THE DISCURSIVE RIFTS WITHIN EU REGARDING CHINA’S ANTI COVID-19 DIPLOMACY - THE AMBIVALENCE OF THE EU’S STRATEGIC POSITION UNDER THE PRESSURE OF US-CHINA’S GLOBAL CONFRONTATION

With the eruption of the global Covid-19 pandemic, the US-China long-standing tension also reach the unprecedented level than ever before. Under such circumstances, EU -as the semi-global and full regional power- suffered the serious pressure to deal with the situation. Based on this reason, it would not be surprise to see the discursive rift within EU regarding the situation aforementioned. The focuses of the relevant discourse are on the ‘China’s anti pandemic diplomacy’. Based on the specific characteristics like the stance and phrasing preferences of such discourse, it would be reasonable to distinguish one main fault lines (discursive rifts) combined with two sub fault lines within them. The main one stands between different member statesbased on the situation of their internal divisions centering around ‘China’s anti pandemic diplomacy’. According to the indicator above, the paper would distinguish the member states into four groups which is said to be the countries with serious internal discords (group A), the countries with minor internal discords in favor of China’s anti pandemic diplomacy (group B), the countries with minor internal discords being critical of China’s anti pandemic diplomacy (group C) and the countries keeping the theme in minor key (group D). Within the country of each group, the two sub fault lines exist: The first one stands between the governing political elites and the mainstream medias, while the former has been always trying its best to keep the neutrality to appease the controversial of pandemic origin and emphasized the importance of global collaboration to fight against the pandemic at this moment, the latter preferred more to follow the Washington DC’s harsh tone accusing China’s covering up the truth of the pandemic such as the hiding the real timeline of the first case and the possible leaking of the virus from Wuhan P4 laboratory. The second one stands between the governing political elites and the oppositional politicians －especially the one from the populist camp. The distribution of this rift is quite similar to the first one. In order to do this, the essay would introduce the DA (Discourse Analysis) approach. For the conclusion of the analysis, the paper would try to point out that such discursive rift would be one of the important mirrors reflecting the ambivalence EU’s self-strategic position under the pressure of US-China’s full-scale confrontation.

Keywords:

Covid-19, China, Diplomacy, EU EU's Strategic,

PDF

___

Balzacq, T. & Puybareau, B. (2018). The economy of secrecy: security, information control and EU-US relations. West European Politics, 41(4).
BBC News. (2020, April 17). Coronavirus: Macron questions China’s handling of outbreak.
Bechis, F. (2020, April 17). Polls show concerning effect of Chinese coronavirus charm offensive in Italy, FRI.
CGTN. (2020, April 7). China continue to support Portugal in fighting covid-19: ambassador.
DW News. (2020, April 10). Germany’s Maas: Trump coronavirus response took too long.
DW World. (2020, June 1). Coronavirus pandemic further strains US-China relations.
Eckhardt, J. (2015). Business Lobbying and trade governance: The case of EU-China relations, Palgrave Macmillan.
Gabriel, J. & Schmelcher, S. (2018). Three scenarios for EU-China relations 2025, Futures, (97), pp. 26-34.
Glaser, C.L. (2015). A US-China Grand Bargain? The Hard Choice between Military Competition and Accommodation, International Security, 39(4).
Goldstein, L.J. (2015). Meeting China Half Way: How to Defuse the Emerging US-China Rivalry, George Town University Press.
Gosling, T. (2020, May 21). China’s mask diplomacy won’t work in the Czech Republic, Foreign Policy -Argument.
Green-Cowles, M. & Egan, M. (2016). The historical evolution of the transatlantic partnership, The West and the Global Power Shift, pp. 75-97.
Hansrod, Z. (2020, May 21). US-China war of words over covid-19 escalates tensions over Taiwan, RFI News.
Hauser, G. & Kernic, F. (2016). European Security in Transition, Routledge.
Lampton, D.M. (2013). A New Type of Major-Power Relationship: Seeking a Durable Foundation for US-China Ties, Asia Policy, 16, pp 51-68.
Lau, S. (2020, April 30). Sweden plans to ask EU to investigate the origin of covid-19, likely further straining relations with China’, South China Morning Post.
Maher, R. (2016). The elusive of EU-China strategic partnership, International Affairs, 92(4).
Mengru, W. (2020, March 26). China-Austria ties deepened through virus fight, China.org.cn.
Moldicz, C. (2020, March). Hungary external relations briefing: Hungarian foreign policy in the coronavirus crisis, China-CEE Institute, 27(4).
Petrova, A. (2020, March 19). Bulgaria says China ready to help in fight against coronavirus, Pixabay.com.
Reuters World News. (2020, April 26). Germany says China sought to encourage positive covid-19 comments.
Rough, P. (2020, March 25). How China is exploiting the coronavirus to weaken democracies, Foreign Policy-Argument.
Smith, M. (2014). EU-China relations and the limits of economic diplomacy, Asia Europe Journal (January).
Smith, S. (2020, May 19). WHO coronavirus assembly: US-China clash dominates the reaches finale, NBC News.
Transatlantic Relations Initiative. (2020, May 14). Observatory on the EU: How will the covid-19 pandemic affect EU-China relations? Challenges and Perspectives.
Uznanska, P. & Fila, M. (2020, May 22). The New US-China Battlefield over the Covid-19 Narrative: Poland, The Diplomat.
Xinhua. (2020, June 7). China’s Mammoth Foundation donates covid-19 testing equipment to Latvia . Xinhua. (2020, May 13). China to continue helping Spain fight covid-19 epidemic.
Yu, J. (2018). The belt and road initiative: domestic interests, bureaucratic politics and the EU-China relations, Asia Europe Journal (March).