the interests of both parties and fully mitigate the agency problem.

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